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knowledge co-production, the book demonstrates the regional diversity that can 
be seen as the main feature of African urbanism, with even well-accepted concepts 
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Providing an important nuanced perspective on the heterogeneity of African 
cities and the challenges they face, this book will be an important resource for 
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ing urban research centres on the African continent to produce credible and robust 
new knowledge on urban conditions in African cities.
The main purpose of AURI’s work – both generally and in the research con-
tained in the following volume – is to give space to explore and demonstrate the 
value of two core principles within the context of scholarship on African cities. 
The first core principle is the value of knowledge co-production as a vehicle for 
scholarship that seeks to disrupt the notion that the only source of knowledge and 
expertise is the academy. Rather, in the co-production context, it is the deliberate 
and careful building of partnerships – between researchers interested in urban 
dynamics, communities living within the urban environments under examination, 
and government officials tasked with managing those environments as well as the 
services that influence urban systems – that renders essential new knowledges and 
invaluable perspectives.
The second core principle asserts the need for African institutions to be at the 
forefront of research concerning the interconnected dynamics at work in cities 
around the continent, taking into account the heterogeneity of the geography, 
politics, and economic systems in place. This necessary repositioning of African 
experts and their institutions as principal researchers and authors of scholarship 
on African cities is a critical part of enabling an examination of urban dynamics 
in ways that prioritize local knowledge. This approach aims to disrupt the long-
standing power relationships that have governed urban research historically, and 
to elevate the lived experiences of urban dwellers. In doing so, AURI serves as a 
conduit for empirical research that can support the formulation of both innovative 
urban management policies and urban theory. This approach directly challenges 
the ways knowledge about the ‘African city’ has previously been (and often still 
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is) constructed. Moreover, this work enables scholarship from the global South 
to surpass geographic commentary, and rather serve as a space where different 
perspectives on urban conditions and opportunities can be articulated from close 
proximity.
Since its establishment, AURI network members have worked incrementally 
to find ways to engage with one another over significant linguistic and spatial 
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organic and growing network of knowledge institutions working across the disci-
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particular and distinct ways.
Looking ahead, AURI remains committed to facilitating and supporting 
research at a city scale and on a comparative basis, with the aim of using research 
to contribute to local urban policy agendas, and promoting and disseminating 
quality, multilingual publications that shape and inform the urban development 
agenda in Africa.
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1  Introduction
Africa’s urban challenge
Sylvia Croese
With the world’s fastest growing rates of urbanization, Africa’s urban population 
has doubled in the last decade, and is predicted to increase threefold between 2010 
and 2050 (UN-Habitat, 2014). Already home to seven megacities as well as a rap-
idly multiplying number of secondary cities, the transformation of this continent 
formerly regarded as rural to one that is largely urban is undeniable (UNDESA, 
2018).
Over the past two decades, a growing body of work examining Africa’s ‘urban 
revolution’ has emerged (Parnell & Pieterse, 2014). An important strand of this 
work distinguishes itself from traditional and conventional urban research and 
theory by recognizing that the drivers, scale, pace, and nature of urban growth in 
Africa are vastly different from the experience and historical patterns of urbaniza-
tion in the North (Parnell & Robinson, 2012; Fox, 2014). Urbanization without 
industrialization, high natural growth rates, and housing, employment, and basic 
services that are predominantly generated without government intervention or 
regulation are only some of the many characteristics of African urbanisms (Piet-
erse, 2011; Cobbinah et al., 2015).
This means that many of the concepts, models, and logics traditionally associ-
ated with urban growth and development – and related to the role of the state, 
economy, and society – either do not apply, or operate in very different ways, and 
therefore need to be rethought, reformulated, or simply considered in their own 
right (Robinson, 2006; Bekker & Fourchard, 2013; Myers, 2011). The growing 
scholarship on African cities recognizes that this reality is part of a wider geo-
graphical realignment occurring in urban studies over the past years, in which 
southern perspectives are representing new points of departure for theorizing the 
city and urban governance, development, and planning (Edensor & Jayne, 2012; 
Caldeira, 2017; Simone, 2010; Roy, 2009, 2011; Parnell & Oldfield, 2014; Bhan 
et al., 2018; Watson, 2009; Satgé & Watson, 2018).
The need to better understand African cities in order to shape the continent’s 
urban future is also increasingly recognized in the policy sphere (UN-Habitat & 
UNECA, 2015), reflecting a global shift acknowledging the role cities will need 
to play if global development agendas such as the Sustainable Development Goals 
and the New Urban Agenda, as well as agreements such as the Paris Climate 
2 Sylvia Croese
Agreement, are to be realized. High-level support for these global agendas by 
African governments, and the adoption of continental policies such as Agenda 
2063 and national development plans with an urban focus, mark an important 
watershed, and a departure from policies predominantly focused on the rural. 
However, in spite of this discursive turn, there remains a disjuncture between 
urban policies and practice (Pieterse, 2018). National governments across the 
continent often remain unresponsive to the needs of urban citizens, while local 
governments continue to lack the political, administrative, and fiscal means and 
resources to adequately plan, govern, and manage sustainable and inclusive cities 
and human settlements (Silva, 2016; UN-Habitat, 2014).
As a result, few African countries are on track to meeting global goals by 2030 
(UNECA, 2018; SDG Center for Africa & SDSN, 2019). While a lack of financial 
and technical resources represents an important barrier to the implementation of 
plans and policies for more sustainable development, a shortage of the data and 
knowledge that can adequately guide and monitor progress and implementation of 
such plans and policies is just as obstructive. Indeed, much of the knowledge that 
is produced in and on urban Africa does not speak concretely to the challenges 
that are experienced by those who govern and are governed on the ground.
This edited volume seeks to address the disjuncture between urban research, 
policy, and practice, with a particular focus on African cities. It brings together 
contributions from various members of the African Urban Research Initiative 
(AURI), a pan-African interdisciplinary and applied urban research network that 
comprises universities, think tanks, research institutions, and practitioner agen-
cies concerned with urbanization and its impacts across various scales on the 
African continent. As such, the following chapters present research entirely con-
ducted by researchers and practitioners working in and on Africa, most of which 
is also applied, and was conducted in collaboration with local communities, gov-
ernments, and other relevant stakeholders on issues that directly relate to local 
challenges.
This introductory chapter provides an overview of Africa’s urban challenge, 
and emerging modes and methods – expanded on in subsequent chapters – to 
reframe this challenge through knowledge co-production.
Africa’s urban challenge
The challenges of rapid urban growth, poverty, unemployment, mounting social, 
economic, and spatial inequality, and vulnerability to climate change in globaliz-
ing and urban Africa, and the systems of exclusion these challenges produce are 
increasingly well-known and documented by researchers, international organi-
zations, and development institutions alike. However, solutions to address these 
issues too often continue to be shaped by external or outdated perceptions of 
development, and implemented in top-down, isolated ways that do not respond to 
the complexity of local dynamics, needs, and priorities.
This is partly because – in spite of growing interest and scholarship – there is still 
not enough research conducted in and on urban Africa. In this context, researchers 
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have pointed to the geopolitics of urban data production: ‘If 21% of the world’s 
urban population will be living in African cities in 2050, this part of the world is 
still largely overlooked by existing global urban databases . . . partly due to capac-
ity issues, as the technical and human resources needed to collect, process, and 
analyse urban data is often lacking in municipal departments’ (Robin & Acuto, 
2018, p. 79). Moreover, existing global urban databases often do not include the 
full range of stakeholders producing urban data, such as local research institutes, 
civil society, or even national governments (Robin et al., 2017).
When looking at research on urban sustainability, most of the influential and 
mainstream academic scholarship also continues to largely emanate from the 
global North (Nagendra et al., 2018). A lack of research funding represents a 
major impediment to local research output and knowledge creation. The decline 
in research funding in Africa due to a combination of factors can be traced back 
to the 1990s. These factors include the destabilizing influence of political events 
and civil wars, the impact of a change in the policies of the World Bank and other 
international agencies on higher education, and continued low investment in sci-
ence by African governments. These factors in turn affected research infrastruc-
ture and research management and support within higher education institutions, 
further hindering robust data production (Mouton, 2018). These research chal-
lenges have also been exacerbated by rising student numbers and the mushroom-
ing of private higher education institutions, often of dubious quality and standards 
(Mahlubi et al., 2007; Banya, 2008).
But the deficit is not just about the lack of sufficient research; it is also about 
the kind of research that is being produced. The hegemony of western thought in 
education and knowledge production is still reflected in many African universi-
ties, where teaching programmes premised on colonial models of knowledge 
production and taught in colonial languages continue to reproduce themselves 
(Mamdani, 1993; Jensen et al., 2015). Nevertheless, most of the calls for the 
decolonization of higher education remain limited to South Africa (Crossman, 
2004). In some cases, calls for decolonization ironically are the result of chang-
ing international donor agendas, which are increasingly beginning to support 
local or endogenous knowledge production (Shizha, 2010). The sum result is 
that most of the research produced in and on Africa continues to be disconnected 
from local issues.
According to the Kenyan scholar Nyanchoga:
The process of decolonizing education system has been slow. Many times 
universities in Africa are indifferent to the social climate in which they oper-
ate in because they are alien to it. University education fails to integrate the 
multicultural traditions of the society in which they operate largely because 
many of them had their roots in the colonial order. They simply manifest lack 
of a social responsibility to society. Consequently they are unable to mediate 
between cultural diversity and nation building, ethnic contours and political 
disjuncture.
(Nyanchoga, 2014, p. 64)
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Due to the ways in which much research on or in Africa is funded and conducted, 
it often does not find its way back to prospective users, whether policymakers 
or local communities. This lack of reciprocity also reflects the power dynamics 
between researchers and the communities they study. While this is not just an 
African problem, it is one that requires urgent attention in an environment where 
the value of research goes far beyond academic curiosity and can inform innova-
tive and inclusive policy.
As noted by the international expert panel ‘Science and the Future of Cities’ 
(an independent, international effort to assess the state of the urban science-policy 
interface for global sustainability):
Cities need better science-policy connections. To harness the global efforts 
around these agendas, we urgently need to address two key matters: forge 
new knowledge that responds to complex urban challenges, and accelerate 
uptake of scientific urban information by practitioners.
(Science and the Future of Cities, 2018, p. 3)
This assessment illustrates an emerging call for more applied work that bridges 
the gap between science/research and policy, especially in the field of cities and 
urban sustainability, as well as adequate support for such work (e.g., Mauser et al., 
2013). Building on this call, this book identifies Africa’s overarching challenge 
as the need for new knowledge production, through the use of methodologies 
and approaches that bridge the science-policy gap with an explicit intention to 
adequately, sustainably, and inclusively respond to the continent’s development 
challenges.
As such, the questions underpinning this book’s rationale are: what modes of 
knowledge production are needed to fill the knowledge gaps in/on African cities? 
And how can different ways of producing knowledge contribute not only to know-
ing more about Africa’s urban challenges, but also to reframing the challenges 
themselves?
Reframing through knowledge co-production
There is growing interest and an expanding body of work around the notion of 
‘co-production’. Many still use this term in the way it was first introduced in the 
1980s, from work on street policing in the US that argued that security was not 
delivered solely by the police, but rather was the product of relationships, nego-
tiation, and collaboration between police officers and local residents (Brudney & 
England, 1983, cited in Mitlin & Bartlett, 2018). In their review of the concept in 
a special issue of the journal Environment and Urbanization, Mitlin and Bartlett 
(2018) outline how the concept moved to the global South in the mid-1990s, but 
still retained a focus on service delivery (Ostrom, 1996; Evans, 1996). As such, 
the primary emphasis of the contributions published in that special issue is on the 
co-production of public services such as water and sanitation, informal settlement 
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upgrading, or post-disaster reconstruction, with each contributor using a different 
definition to describe the nature of the collaborations involved.
Another strand of work instead focuses on the co-production of knowledge, 
with a view to bridging the gap between science and society (Gibbons et al., 1994; 
Jasanoff, 2004). In more recent years, this work has increasingly moved into 
the field of sustainable development, emphasizing the need to produce ‘usable’ 
knowledge not just on but with, as well as for, society (Polk, 2015; Clark et al., 
2016). This kind of work is also referred to as ‘transdisciplinary’ research, in the 
sense that it represents a ‘reflexive, integrative and method driven’ way of doing 
research aimed at the solution or transition of societal problems . . . by differen-
tiating and integrating knowledge from various scientific and societal bodies of 
knowledge’ (Lang et al., 2012, pp. 26–27; see also Jahn, 2008; Lawrence, 2015).
In an attempt to synthesize this growing body of work, a large group of research-
ers have collectively defined knowledge co-production in the context of sustain-
ability research as: “Iterative and collaborative processes involving diverse types 
of expertise, knowledge and actors to produce context-specific knowledge and 
pathways towards a sustainable future”(Norström et al., 2020).
Norström et al. also distinguish four principles that can contribute to high-quality 
knowledge co-production for sustainability. Specifically, they suggest that pro-
cesses should be:
1 Context-based: situated in a particular context, place, or issue.
2 Pluralistic: explicitly recognizing the multiple ways of knowing and doing.
3 Goal-oriented: articulating clearly defined, shared, and meaningful goals that 
are related to the challenge at hand.
4 Interactive: allowing for ongoing learning among actors, active engagement, 
and frequent interactions (Norström et al., 2020).
The chapters in this book demonstrate that knowledge co-production is an appro-
priate approach to conduct urban research in the context-specific manner demanded 
by the challenges facing Africa’s cities. This imperative stems from the fact that 
while key urban trends can be discerned across the continent, local dynamics, 
needs, systems, actors, and priorities remain highly specific to local contexts, 
mostly undocumented, and often contested and in flux. Knowledge co-production 
represents a way to include voices typically absent in research, and in the process, 
to foster new relationships between key stakeholders. Such an approach not only 
generates new knowledge concerning societal problems, but also renders actiona-
ble knowledge for problem-solving. While still incipient, the use of knowledge co-
production by researchers in and on Africa is growing, especially with reference 
to (urban) sustainability challenges related to slum upgrading, coastal flooding, 
and waste management (Buyana, 2019). Much of the work done so far has been 
concentrated in South Africa, where experiments with knowledge co-production 
can be seen as having emerged in the post-apartheid era as a way for researchers to 
call for more reflexive approaches to policy deliberation (Swilling, 2014).
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At the African Centre for Cities (ACC) at the University of Cape Town in 
South Africa, knowledge co-production has become ingrained in the ACC’s DNA 
through its work over the past decade as part of Mistra Urban Futures, a network 
of researchers using co-production processes for achieving sustainable urban 
futures and realizing just cities (Mistra Urban Futures, 2016). The network is part 
of a number of multi-country, multidisciplinary, and multi-partner research con-
sortia across the global North and South engaged in research for urban sustain-
ability and equality (Osuteye et al., 2019).
Central to ACC’s work has been the CityLab programme, which started in 2008 
with the aim of brokering ‘interdisciplinary engagement, both across academic 
disciplines and between the academy and broader society, towards new knowl-
edge generation and knowledge sharing, and the creation of working partnerships 
to engage with the issues pertinent to the African urban situation’ (Anderson et al., 
2013, p. 2). CityLabs can have different meeting formats, ranging from seminar 
series to the establishment of a think tank or collaborative research projects. In 
Cape Town, they have been both place- and theme-based, concentrating on par-
ticular parts of the city or on topics ranging from healthy cities and sustainable 
human settlements, to climate change, urban violence, safety, and governance, 
and have resulted in a variety of outputs from academic journal articles, book 
chapters, and edited book volumes, to popular publications and policy documents 
(Cartwright et al., 2012; Brown-Luthango, 2015; Cirolia et al., 2016).
Altogether, the ACC CityLabs can be seen not just in the literal sense as refer-
ring to places of work or ‘labour’ (Anderson et al., 2013, p. 2), but also as labo-
ratories or sites representing ‘experimentations with knowledge co-production’ 
(Culwick et al., 2019, p. 9). As such, they fit into a broader body of work on ‘urban 
experimentation’ (Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2013; Karvonen & van Heur, 2014; 
Evans, 2016; Patel et al., 2017).
While important and needed, knowledge co-production – through CityLabs or 
other research methods – is not without its difficulties. Based on their experiences 
as sustainability researchers in research projects in Kenya, Switzerland, Bolivia, 
and Nepal, Pohl et al. (2010) point to three specific challenges. The first is the 
challenge of addressing power relations and ensuring that no single actor or view-
point is privileged over others. The second concerns the challenge of integrating 
and interrelating different perspectives on the issues at stake in order to achieve a 
more comprehensive or balanced understanding of the issue and its correspond-
ing solutions. The third has to do with the challenge of working with the concept 
of sustainable development as a framework that is normative and contested and 
therefore requires negotiation around its use as ‘a starting point and key motor of 
the co-production process’ (Pohl et al., 2010, p. 272). Dealing with these various 
challenges requires a set of practical skills – often acquired in past experiences as 
practitioners – to enable researchers to let go of their own viewpoints and assump-
tions as academics, and assume roles that can vary from reflective scientists to 
intermediaries or facilitators (Pohl et al., 2010, pp. 277–279).
Experiences from the ACC CityLab programme further highlight challenges 
around knowledge co-production, including micro-politics, getting people to 
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move out of their disciplinary and practice biases (and related norms, values, and 
ethics), the difficulties of writing and producing knowledge in interdisciplinary 
groups, and the fact that this type of work is more time-consuming than standard 
research (Anderson et al., 2013; Smit et al., 2015). Culwick et al. (2019, p. 4) 
therefore conclude that ‘the CityLab model is not suited to all contexts or objec-
tives. They require commitment and joint goals, and a willingness to engage and 
rethink current practices and ways of knowing’.
Indeed, knowledge co-production is inherently complex, time-consuming, 
and often unpredictable in terms of outcomes (Simon et al., 2018). In order for 
such research to feed into the formulation, implementation, and monitoring of 
urban policy – and ultimately changed practices – there is a need to find sus-
tained modes of collaboration between government, researchers, practitioners, 
and communities.
The African Urban Research Initiative
The AURI network emerged in 2013 at the ACC at the University of Cape Town 
in South Africa out of a sustained engagement with policy actors and Africa-
based research centres seeking to reach a shared understanding of the scope 
and implications of the urban transition in Africa. The project is driven by the 
premise that unless an active network of durable knowledge institutions, focused 
on applied urban research and capacity-building, is urgently established, the 
decision-makers for the continent’s rapidly growing urban centres will not be 
in a position to understand their urban development dynamics, let alone address 
them effectively.
AURI is distinct not just because its contributions come from researchers and 
practitioners who live and work on the ground, but also in its methodological focus 
on knowledge co-production. ACC cofounders Susan Parnell and Edgar Pieterse 
point to the need for appropriate understandings of urbanization in Africa to go 
beyond theoretical, dogmatic, and dichotomous approaches, and to focus instead 
on ‘endogenous readings of the urban’ (2014, p. ix), firmly grounded in the com-
plex local realities of African cities. Such efforts require different theoretical and 
methodological practices to generate the kind of urban research and knowledge 
that is needed to understand and inform Africa’s urban transformation. In other 
work, Parnell and Pieterse call this ‘translational research’: a method that is, at 
least initially, primarily descriptive, and which builds on ‘the co-construction of 
a knowledge base to provide a legitimate and shared understanding of the state of 
the city and its needs’ (Parnell & Pieterse, 2016, p. 241). Parnell and Pieterse see 
translational research as a method that is not just practically suited to and needed 
in light of the constraints of doing research in Africa, but also as a deeply political 
practice that aims to enable urban transformation.
Members of AURI recognize the necessity for research centres in Africa to 
be networked, in order to exchange knowledge, know-how, and expertise, and 
thereby foster a foundation of credible and resilient knowledge institutions on the 
continent that are at once rooted in local realities and engaged with broader trends.
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AURI currently consists of 21 interdisciplinary applied urban research centres. 
These institutions include university-based research centres, think tanks, and civil 
society organizations. The basis for membership is voluntary, requiring only an 
active participation in the urban research agenda, and a commitment to building 
and strengthening local knowledge networks. AURI’s core objective is to develop 
a collaborative pan-African network that relies upon and actively nurtures African 
expertise and research agendas. This network is intended to serve as a platform for 
both innovation and strategic thinking for Africa’s urban challenges and opportu-
nities. At present, the membership of AURI is as per Table 1.1.
Contributions: outline of the book
This book includes a selection of research undertaken by AURI members as 
part of the 2017–2019 work programme on ‘Spatial Inequality in African Cities: 
Table 1.1 AURI member institutions
Institution City, Country
Centre for Urban Research and Innovations Nairobi, Kenya
Institute for Urban Development Studies, Ethiopian Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Civil Service University
Development Workshop Angola Luanda, Angola
Takween Integrated Community Development Cairo, Egypt
Lagos Urban Research Network, University of Lagos Lagos, Nigeria
Ecole Africaine des Métiers de l’Architecture et de Lomé, Togo
l’Urbanisme
Laboratoire Citoyennetés Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
Environnement et Développement du Tiers Monde Dakar, Sénégal
Centre for Urbanism and Built Environment Studies, Johannesburg, South Africa
University of the Witwatersrand
Cairo Laboratory for Urban Studies, Training and Cairo, Egypt
Environmental Research
Sierra Leone Urban Research Centre Freetown, Sierra Leone
Laboratoire d’Etudes et de Recherche sur les Niamey, Niger
Dynamiques Sociales et le Développement Local
Urban Research and Advocacy Centre Malawi Mzuzu, Malawi
Centre for Urban Research and Planning, University of Lusaka, Zambia
Zambia
Centro de Análise de Políticas, Universidade Eduardo Maputo, Mozambique
Mondlane
Institute for Human Settlement Studies, Ardhi University Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
College of African and Oriental Studies, Addis Ababa Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
University
Faculty for the Built Environment, Arts and Science, Ba Gaborone, Botswana
Isago University
African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town Cape Town, South Africa
Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi Nairobi, Kenya
Centre for Settlement Studies, Kwame Nkrumah Kumasi, Ghana
University of Science and Technology
Source: AURI
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Research and Practice’. AURI members responded to a call for proposals for con-
temporary applied research to be carried out over a 12-month period with the 
support of the Ford Foundation.
There were three broad themes:
• Urban governance.
• Infrastructure and service delivery.
• Dynamics and nature of informality in African cities.
Researchers were asked to respond with proposals for research that included 
knowledge co-production methodologies as well as critical comparative analysis. 
The result is this new body of research that makes three important contributions. 
First, it demonstrates the depth of contemporary urban research being undertaken 
by African knowledge institutions across the continent. Second, it allows the 
reader to examine a selection of African cities beyond the (traditional) frame of 
city classification as measured by criteria such as population size, global com-
petitiveness, or economic productivity. Third, the collection of work contained in 
this volume provides important perspectives on how ideas such as knowledge co-
production travel across boundaries and, in particular, differentiate across diverse 
African contexts.
The six chapters are grouped together under the two broad themes of (in)
formality and infrastructure, with issues of urban governance underpinning all 
of them. While an attempt has been made to include contributions from across 
the continent, not all linguistic or geographical regions, such as Francophone 
Africa, East Africa, or the islands of Africa, are equally represented. However, 
by covering large metropolitan areas (Cairo, Johannesburg, Luanda), mid-sized 
cities (Kumasi, Lusaka, and Alexandria), small cities (Minya), and peri-urban 
spaces (Thika) alike, different urban environments are represented. Moreover, the 
chapters collectively cover some of the issues most pertinent to African cities – 
from urban inequality to climate change, the urban food economy, and land and 
housing – as entry points into wider discussions on urban governance and devel-
opment in Africa. In addition, all chapters have sought to adopt innovative mixed 
methods and research approaches to knowledge co-production, as well as com-
parative experimentation.
(In)formality
The book’s first three chapters are concerned with the governance and differ-
ent manifestations of urban informality. In spite of the importance of the infor-
mal economy across the continent, government actions continue to be, at worst, 
aimed at eliminating informality and, at best, formalizing it. The Zimbabwean 
scholar Kamete (2013) explains this urge by discussing African city authorities’ 
‘fetish about formality’, which he sees as ‘fuelled by an obsession with urban 
modernity and Western notions of the “desired city” ’ (p. 24). However, as Indian 
scholar Ananya Roy (2005) has persuasively argued in the context of urban India, 
in the process of denying informality, states often play an important role in 
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(re-)producing informal practice. The chapters in this first part of the book provide 
insight into the different actors and practices involved in producing informality, 
and the particular, complex, and interwoven nature of the ways in which these 
interactions manifest in the African urban context.
Chapter 2 presents the Centre for Urban Research and Planning (CURP) at the 
University of Zambia’s research investigating the ‘everyday’ in Zambia’s larg-
est urban food market, with the goal of better understanding the formal-informal 
continuum, and thus grounding policy to support more inclusive and sustainable 
urban development in the global South. Conducted together with policy officials 
from Lusaka City Council as well as a range of food actors from the Soweto Mar-
ket, the research process included round-table meetings, multi-stakeholder meet-
ings, learning labs, and a policy dialogue on the Soweto Food Market. Through 
this collaborative process, the team gained insight into the ways in which formal 
rules and regulations are used and contested by multiple actors and practices in 
ways that are neither fully formal nor informal, but rather a constantly negotiated 
hybrid, structured by ‘multiple sites’ of power and control.
Chapter 3 comes from practitioners at the Cairo Laboratory for Urban Stud-
ies, Training and Environmental Research (CLUSTER), who have been under-
taking urban research and design interventions in Egypt’s post-uprising era since 
2011. In a multi-scalar study across three different Egyptian cities, the researchers 
developed a comparative framework that utilizes the variables of borders, cross-
ings, activities, and flows to explore the nature of the interconnections between 
the informal and formal. Working with practitioners, academics, community lead-
ers, and experts in each city to examine different physical, social, and economic 
variables that have often emerged as responses to policies seeking to combat 
informality, the chapter proposes a redefined understanding of informal spaces 
and activities as central nodes of urban integration and connection, with the aim 
of illuminating larger questions around how to promote integrated urban policy.
Chapter 4 is written by researchers from the Centre for Urban Research and 
Innovations (CURI) at the University of Nairobi. Through a series of CityLabs 
bringing together community members, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), 
and city officials in the informal settlement of Kiandutu in the peri-urban munici-
pality of Thika on the outskirts of Nairobi, the research team explored prospects 
for land sharing as an approach to resolving long-standing local conflicts and 
contestations around land tenure. Based on this experience, the chapter offers use-
ful insights into the challenges and opportunities for community engagement and 
negotiations around land tenure and slum upgrading, exploring land sharing not 
only as a potential solution to a housing problem, but also as a rights-based model 
that may illuminate new ways of teaching, conceptualizing, and implementing 
urban planning in contested and fragmented spaces on the continent.
Infrastructure
An important link connects informality and infrastructure. As Pieterse (2018, 
p. 40) puts it: ‘infrastructure systems . . . reveal most clearly the coexistence of 
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formal and informal systems of social and economic reproduction’. We can see 
this in areas from energy to transport and housing, but also in their social mani-
festation, as urban scholar AbdouMaliq Simone describes, using his notion of 
‘people as infrastructure’ (Simone, 2004). In both their social and physical dimen-
sions, studies of infrastructure offer useful insight and critique on the extent to 
which global agendas such as the Sustainable Development Goals can be moni-
tored and achieved in African cities (Pieterse et al., 2018).
Chapter 5 brings together contributions from researchers at the Takween Inte-
grated Community Development practice in Cairo and the Centre for Urbanism 
and Built Environment Studies (CUBES) at Wits University in Johannesburg. 
Mapping and comparing the locations and levels of access to basic services and 
infrastructure, the chapter shows how inequality is manifested differently both 
between as well as within the two cities. It further argues that there is a recursive 
relationship between service provision and inequality: that lack of public services 
is not only a manifestation or measure of inequality, but also a producer of social 
inequality, and that these inequalities are often disguised by scale. In doing so, the 
chapter highlights the importance of spatial analysis and localized measures that 
reflect the local nature and diverse characteristics of urban inequality as they are 
manifested on the ground.
Chapter 6 reflects on a study conducted by researchers from the Centre 
for Settlement Studies (CSS) at Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and 
Technology in Kumasi, Ghana. Addressing the increasing devastation caused 
by recurrent floods, the research team conducted a series of CityLabs in the 
flood-prone settlement of Sepe-Buokrom in the city of Kumasi. Through focus 
group discussions and stakeholder meetings, the team brought together local 
community members and leaders, as well as city and national government 
officials to explore the potential for developing a community resilience frame-
work (CRF) for flood-risk management. In the process, the role and impor-
tance of different levels of leadership sharing a common vision – and existing 
impediments to a spirit of collaboration – emerged as a key enabling factor 
for the successful development of community-based approaches to flood-risk 
management. The research further concluded that a shift in methodological 
approach to co-production is vital if the gap between research and policy in 
Africa is to be bridged.
Chapter 7 presents findings from research conducted by the NGO Development 
Workshop (DW) in Angola. This work builds on decades of action research con-
ducted by DW among peri-urban communities and informal settlements as well 
as the monitoring of the implementation of global agendas at the Angolan gov-
ernment’s request, bearing in mind the goal of building sustainable and equitable 
cities that leave no one behind. Based on a combined set of mixed and participa-
tory research tools, the research shows the limited impact of the Angolan govern-
ment’s ambitious Urbanization and Housing Programme, launched in 2009 with 
the aim of building 1,000,000 houses, and suggests a more inclusive approach to 
rebuilding Angola’s war-torn cities that builds on and supports self-built ‘social 
production of housing’.
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Knowledge co-production
Taken together, the chapters in this book represent the diverse set of actors, prac-
tices, and experiences involved in urban governance and development across the 
continent. In their work the researchers affirm a heterogeneous concept of knowl-
edge co-production (van der Hel, 2016) by giving concrete examples of how dif-
ference can play out at the city, neighbourhood, and settlement levels. As such, 
they offer useful learnings on the localization, monitoring, and implementation of 
global and local urban policy agendas, and importance of recognizing urban dif-
ference and complexity (Parnell & Robinson, 2017).
In their collective pursuit to adopt innovative and more inclusive approaches 
to knowledge production, one of the major learnings that comes through from the 
chapters in this volume is the importance of close relationships between research-
ers and representatives from local governance structures, which in most of the 
cases have been fostered and built over long periods of time. In a context where 
levels of trust – both in public institutions as well as among different members of 
urban communities – are generally low, the importance of such relations cannot 
be underestimated. However, even with such relationships in place, the chapters 
also demonstrate the challenges of working with those local leadership struc-
tures – including traditional authorities or local party cadres – which are vital for 
access to local communities, but also function as gatekeepers. Often, day-to-day 
cultural and political practices and dynamics, as well as ‘conflicting rationalities’ 
(Watson, 2003), determine the scope, availability, and willingness of local leaders 
and communities to participate in research projects and knowledge co-production, 
even when these projects are aimed at community participation. Overcoming such 
challenges requires a deep understanding of the complexity and workings of local 
governance structures, as well as the factors, systems, and dynamics that can con-
tribute to building trust and collective action.
This volume contributes to the growing literature on urban research, and specif-
ically offers a view from the ground that provides insight into the wide spectrum 
of actors, systems, processes, and modes of governance that constitute African 
cities. Rather than offering and replicating a standard research approach across 
the case cities, the collection demonstrates the fluidity of urban themes and con-
cepts, as examined across six African cities. Most importantly, the work contained 
in this book amplifies the need for urban research in African cities to be viewed 
beyond its ability to conform to or defy northern typologies. The output of this 
research collective demonstrates that indeed there are other understandings and 
knowledges of urbanization that require different terms of engagement. We offer 
this work from AURI – a nascent pan-African collaborative network – as a contri-
bution to both new forms and methods of knowledge production.
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Introduction
Although it is widely recognized that informal-sector activities heavily character-
ize urban systems in Africa, debates around African urbanization, urban devel-
opment, and urban planning still fail to usefully conceptualize and characterize 
informality and its interface with formal actors, practices, and interactions in Afri-
can cities. Based on a one-year research project implemented by the Centre for 
Urban Research and Planning (CURP) at the University of Zambia on the opera-
tions of the Soweto Retail and Wholesale Food Market (a large urban wholesale 
and retail market in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia), this chapter takes urban food 
systems as an entry point to understanding the workings and complexity of the 
formal-informal continuum in an African city (Jones, 2017). The study had two 
goals: firstly, to use co-production research methodologies to achieve a nuanced 
understanding of the formal-informal interface in an African city through the lens 
of food systems; and secondly, using this understanding, to ground and explore 
policy and other interventions that could make Lusaka’s urban food markets more 
inclusive and sustainable spaces.
By critically evaluating market interactions and processes by and with food 
actors (in production, transport, storage, wholesaling, retailing, and waste man-
agement), we found that groups and individuals from the state, private sector, and 
society engage in creative and often manipulative interpretations of formal market 
regulations and laws to achieve maximum gain, resulting in both exclusion and 
inclusion. These multiple practices, relations, and systems are interwoven, inter-
dependent, and exist between and within state and society – creating a new urban 
operational space that cannot be categorized as either formal or informal, and 
which exemplifies the wider workings of a society operating in the absence of a 
democratically functioning state.
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Policy interventions and intellectual discourses in and on urban Africa need 
to engage with the complexity of urban governance dynamics and the ways in 
which they relate to and manifest themselves in formal and informal practices, 
power relations, and urban systems (Satterthwaite, 2016; Jones, 2017). We argue 
that urban studies and planning research need to set clear intellectual and policy 
goals for Africa and, by extension, the global South. Such studies need to delve 
into the policy space, critically analysing how the state and society interact, how 
these interactions are configured by power, and how they territorialize over geo-
temporal scales. In other words, urban scholarship needs to transcend traditional 
urban studies and planning methodologies, and critically interrogate how urban 
contexts of the global South function in order to better understand why they 
remain so resistant to policies or interventions that are developed with different 
systems in mind.
The first section of this chapter provides the study’s conceptual framing (which 
uses urban food systems as an entry point into debates on informality), and rel-
evant context and background about urban markets and local governance in Zam-
bia. Next we present our methodology and findings, which provide a granular 
understanding of the relationships and systems in Lusaka’s Soweto Food Market, 
and point to the necessity of understanding the formal and informal as an interface 
or continuum. Finally, we present the study’s conceptual implications, followed 
by conclusions and policy recommendations.
Conceptual framing
Urban food systems, governance, and informality in African cities
While global demand for food is rapidly growing, sustainably and equitably pro-
ducing and distributing sufficient, nutritious food is becoming ever more chal-
lenging (Knorr et al., 2018). Meanwhile, with the impact of rising global food 
insecurity increasingly felt in cities, access to food – like that to clean water, 
sanitation, energy, and income-generating opportunities – has become a major 
urban issue (Crush & Riley, 2017), as well as one increasingly determined by 
income levels. On top of climate change and shifting patterns in small-scale farm-
ing, the rise of supermarkets, shopping centres, and wholesale retail chains further 
add to the complexity of a global food system that has led to poverty, unemploy-
ment, education, and city planning impacting hunger and malnutrition as much 
as agricultural yields and environmental conditions. Despite all of this, the urban 
dimensions of contemporary food systems are often overlooked, as are the ways 
in which these systems are governed, especially in the African context (Crush & 
Frayne, 2011; Battersby & Watson, 2018).
While there are many gaps in the existing knowledge about urban governance 
and urban food systems in Africa, one of the main deficits concerns the role of 
food actors in ensuring an inclusive and sustainable urban food system (Smit, 
2016). Although much work has been done concerning potential improvements to 
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the governance of urban food systems in African cities, there is surprisingly lit-
tle research examining existing processes through which urban food systems are 
governed (Battersby, 2013). As Porter et al. (2007) suggest, complex processes 
and rules shaping food systems and food marketing in Africa exist, and there is 
a need to know more about how these formal and informal regulatory systems 
and norms operate, and how they influence urban food dynamics and the broader 
urban livelihood systems.
The governance of urban food systems in Africa is complex and includes a 
range of formal and informal actors and economies, between whom a growing 
body of work shows many points of intersection and interdependence (Battersby 
et al., 2016). That said, Skinner (2016) argues that the majority of food retail and 
wholesale sectors in most African cities are located at the ‘informal’ end of the 
formal-informal continuum, and indeed, a wide variety of informal food outlets 
are evident in most African cities – from traditional, large public market spaces, 
to a variety of shops and kiosks, to street food vendors.
Like their formal counterparts, informal food traders are impacted by urban 
governance in various ways, from processes allocating trading space, to infra-
structure and service provision (e.g., water, security, energy, and waste removal). 
Additionally, the regulatory environment, which can include ‘land-use planning 
and retail sites, shopping hours laws, labour-market regulations, and advertising 
codes, health claims legislation and consumer protection’ has a significant impact 
on urban food systems (Dixon, 1999, p. 155). Such regulations, which can be 
formal or informal (or a combination of the two), can impact on where food is (or 
is not) produced or processed, where and when retail is allowed, what types of 
food can be sold, and who is involved in producing, distributing, and selling food.
While this chapter argues that formal and informal systems are inextricably 
interwoven, it is also true that the often-contested nature of who is able to access 
ownership to spaces and opportunities, and who is excluded, is highlighted in 
informal spaces (Roy, 2005). For example, concerning the informal nature of 
marketplace governance in Maputo, Mozambique, Lindell (2008, p. 1896) notes: 
‘governance appears to lack any semblance of coherence and to be more frag-
mented, disjointed and split by deep antagonisms’. In other words, key actors 
continuously challenge each other’s legitimacy to govern, and this contest is 
invariably more pronounced in informal spaces. As such, the examination of 
bottom-up, market-based, urban-space governance systems and tools (such as lev-
ies and planning regulations, among others) can offer new perspectives on the 
use of surveillance, peer pressure, and control of physical space (Lyon, 2003) as 
modes of governance. But bottom-up approaches to food governance rarely exist 
in a vacuum, and often interlock with top-down state apparatuses, creating select, 
aggressive groups that conquer and control others in urban market spaces. How-
ever, the details and nuances of how the formal-informal continuum is governed – 
and how these groups interact – remain largely unexamined.
In spite of advances in the literature, ‘the African city’ often remains depicted in 
policy circles as a dualistic space made of formal and informal activities, systems, 
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actors, and processes.1 Such a dualistic understanding perpetuates views of the 
informal as illegal and impermanent, negates the complexity and interdepend-
ence of the actual relationship between the two, and reinforces the state’s percep-
tion that the informal economy should be eradicated (SERI, 2015). The reality, 
however, is that urban space in Africa is formed and structured by an interwoven 
and interdependent continuum of both formal and informal practices, power rela-
tions, and infrastructural systems, which are in turn characterized by various con-
cepts, urban management dynamics, and urban development outcomes (Lindell, 
2008). Chief among these is Resnick’s (2014) argument that the urbanization and 
governance processes and dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa have direct implica-
tions on livelihoods and service delivery, and that understanding the ‘everyday’ – 
and the survival tactics required to get through it – is key to critical African 
urban studies. As such, this study seeks to contribute to debates on what Pieterse 
(2011a) calls the ‘vein of postcolonial theorization’, opened up by de Boeck and 
Plissart (2014), Diouf (2003), Mbembé and Nuttall (2004), Simone and Simone 
(1994), and many others, who argue that theorizing the urban post-colony requires 
nuanced insertion of theoretical discourses in grounded reality.
Achieving a deeper appreciation of urban reality in contested food market 
spaces requires deployment of a pedagogical approach that can unravel the com-
plex urban food systems found in African cities. This requires digging deep into 
the reality of relations; that is, how actors deploy various governance tactics to 
dominate and control what we call ‘dense food markets’. As such, this study is 
mindful of the imperative to know what is happening on the ground before pro-
ceeding to interpret how citizens understand, experience, navigate, transcend, 
resist, admit, or reinterpret the psychosocial experiences that are affected by 
‘tough material conditions’ (Biehl & McKay, 2012; Pieterse, 2010).2
But to understand relationships on the ground, a broader view of governance 
in the African urban context must also be considered. Swyngedouw (2005) draws 
on neo-Foucauldian theories of governmentality and technologies of government 
to discuss a ‘democratic deficit’, or a lack of governance that raises questions 
about who is allowed and enabled to participate, and who is excluded. Such a 
deficit underscores ill-defined systems of representation, accountability, and legit-
imacy, and the state’s role in organizing and ‘legitimating’ urban governance net-
works systems. Urban spaces characterized by such deficits tend to be governed 
by creative and manipulative relations between state and society, and aspects of 
clientelism, fear of the politically powerful, patronage, utter theft, and corruption 
become the structuring elements of such urban governance. Thus while policy-
makers extol the virtues of democratic citizenship and participation, in reality 
‘existing forms of participation in many parts of the global South do not conform 
to these idealized governance models’ (Robins et al., 2008, p. 1070). That the 
nature of democratic practices in countries with political and historical contexts 
marked by disenfranchisement, poverty, and clientelism differ from those found in 
countries of the global North (Robins et al., 2008) must be acknowledged. Robins 
et al. (2008, p. 1071) further argue that the relations between the state and people 
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in such ‘political and historical contexts’ are punctuated by disenfranchisement, 
authoritarianism, and clientelism, and do not align with normative versions of 
citizenship and the virtues of a functional democracy.
Using the lens of food systems, this study thus investigates the ‘everyday’ in the 
‘ways of doing business and existing’ in Zambia’s largest urban food market. By 
uncovering and critically interrogating inter-actor relations (between food traders, 
market managers, political party cadres, and national state operations), this chap-
ter attempts to capture the granular reality of Soweto Market’s governance, and 
through this, arrive at a better understanding of the formal-informal continuum.
Context and background
Urban markets – history and governance
Though Zambia does not have a long history of urban market activity (Nchito, 
2007), markets exist in every urban settlement today, where they serve a dual 
purpose of providing employment for people not in the formal labour structure, 
as well as goods and services to the majority of urban households. The Markets 
and Bus Stations Act of 2007 sets out two ways of establishing and managing a 
public market in Zambia. The first is the formal, top-down process, where a city 
council establishes a market with on-the-ground administration through the mar-
ket master (a city council employee), and a Market Advisory Committee (MAC) 
overseeing functionality and management (see the section on Local Governance 
for more detail).
The second type – known as cooperative markets – is a response to a govern-
ance void in areas of the city that are yet to be formally sanctioned through the city 
council. Cooperative markets, constituting about half of Lusaka’s marketplaces 
(Blekking et al., 2017), are governed through independent market committees 
comprised of people elected from the market’s vendors. Official channels point to 
the market committee, but everyday access to markets relies on negotiating with 
a number of actors, includes political cadres, the city council, the traders them-
selves, the food suppliers, and the commodity association(s), all of which have a 
core interest in the running of the market.
While access to trading spaces in both formal and informal marketplaces is 
guided by rules and regulations, the reality is that these rules are relaxed, sus-
pended, or simply contravened when ‘political party cadres’ take charge of market 
management. Indeed, most markets in Zambia serve as strongholds of the ruling 
political party. Political party cadres in Zambia refer to party loyalists who use 
their political affiliation or association with the ruling party principles to influence 
and control access to the markets.3 The allocation of market trading spaces by 
party cadres has a long history, dating from the UNIP era (1964–1992) through 
to the MMD (1992–2011) and PF (2011-todate) eras.4 Traders, who can always 
be threatened with eviction, continue to be easily manipulated and organized for 
political gain, making marketplaces indispensable to politicians (Nchito, 2007).
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Lusaka’s Soweto Food Market
Lusaka is Zambia’s capital and largest city, with a population of over 2.5 million 
people. Located near Lusaka’s Central Business District (CBD), Soweto Food 
Market (henceforth referred to in this chapter as Soweto Market) is Zambia’s larg-
est formal, council-managed, open-air urban market that serves as both a whole-
sale and retail space for various food products farmed and manufactured from 
within and outside Lusaka (Hampwaye et al., 2016, p. 46; Wragg & Lim, 2015). 
According to Blekking et al. (2017, p. 7), ‘Soweto Market is the central node of 
Lusaka’s food system . . . supplying both cooperative and city council markets 
with fresh produce daily’. Acting as the largest landing site for food from farms 
and traders in the Lusaka City region and beyond, the Market is also an important 
contributor to food security in Lusaka (Hampwaye et al., 2016). Soweto Market’s 
core role in influencing urban food systems, and the obvious financial flows in 
Lusaka’s food value chain, mean the stakes here are high, causing a broad range 
of actors to be interested in the Market’s activities and functioning.
Local governance
The Constitution of Zambia, as amended by Act No. 2 of 2016, has devolved pow-
ers to the local authorities (called city councils) in a quest to decentralize govern-
ment operations, with all government departments and institutions intended to 
eventually be managed at the local authority level. Lusaka City Council (LCC) is 
the largest local authority in Zambia, and its primary responsibility, like that of all 
city councils, is public service delivery (e.g., garbage collection, construction of 
drainage systems, management of public markets, etc.). A representative form of 
local government, the LCC is formed of elected local leaders who serve as com-
munity representatives (councillors). The LCC encompasses 33 wards, which are 
smaller geographical demarcations in the seven larger constituencies that consti-
tute the broader boundary jurisdiction of greater Lusaka City (LCC, 2019).
The Markets and Bus Stations Act of 2007, which, as noted earlier, governs 
market function in Zambia, names the city council as the body responsible for 
market management. In Lusaka, the LCC ‘formally’ interacts with market trad-
ers through the MAC, which is the committee responsible for administering and 
managing a market’s affairs on behalf of the city council. MACs are comprised 
of seven members: the chair (the local councillor), secretary (the market master), 
tax collector (a council employee), council police officer, and three elected ven-
dors from the local market. Some of the listed responsibilities of MAC include 
enforcement of council bylaws, provision of security in a market, revenue collec-
tion, monitoring standards of hygiene, and general cleanliness and allocation of 
market stalls.
Officially, access to formal market trading spaces like those in Soweto Mar-
ket is based on merit-application to the MAC as an agent for the LCC, where 
applicants must meet minimum requirements, including the capacity to pay 
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council-approved levies. While Soweto Market has a MAC in place, actual man-
agement of the market – including the allocation of trading spaces – is dynamic 
and contested among various forces and actors. As is further discussed next, de 
facto governance systems differ sharply from those prescribed by law, and rules 
are more often than not relaxed, suspended, or simply contravened, particularly in 
the face of political party cadre interference, as is discussed in our findings.
It is important to note here the overarching role that political cadres have played 
in city council governance in Zambia since the early 1970s with the passage of the 
Village Registration and Development Act No. 30 of 1971. Seeking to actualize 
one-party state governance, this Act integrated city councils, ward development 
committees (WDC), and ruling party functionaries in the governance of local 
councils (Mukwena & Lolojih, 2002). Over the 1970s, the supremacy of the rul-
ing party over local governance was further consolidated (Chikulo, 1993), until 
multiparty democracy in 1990 led to the scrapping of the one-party state (Chikulo, 
1993). The promulgation of the Constitution of Zambia Act No.1 and Local Gov-
ernment Act No.22 (1991) delinked the ruling party from the civil service and 
state apparatus, reintroducing the distinction between the ruling party, the central 
government, and local government. However, implementation of subsequent Acts 
and decentralization policies have fallen short of depoliticizing local government, 
and national laws and Lusaka city bylaws have not been used effectively to ensure 
markets are not overtaken and managed by political party supporters. As a result, 
political party cadres continue to exert a strong influence in Lusaka city’s govern-
ance and operations.
Methodology
Studying the market
The method applied in the study of Soweto Market was informed by the Afri-
can Centre for Cities CityLab Programme5 supporting co-production of policy-
relevant knowledge for African cities. One of ten CityLab studies funded at urban 
research centre members of the African Urban Research Initiative (AURI), this 
research, framed as a case study, follows the principles of case study methods 
in urban studies and planning literature (Flyvbjerg, 2011, 2004; Duminy et al., 
2014). Using qualitative methods, our research sought to study the ‘everyday 
practices’ (Horelli et al., 2013) in food transactions in Soweto Market, a response 
to Robins et al.’s (2008, p. 1069) call for ‘more attention to contextual understand-
ings of the politics of everyday urban life, and to locating state, civil society, and 
donor rhetorics and programmes promoting “active citizenship” and “participa-
tory governance” ’ in the urban South.
In doing so, our research also responds to Parnell and Robinson’s (2012) 
post-neoliberal call for a need to re-engage with the state as a ‘complex set of 
institutions, open to diverse political and policy agendas’ (Parnell & Robinson, 
2012). That is, Parnell and Robinson (2012) argue that traditional critiques of 
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urban neoliberalism that may have salience in the global North are inappropriately 
applied to interpret contexts that do not reflect this context, for example, in cities 
in the global South. To move beyond this approach requires more than under-
standing that neoliberalism is produced in different ways in different contexts, and 
indeed demands a geographical repositioning of urban theory (ibid.). As such, we 
argue that research such as this, which highlights the complexity of dynamics and 
economies as they actually operate in cities of the global South, are contributing 
to the need for more relevant ideas and concepts to emerge.
Focusing on the ‘everyday’ in Soweto Market, we collected and analysed data 
on transactions, engagements, and relations in food merchandizing, including a 
wide range of sociopolitical actors and infrastructural technologies of food flows 
both in Soweto Market and the wider City of Lusaka. We zoomed in on the detail 
of the food business in a growing city, examining specific instances of how actors 
engage with food merchandizing in Soweto. Responding to Flyvbjerg’s (2004, 
p. 283) call for a return to ‘concrete things’ of the urban (Pieterse, 2011b), we 
sat down with food retailers, food middlemen, farmers, political leaders, and 
state agents, examining how all these actors engage with both formal and infor-
mal food systems in Soweto. Given the complexity of Soweto’s food systems, 
a nuanced study of these systems required active involvement from all relevant 
actors. As such, the study was transdisciplinary and collaborative in nature, with 
our research team including scholars from different disciplines, as well as non-
academic stakeholders, who together could address the challenge of food system 
governance with a view to developing solutions (Lang et al., 2012).
Research consisted primarily of personal interviews, focus group discussions, 
round-table discussions, and observations by all project researchers to gener-
ate primary data. We selected research participants using a purposive sampling 
approach, which sought to achieve data collection based on level of actor engage-
ment in the activities and processes in Soweto Market. Research participants 
included: officials and senior managers at LCC, researchers at CURP, members of 
the People’s Process on Housing and Poverty in Zambia (PPHPZ), a local branch 
of the Slum Dwellers International (SDI) in Zambia, and relevant groups from 
Soweto Market (e.g., political party representatives, produce associations and alli-
ances, individual traders, consumers, and market managers).
As per the co-production methodology, our team worked together with policy 
officials from LCC and food actors from the Soweto Market to frame the research 
questions for the study, collect and analyse the data, and produce research find-
ings. Stakeholders grouped the data in themes and presented the data in the form 
of narratives; this happened in round-table meetings, multi-stakeholder meetings, 
learning labs, and a policy dialogue on Soweto Food Market.
The two CityLabs that we held enabled us to collaboratively analyse the data 
and share the research findings in the form of policy briefs. A city learning lab is a 
multi-stakeholder social meeting that seeks to collaboratively explore city devel-
opment problems and frame possible actions by stakeholders. Allowing for deep 
conceptual analysis and exploration of material for policy innovation to improve 
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systems relevant to a complex and contested issue such as equal access to Soweto 
Market (Steynor et al., 2016). Intended to create an open space for thinking, 
debating, and engaging with the research process and outcomes, the labs proved a 
key innovation in our knowledge of co-production process, and we endeavoured 
to make them neutral or ‘safe spaces’ for all stakeholders. In some cases, creating 
a safe space can be done by choosing a venue that is both convenient and unfamil-
iar, in the sense that it is outside of people’s day-to-day ‘functional’ environments 
(Culwick et al., 2019, p. 13). In our case, we chose to separate political party 
leaders from the administrative staff of the LCC during the two CityLabs held on 
Soweto Market, in order for them to engage more freely.
Findings
This section identifies the actors present in the Soweto Market and shows how 
relationships are organized and structured; that is, the various ways multiple 
actors in the market use and interpret rules and regulations, and command control 
to change the outlook of market operations from a supposedly top-down market 
to a seemingly cooperative market.
The actors and regulations
As discussed in earlier sections, Soweto Market is officially a formal market. 
However, daily activities at Soweto show that its operations tilt towards those 
of an informal or cooperative market managed under non-state approved rules. 
For example, the ability to secure trading rights is not a clear process, but rather 
considered a privilege that is dependent on the nature of one’s relations with either 
LCC, one or more of the many commodity associations, or political party repre-
sentatives. These agents or actors, all of whom compete for visibility and ‘job’ 
security, control all activities in Soweto Market. Thus, to win a food trading space 
in Soweto, one must show allegiance and loyalty to one or all of these actors. 
Findings around these actors and how they engage both formally and informally 
follow next.
Lusaka City Council
The most ‘formal’ mechanism around access to trade in Soweto Market is the 
LCC, which has established a daily 2 Zambian Kwacha (ZMW) citywide levy for 
all traders using public markets in Lusaka. While the LCC argues that this levy is 
used for service provision (e.g., security, waste removal), this was hard to prove 
on the ground. And although the LCC claims the fee is uniform and citywide, the 
reality we observed is that the amount varies according to the size, location, and 
quality of trading space (i.e., accessibility and convenience for doing business).
The LCC is also responsible for health and sanitation regulations at the 
Market, and fees are intended to improve the delivery of these services. 
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Although health inspectors carry out routine inspections, the maintenance of 
stipulated health and hygiene standards is never certain, and Market services 
are mostly provided by traders and political party representatives. Limita-
tions around services such as poor public health, poor water and sanitation 
conditions, and waste management, among others, came to the fore in 2017, 
when a cholera crisis forced the Market to shut down nearly completely from 
November–December.
Produce associations
Produce associations are formally registered with the Registrar of Societies, the 
LCC, the Zambia Revenue Authority, and the Patents and Companies Registration 
Agency (PACRA), implying that they pay some statutory taxes, and can be said to 
be formal entities. In addition to paying the LCC’s required levy (providing access 
to trading spaces), food traders are pressured to register with produce associations 
(e.g., Banana, Beans, Tomatoes), which membership enables them to deal in the 
associated commodity.
Each association has its own procedures for joining, as well as rules and regu-
lations governing association operations and, to some extent, transactions in the 
trade of products. Transaction regulations include things like only allowing reg-
istered commodity traders to deal in the associated commodities, and enforcing 
separate produce trading spaces (e.g., bananas from potatoes). It is worth noting 
that all produce designated spaces in the Market are owned by various associa-
tions, and as such, traders must register with an association to acquire produce 
trading rights. Only bona fide members of an association can trade on the prem-
ises belonging to associations.
Association membership does come with benefits, including social protection, 
access to capital, the aforementioned right to trade, as well as discounted rates 
for trading spaces depending on market forces of demand and supply. Associa-
tions sometimes provide small loans to members at a widely used 20% inter-
est rate, or act as guarantor when members need to borrow from micro-financial 
lending institutions found in the Market, thus increasing opportunities for busi-
ness growth. Most produce associations also have storage facilities where mem-
ber traders can keep their goods at the close of business for a reduced fee. Most 
associations require a universal association joining fee of ZMW55, and monthly 
or annual contributions to the funeral committee, which pays out ZMW2,000 to 
cover funeral expenses.
Political parties
As discussed in the previous sections on context and local governance, the Mar-
ket is dominated by ‘party cadres’, through whom national politics operate, and 
who – according to traders, LCC market staff, and LCC head office actors alike – 
are the Market’s most feared actor.
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The study established that the easiest guaranteed way to obtain a good trading 
space in the Market is to pay party cadres, with amounts varying from ZMW2 
to ZMW20 per month (in addition to the daily LCC levy of ZMW2). The fees to 
party cadres include what both traders and party cadres refer to as an ‘operations 
fee’ (ZMW5), required by all traders every Wednesday, as well as the daily ZMW2 
LCC trading levy. No one could say what the operation fee is for. While these 
levies cannot be ‘questioned’ by the traders, party cadres promise traders physical 
security and potential loans from government. Party cadres justify the levies on the 
basis that they provide material support in the form of improved security, access to 
capital, and guaranteed trading rights. While access to trading rights is verifiable, 
it is hard to prove that complying with party cadre demands creates opportunities 
for physical security, and/or increased access to financial capital.
Because both the LCC and party cadres allocate trading spaces, traders often 
pay twice for the same trading space (personal interview, Soweto trader, Novem-
ber 2018). Such levies for trading spaces, registration, and commodity licences 
mean that traders often pay at least twice and sometimes three times (overlap of 
LCC, association, and party-cadre levies) for the same thing. Traders also must 
pay offloading fees of ZMW30–40 per load to party cadres, which maintain ulti-
mate control of space in Soweto Market. Loading fees also differ from one trading 
space to another, with trucks coming from out of town taken advantage of and 
required to pay offloading fees of no less than ZMW100, while those from within 
Lusaka pay a maximum of ZMW40.
When it comes to security, while official rules governing actors’ behaviour in 
the market do exist, an informal arrangement between the LCC and party cadres 
allows cadres to play a larger security role at Soweto Market than the officially 
and legally mandated actors:
The police and party cadres jointly maintain law and order in the market. 
When an offender is caught, he or she is first taken to the cadres who assess 
the gravity of the offence before deciding whether they deal with the case 
conclusively or refer it to the police. Offenders with smaller offences are 
fined and released, while those with serious offences are handed over to the 
police where the due process of the law is purportedly followed.
(Personal interview, November 2017)
This quote illustrates how informal and formal actors and systems meld to the 
extent that it is impossible to separate one from the other, and how power is main-
tained through a constantly negotiated process and sharing of benefits among 
them. Law and order in the Market is a product of both formal and informal sys-
tems, symbiotically intertwined on mutually agreed aspects of the Market. For 
example, the police use cadres as fronts to enforce the law, while the cadres gain 
monetary benefit by engaging in this collaboration.
Meanwhile, our findings also reveal that multiple actors in Soweto Mar-
ket express political identity – in order to gain influence and power in the 
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Market – through various means, including displaying party regalia, expressing 
verbal allegiance to senior political party leaders and individuals, and promoting 
and enforcing clientelism between food traders and the party in power by means 
of rule relaxation. It should also be noted that within the cadres there are many 
individuals who merely claim to be members of the ruling party, but in fact are 
just thieves. Pickpocketing and beating of Market patrons (especially traders and 
consumers) by the cadres is rife, and often carried out by people who purport 
to act in the name of a ruling political party. In sum, it is very hard to delineate 
genuine from non-genuine party cadre members in Soweto. As such, the study’s 
findings show that the relations and interdependences between formal and infor-
mal systems and actors create a non-sovereign, urban market space that belongs 
to no single actor exclusively.
Social solidarity economy
It is notable that the study found an absence of a strong farmer or food producer 
association in Soweto Market. This lack works against the interest of market 
farmers and food suppliers, inhibiting their ability to harness the potentials 
of a social solidarity economy (SSE). The International Labour Organization 
(ILO) explains SSE as enterprises and organizations (cooperatives, mutual 
benefit societies, associations, foundations, and social enterprises) that pro-
duce goods, services, and knowledge that meet the needs of the community 
served, through the pursuit of specific social and environmental objectives 
and the fostering of solidarity (ILO, n.d.). Given that all actors have power 
and a sphere of influence, if the governed masses in Soweto Market could find 
a way to overtly assert their influence on those in power, they could redirect 
actor relations to safeguard the public good, which would serve to protect the 
food traders and consumers, and ensure that the Market’s politics work for the 
good of all.
In fact, some of the Market’s produce associations have begun to create SSE 
for their members, setting objectives to improve their own operations and make 
the market more enabling to their members. Providing members with things like 
social protection through funeral grants, access to capital at lower interest rates, 
and protection of their businesses (through restrictions on nonmembers to engage 
in certain activities), these produce associations have also made efforts to increase 
production through collective entrepreneurship. Such collaborative efforts 
endeavour to create and sustain the social solidarity economy (Jolly & Raven, 
2015) in Soweto Market.
However, the current overwhelming relationship between Soweto Market food 
producers can best be described as disjointed and uncoordinated, undermining the 
potential of SSE, and creating sociopolitical spaces for manipulative acts by ‘local 
political elites’ to continue. In other words, there is no farmer or food producer 
association that seeks to protect and champion the interests of food producers in 
this dynamic and contested food market space.
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Balance of power
Examining the various actors managing Soweto Market,6 the study revealed con-
stant contestations over ownership and control of space, as well as implementa-
tion of norms and practices.
Pros and cons of ‘belonging’
Despite clear benefits of association membership, some traders do not belong to 
any association, having withdrawn membership because they feel the associations 
do not meet their expectations of providing loans or boosting their business. These 
traders typically register only with the LCC for permission to trade. LCC-only 
registration allows one to trade with limited rights in a shop or established stand, 
and not on open spaces, which are largely controlled by party cadres. Thus, while 
incurring lower costs, such traders remain confined to the shops, and argue that 
they have less visibility (and limited market rights). While LCC-only traders may 
escape commodity association affiliation fees, they still must pay the party cadres’ 
other fees, as described earlier.
Some traders have neither association membership nor LCC permission to 
trade, and rather acquire trading spaces or rent trading stands solely from political 
party cadres and/or those who have opted to sublet their trading spaces and prop-
erty rights. However, subletting a trading space with neither association mem-
bership nor cadre support can be risky: for long-term tenure security of trading 
space, and for a sense of physical security (i.e., protection from possible attack for 
resisting political force), traders find it both convenient and necessary to ‘cooper-
ate’ with the cadres. While party cadres have a long history of allocating market 
spaces, research participants noted that the situation is increasingly out of control, 
and currently verges on localized gangsterism. This situation is leaving food deal-
ers with very little space to negotiate and protect their rights to freely trade in the 
market.
Some traders do not register with the LCC, political parties, or a produce asso-
ciation. Nonetheless, they still are forced to comply with and pay levies to the 
political cadres. Lack of compliance with cadres can lead to loss of trading space 
and physical attacks. By contrast, other traders and food dealers pay multiple lev-
ies to multiple centres of control and regulation (e.g., the LCC, produce associa-
tions, and cadres) in order to access services such as trading space and physical 
protection from various market players. Nearly all traders lamented the rising cost 
of doing business in the Market, attributing the high costs to multiple and unex-
plained levies that have not translated into an improved business environment or 
protection of rights.
Overlapping interests and responsibilities
While the produce associations and the LCC together have reasonable con-
trol over the movement of food products, they have limited control over other 
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aspects – both formal and informal – of the Market, which most traders and LCC 
staff say is dominated by the party cadres. For example, despite the regulation 
requiring the market to open at 06:00 and close at 18:00, some traders indicated 
they can enter the market any time. Traders also say they trade in a very dirty 
environment, largely due to indiscriminate dumping of solid waste by themselves, 
and the local authority’s failure to implement water and sanitation programmes to 
keep the market clean.
Thus, our study observed contradictions and overlapping interests and respon-
sibilities between market actors. This observation challenges the normative notion 
of democracy, largely espoused in the global North, where public spaces in gen-
eral, and urban markets in particular, are/should be publicly owned and managed, 
and market interest groups are well-organized and seen as working to promote 
the public good and guarding against manipulation and unproductive practices 
(Robins et al., 2008).
By contrast, in Soweto Market we found multiple mechanisms controlled by 
various actors to facilitate food businesses, regulate and control traders, protect 
consumers, provide opportunities for raising financial capital, and grant access to 
trading spaces including shops. These actors, both formal and informal, in some 
cases were promoting public good, and in others, very much protecting personal/
group interest. For example, most traders access capital largely via informal 
lending by produce associations, supplemented by financing from formal micro-
enterprises. This again demonstrates the loose integration of both the formal and 
informal systems. Other mechanisms of control and regulation that include col-
laboration between (formal) state and (informal) non-state institutions are the 
police and cadres, which collectively ensure law and order, a state that also draws 
on LCC and cadre collaboration to jointly allocate and manage trading spaces. 
Finally, the study also established the existence of ‘fronts’ in the administration 
and management of shops and other trading spaces in the Market, where people 
used political agents to acquire spaces that supposedly were only available for 
those with LCC and/or association membership.
Clientelism
The nature of the relationship between the state and other actors in Soweto Mar-
ket has created fertile grounds for clientelism. Having established that in Soweto 
Market, anything goes and no one escapes the overwhelming and dominating 
presence of political cadres, the study also demonstrated that party cadres have 
near total control of the Soweto Market, to the extent that they even can overrule 
the LCC. In many instances, decisions made by the Council are overturned by the 
cadres, which have gone so far as to assume most Council responsibilities in the 
Market. Thus, actions and decisions such as allocating trading space, collecting 
levies, providing security, and enforcing the regulations and norms for food deal-
ers are largely the purview of party cadres, with the local authority reduced to a 
subordinate position.
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While many state agents with an interest in the Market lament this frustrat-
ing situation, they have limited decision-making power, or power to change 
the course and occurrence of the Market’s function. The party cadres wield siz-
able power due to their linkages to the ruling party. Challenging the cadres may 
leave traders or state agents vulnerable to intimidation and violence. Personal 
interviews further revealed that LCC hesitates to enforce the established market 
regulations and rules uniformly in Soweto because of fears of interference and 
possible punishment.
While this dynamic may be hard to understand if viewed from a northern 
perspective, in Soweto Market, as in other spaces in African cities, urban gov-
ernance ‘encompasses multiple sites where practices of governance are exer-
cised and contested’ and ‘a variety of players, various layers of relations, and 
a broad range of practices of governance that may involve various modes of 
power, as well as different geographical scale of occurrence’ are found (Lin-
dell, 2008, p. 1880). Robins et al. (2008, p. 1079) posit that: ‘urban populations 
in the South tend to adopt plural strategies; they occupy multiple spaces and 
draw on multiple political identities, materialistic identities, and social relation-
ships, often simultaneously’. This has certainly been the case in Soweto, where 
the study observed food traders taking on materialistic identities, or various 
assumed identities that ensure access to the Market and protect their interests in 
the food sector.
Goodfellow (2010) argues that clientelism and patronage are very much part of 
political cultures, as citizens straddle ‘civil society’ and ‘state’ spaces in Soweto 
Market, which reality is vividly displayed in the ways that party cadres carry out 
their activities. The success of strategies for survival and well-being in the Market 
depend on one’s ability to establish multiple strategic relationships and become 
visible to several powerful players. The relationship between ‘the citizen’ and ‘the 
state’ in many urban African settings seldom resembles the kinds of deliberative, 
democratic models of citizen participation promoted by normative discourses on 
state-society relations in the mainstream urban governance literature. We see this 
in Soweto Market, where unproductive practices in the formal systems are coun-
tered by clientelistic relations that simultaneously consolidate the resilience of the 
Market’s informal systems.
We observed that the ability to effectively trade in Soweto depends largely on 
networks and clientelistic relations, and that the workings of the state and society 
are clearly not monolithic, but rather divided and fractured. Finally, all of these 
relationships are weakened by infighting, poor organization, manipulation, and 
corruption across the spectrum of Market actors. Relations in the market are con-
stantly modifying and never take on one permanent feature. What happens in the 
market is under the bedrock of messy and wickedly complex relations between 
the top-down state and bottom-up urban populations seeking to survive the harsh 
conditions of urban poverty. Both the state and society use multiple tactics involv-
ing loyalty, identity, solidarity, and clientelism to exert influence on each other 
and extract benefits form the marketplace.
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Analysis: conceptual implications
A lucrative space for both formal and informal food dealers in the Lusaka City 
region, Soweto Market markedly manifests the politics of livelihood systems. 
Here we see various actors deploying a range of tactics and tools to participate, 
and ensure their continued operation and access to Soweto, as traders or other-
wise. This fight for access is seen most clearly in the way political party cadres 
force other actors (traders, wholesalers, and farmers) to pay multiple ‘unexplained 
levies’ in order to participate in the Market. Using the traders’ fear of eviction, 
party cadres extract taxes and enforce other localized regulations. Meanwhile, 
the state systems and organizations (LCC and associations) intended to promote 
accountability and participation in the Market are weak, failing to regulate food 
trading or, perhaps more significantly, to resist the very strong informal sector 
power of the party cadres. The combination of these characteristics of market 
management systems in Soweto Market have resulted in persistent low-level con-
flicts and persistent clashes of interests.
The following section analyses the social and economic implications of the 
formal-informal relations and interactions in Soweto on food traders. Identifying 
and analysing the conceptual significance of relations in Soweto Market on urban 
studies and urban interventions in the African context, our findings also speak 
to a gap in that body of literature and research. As such, it is our hope that these 
findings will contribute to conceptual innovations and generate new learnings on 
urban food markets and governance in African cities.
Significance of findings to questions of formal-informal interface
The study shows how intertwined the formal and informal systems are in Soweto Mar-
ket, and that the market’s formal and informal systems are contradictory, complemen-
tary, and interdependent. The allocation of space and enforcement of physical security 
and health and hygiene standards are undertaken by both city officials and political 
party cadres. The produce associations are also major players in enforcing both formal 
and informal norms, regulations, and laws governing operations in Soweto Market. 
Next to those realities is the fact that political cadres ultimately have final say about 
what happens in the Market. As such, delineating formal from informal systems and 
practices in the Market is a fool’s errand. The market space is a continuum that is 
neither formal nor informal, but rather a zone of constant change and evolution, the 
character of which is shaped by both formal and informal rules concerning market 
operations. Ideas around belonging and becoming in Soweto Market are subject to 
various multiple factors that are both contradictory and complementary.
Arbitrary ‘urban things’ and a clash of governmentalities  
in Soweto Food Market
The study established that use of force for manipulative purposes is rampant in 
Soweto Market, and has given birth to a rampant case of what Pieterse (2011a) 
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calls arbitrary ‘urban things’ – or how the arbitrary exercise of power gives rise 
to manipulative urban politics in African city contexts. As discussed earlier, the 
political cadres constantly and arbitrarily exert force over other actors, imposing 
serious sanctions (from intimidation to forfeiture of trading spaces) if those actors 
refuse or report such ‘illegal’ behaviour to the LCC, which in any case is largely 
impotent to act against the cadres. Further, the difficulty of delineating genuine 
from non-genuine party cadres in Soweto has created a behavioural free-for-all 
where anyone can claim to be part of the ruling political party, thus throwing the 
idea of spatial and social order, rule of law, and protection of urban rights in deep 
jeopardy, while also rendering traders ‘space-less’, as they are deprived of any 
form of proper recourse.
This study has shown that the ability to engage in food trading in Soweto Mar-
ket is a direct outcome of one’s ability to successfully connect with agents who 
control the Market. Market efficiency has been undermined by fractured relation-
ships within civil society (associations and groupings), as well as the relation-
ships between the state and civil society, which are characterized by corruption 
and manipulative acts (Lindell, 2008; Robins et al., 2008). Unsurprisingly, trust 
among Market-space players has eroded, causing rampant manipulative acts from 
both state and non-state actors to flourish. The reality of this state of affairs has 
served to increase costs for food traders, reduce the Market into a site for manipu-
lation and criminality, and exclude weaker members of society (e.g., members of 
opposition political parties, women, and disabled food dealers), despite state prac-
tices that claim to offer physical and social security at Soweto Market. That said, 
the state is also constantly evolving. This speaks to how the governance of Soweto 
Market ‘encompasses multiple sites’, meaning the state authority engages with a 
variety of players, various layers of relations, and a ‘broad range of practices of 
governance that involve various modes of state power at different scales’ (Lindell, 
2008, p. 1880). In other words, while the state in many instances is not sovereign 
over Soweto Market’s networks and trading spaces, operations, activities, and 
outcomes, it retains the potential to steer all of these (Rhodes, 1997).
The existence of governance from above – that is, the state presence as embod-
ied by the LCC as well as the political party cadres – provides a sense of legiti-
macy and power to market relations, and allows certain actors to claim due and 
undue privilege (e.g., levies paid to party cadres, allocation of trading rights in the 
Market, etc.). In Soweto, one cannot trade if not recognized by the ‘right’ people; 
specifically, ruling party cadres, the LCC, and/or other structures recognized by 
the ruling party. This system where political recognition (through the local state 
and ruling party agents) is tied to the allocation of responsibilities and privileges 
allows the state to control traders in Soweto Market, as the latter require registra-
tion and recognition to do business. Thus, the state and party cadres give or take 
traders’ rights and freedoms in Soweto Market, and, most importantly, bend the 
rules to their advantage.
At the same time, conflict and deviance from the norm also exist in Soweto 
Market. Manifesting ‘governmentality from below’ (Roy, 2009), non-state actors 
such as produce associations and political party cadres have formed rules and 
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norms of operating in Soweto Market and sub-locations within the food sec-
tion. Thus, while party cadres on one hand assume the role of state actors, on the 
other hand they camouflage themselves, taking on multiple roles in order to make 
claims from various positionalities of privilege in Soweto Market. Meanwhile, 
although our research concluded that there is space and a need for the develop-
ment of SSE in the Market, currently there is no group that has shown an inclina-
tion to take this on.
In sum, players in Soweto Market management exhibit various traits (Roy, 
2009): collude with the state and act against weaker Market groups; become 
exclusionary in their practices; collaborate with the state to deliver services such 
as security, sanitation, etc.; and behave unilaterally and arbitrarily to protect their 
interests. This array of practices serves to either increase or undermine the legiti-
macy of a wide spectrum of the Market’s actors, with questions of legitimacy 
creating grounds for conflicts. Such fluidity in turn creates fertile ground for state 
rules (through LCC) to clash with community rules (as established and imple-
mented by party cadres and interest groups), as evidenced by food traders opting 
to register with and obtain trading rights from party cadres only, thus snubbing 
LCC and produce associations.
As decentralization efforts in Zambia coincide with Lusaka’s rapid growth, 
Lusaka’s urban food security issues appear to suffer from a lack of horizontal 
cooperation across sectors, as well as vertical coordination across tiers of gov-
ernment (Resnick, 2017). We argue for a conceptualization of the state, society, 
and relations between them that views the whole as a contested sociopolitical 
mosaic. Further, this view acknowledges that governmentalities from both above 
and below are constantly clashing, thus shifting the power and political dynamics 
that structure that mosaic.
Conclusion
Critically analysing the dynamics shaping relations in the Soweto Food Market, 
this chapter has shown how the formal-informal duality is in fact nonexistent. We 
argue that Soweto Market is a contested political commodity, and that relations 
between food traders and centres of control are largely based on political rational-
ity. Further, we observed that food systems in the Market are under a political grip 
that uses food trading to manipulate the publics in Soweto. These findings point 
to the reality that while designated as a ‘formal’ space, the urban marketplace is 
largely an informal site, where the state is weak, and much governance happens 
beyond it. Governance, then, must be understood as ‘a broad range of practices 
that may involve “various modes of power and contestations” ’ (Lindell, 2008, 
p. 1880), where the complex relations between formal and informal actors are a 
form of ‘provisional governance’ (Simone, 2004; Pieterse, 2010; Schindler, 2017; 
Foucault, 1980; Foucault & Hurley, 1990; Allen, 2004), and where the idealized 
figure of the ‘stakeholder’ – who is theoretically free, and encouraged to partici-
pate in governance, and by extension, governance of public space – does not have 
much sway (Swyngedouw, 2005).
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That is, in urban public spaces like Soweto Market, state promises of empow-
erment are paralleled by often undemocratic and authoritarian state processes 
and actions that lead to a substantial democratic deficit (Swyngedouw, 2005), 
uneven access to resources and livelihood opportunities (Pieterse, 2010), and 
skewed influence on governance institutions that collectively can result in out-
right exclusions, but also to partial and problematic inclusions that must be exam-
ined critically. The Soweto Market’s hybridized governance framework, with its 
contradictory tendencies and manipulative acts (Swyngedouw, 2005), compli-
cate citizens’ relationships to and influence on the formal and informal systems 
and structures operating therein, thus keeping those relationships insufficiently 
codified to support the emergence of a strong social solidarity economy and/or 
good governance. Indeed, the lack of effective counterhegemonies, as could be 
manifested by food trader groupings, exacerbates the existing political hegemony. 
While SSE theoretically could serve as a counterhegemony to normative urban 
market management and operationalization, the reality remains that SSE would 
only work in circumstances where civil society and social mobilization are well 
thought out and organized. Currently, social mobilization for public good remains 
a challenge in many African cities and urban markets, including Soweto.
In sum, the Soweto Market case supports our conclusion that urban govern-
ance in African cities is undergoing informalizations; that is, it is highly frag-
mented and fluid, and contests the assumptions that underlie northern debates on 
urban governance and, by extension, the nature of the urban in Africa. Based on 
our findings, we argue that the interwoven formal-informal relations in Soweto 
Market are structured by ‘multiple sites’ of power and control, and that this con-
ceptual finding is extremely relevant to the debates over the politics of urban 
livelihoods in African settings, and the political economy of urban informality and 
urban markets (Van Gent et al., 2014; MacLeod, 2011). Conceptual and policy 
innovations designed to transform African urban spaces must be driven by this 
concept of power and control located in ‘multiple sites’ power, which demands 
more nuanced understandings of the richly layered nature of urban settings like 
that found in Soweto Market.
The work presented in this chapter was only possible thanks to the use of 
co-production methods, which forced us to challenge traditional disciplinary 
approaches to urban space governance, and brought all relevant teams together 
in one room to critically dissect a complex and wicked issue. Collaboratively 
exploring policy options for better-managed urban markets in Lusaka, we came 
to appreciate the significant and emotive challenge facing public servants who 
deal with the daily politics of urban markets while striving to remain professional. 
Thus the co-production approach enabled us to explore the real feasibility of pol-
icy options, such as phased and partial integration of various informal food actors 
(e.g., food brokers) into the Market’s formal management systems.
We argue that further comparative studies of such sites could offer robust and 
concrete possibilities for radically contributing to a new body of urban theory, 
urban studies, and critical urban theory, as well as advancing ideas of state-society 
relations and understanding of collective production of the urban in Africa. Such a 
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progressive intellectual positioning could serve as a bedrock to radically transform 
the current deeply entrenched hegemonic policy caricatures of African urbanism, 
and thus begin shifting the balance of power in favour of diversity, inclusivity, and 
a globally transformative urban agenda.
Recommendations
This chapter has argued that urban governance and, by extension, governance of 
urban public spaces is in a post-political or post-democratic governance era, and 
that a new fusion of formal-informal systems and practices of governance must be 
acknowledged and reckoned with if transformative interventions are to meet with 
success in African cities. We have shown that urban market governance as seen in 
Soweto Market is based on the realities of the formal-informal continuum, where 
dynamic and subjective semi-formal protocols are grounded in ideas of loyalty 
and power and the survivalist nature of urban livelihoods. As such, any policy 
hoping to transform African cities must understand and speak to these realities. 
Based on these findings, we submit the following recommendations:
Firstly, interventions in urban markets need to be framed within the political 
reality of those market spaces. Soweto is a political and economic space that is 
governed by highly intertwined formal and informal systems and institutions. 
Thus, policy and practical measures to improve food trading needs to recognize 
and engage with the actual political forces at work in the Market.
Secondly, having established that governance in Soweto Market does not con-
form to western democratic norms, interventions to promote and protect urban 
rights must acknowledge and incorporate the ‘arbitrary urban things’, and how 
they play out in real life.
Thirdly, authorities’ efforts must move beyond the formal-informal binary, and 
rather seek to engage with the formal-informal continuum as the site for trans-
formative Market policy in particular, and urban policy in general. This could 
involve actions like revising capital sourcing to formalize the informal sources 
of capital (e.g., strengthening the lending capacity of produce associations) and 
establishing a formally recognized hybrid governance structure, such as a Market 
Board composed of both state agencies and informal actors (e.g., party cadres, 
interest groups such as loaders, among others).
Finally, the co-produced research presented here reinforces the need for stud-
ies of urban spaces, particularly in the global South, to methodologically extend 
beyond traditional disciplinary silos if they are to advance either policy or intel-
lectual agendas.
Notes
 1 Zambia’s Markets and Bus Stations Act of 2007, which covers governance around mar-
ketplaces, divides markets into ‘formal’ and ‘informal’, rendering traders and vendors 
who do not comply with statutory requirements illegal and thus subject to sanction. 
Based on this framing, the activities taking place in the Soweto Market can be defined 
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as extra-legal in terms of the Act, though in practice the trading taking place reflects new 
norms and evolving realities.
 2 Pieterse (2010) describes ‘tough material conditions’ as a context in which exploitative 
systems of daily rule govern every facet of life in African informal spaces (markets 
and settlements), and where the overwhelming majority of the urban population is left 
largely to its own devices for daily survival.
 3 Political party cadres grant access to the markets usually through rent seeking; traders 
who oppose or refuse to comply are vulnerable to physical violence and/or being barred 
from trade.
 4 Political parties that have governed Zambia since political independence in 1964 have 
included UNIP, MMD, and PF.
 5 www.africancentreforcities.net/programme/mistra-urban-futures/citylab/
 6 Market leadership management structures include the chairpersons and secretaries of 
produce associations, political parties, and LCC as well as various stakeholders and 
interest groups that do not belong to associations, including the loaders.
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3  Formal-informal interface
Comparative analysis between 
three Egyptian cities
Omar Nagati and Beth Stryker1
Introduction
Research on informality tends to treat informal and formal zones as discrete, and 
often homogenous entities, thus reproducing the segregation, marginalization, 
and exclusion of informal neighbourhoods. Seeking to challenge the perception 
of the dualistic city, we examine the formal-informal interface as a place with 
links to both spaces, and from which we can ultimately formulate appropriate 
integrated policies.
Current policy in Egypt around urban informality is based on a characteri-
zation of informality as an abnormal and inherently negative phenomenon that 
can only be solved by its removal from the city, or, at best, through upgrade and 
reform. This characterization, bolstered by the lack of economic profit extracted 
from informal settlements in the form of property taxes, continues to influence 
the two current policy approaches to engaging with urban informality: preventa-
tive and interventionist. The former, which includes ‘belting’ measures that build 
formal districts around informal areas, seeks to limit expansion of the informal. 
Meanwhile, interventionist approaches endeavour to remove, displace, or upgrade 
informal areas through measures like the resettlement process, whereby unsafe 
areas are cleared and residents are relocated to newly built areas in the outskirts 
of the city (Hasan, 1989).
Despite the general trend towards the integration of informality in the urban 
fabric, urban policies continue to uphold a formal-informal dichotomy. This dual-
istic view of the city continues to engender challenges, controversies, and contra-
dictions around how informality is perceived and handled.
Problem statement: current policy
In the Greater Cairo Region (GCR), current policy dictates that district boundaries 
are delineated based on the informal or formal nature of the built environment. 
This key policy contradiction – effectively institutionalizing the separation of for-
mal and informal neighbourhoods – may be said to represent Egyptian government 
policies for urban areas more generally. Such urban policies further perpetuate 
existing imbalances between formal and informal areas through budget allocations.
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Comparing the local development budget allocation per capita in the GCR 
districts with a map of Cairo’s formal and informal areas, we see that informal 
areas receive far less funding for development than do formal districts (Tadamun, 
2015). For example, the informal areas of Bulaq al-Dakrur and Shubra, which 
have the highest concentrations of urban poor and thus require more services, 
receive a comparatively lower percentage of the local development budget per 
capita than formal areas such as Madinat Nasr, Ma‘adi, and Misr al-Jadida, which 
already enjoy many services and established infrastructure. Such examples show a 
clear funding discrepancy, resulting in continued unequal access to basic services, 
including education and health care (Tadamun, 2015). Meanwhile, the GCR’s 
policies around upgrading informal areas continue to be grounded in the assump-
tion that informal areas do not fit the norm, and as such must be demolished and 
reconstructed according to national norms, rather than adapting infrastructures 
and services to the needs of informal areas.
Given these challenges in the ways in which formality and informality are 
understood and treated, this research has three aims:
• Challenge the status quo bifurcation of the city into formal and informal 
areas.
• Deliver a series of policy recommendations based on the aim of integrating 
informal practices into the city.
• Provide a comparative framework that facilitates knowledge-sharing between 
African cities, allowing further insight into the nature of the formal-informal 
interface across the continent, while also promoting a nuanced understanding 
of their local contexts.
Context: introduction to informality
Over the last few decades, urban informality has emerged as a critical issue 
impacting large metropolises today (Soliman, 2004; Simone, 2002; AlSayyad, 
2004). A literature review reveals that research on informal areas tends to 
examine their historic, socioeconomic, and geographic aspects independently 
from those of the formal sector.2 While both informal and formal areas are 
marked by spatial and social segregation, previous literature has at times 
deepened the divide between informal and formal areas, enhancing existing 
social and physical boundaries with theoretical constructs that reinforce a 
story of two separate cities (Viquez Abarca & Hernandez Garcia, 2017; UN-
Habitat, 2010).
What is informality?
Our research hinges on an analysis of urban informality as a spatially produced 
urban condition that takes place outside formal regulations in response to the 
withdrawal of the state. In Egypt, informality emerged in the early 1960s, and 
proliferated in response to state deregulation in the 1970s (Sims, 2010). Thus, 
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informality is understood to refer to actions undertaken by individuals and com-
munities to meet their own needs, outside of legal means recognized by the state.
Formal-informal interface in Egypt
In Egypt, as elsewhere, informality is influenced by responses to governmental 
policies, but also triggers new governmental responses. Egyptian central authori-
ties’ response to informality has evolved over the decades in relation to percep-
tions and definitions of informal areas. By examining the evolution of urban 
informality in Egypt, we see how cities’ morphologies have changed alongside 
gradual policy shifts.
Evolution of urban informality in Egypt: 1950–2018
Informal housing development has existed in Egypt since the 1950s, when new 
rent control laws reduced rental market profitability, prompting the mainstream 
real estate market to become predominantly owner-occupied. A housing shortage 
resulted, as demand for housing outweighed supply (Khadr & Bulbul, 2011). The 
earliest manifestations of informality in Egypt responded to this housing demand, 
with informal construction developed on agricultural lands at urban fringes. The 
Figure 3.1 Izbat Awlad al-‘Alamin Duqqi: Informal Enclave within the Formal City
Source: Authors
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government presented no official resistance to these first informal settlements, and 
while officials granted permission to some dwellers to remain in their locations, 
they also abdicated responsibility to provide basic amenities for informal settlers 
(Center for Sustainable Development, 2013). During the 1960s, informal settle-
ments expanded due to rural-urban migration, spurred by employment opportuni-
ties in industrial zones adjacent to large cities.
During the Arab-Israeli conflict (1967 to 1973), financial resources mobilized 
for military needs led to decreases in public housing project investment. Mean-
while, 1.5 million people evacuated from the Suez Canal zone fled to other cities. 
With formal housing development stalled due to war efforts, informal develop-
ment grew considerably (Soliman, 2007). Again, authorities overlooked this 
growth, partly because it largely took the form of village expansions in the rural 
peripheries, where building permits were not required (Hassan, 2012).
Post-war, the government intensified efforts to rebuild the country’s economy, 
directing resources to modernize formal area infrastructure and to develop new cit-
ies (e.g., Sadat, Sixth of October, and Tenth of Ramadan), as dictated by new town 
policies, which aimed to redistribute the urban population and build alternatives 
to informal development (Sims, 2010). New town development was undertaken 
in the context of Sadat’s Open Door Economic Policy (Infitah), which marked 
the first wave of the liberalization of Egypt’s economy (Mkandawire & Soludo, 
1999). Significant capital investments in housing increased land values to unprec-
edented levels, leading to high inflation, a real estate bubble, and a lack of afford-
able housing (Evin, 1985). As a result, low-income and middle-class residents, 
and Egyptian workers returning from the Gulf countries, turned to the informal 
sector and peri-urban suburbs to address their housing needs (Sims, 2010).
By the 1980s, the prominence of urban informal areas prompted measures lim-
iting ‘illegal’ urbanization, such as Egyptian Military Decrees 1 and 7, which 
forbid encroachment on agricultural land (Séjourné, 2009). However, informal 
settlements continued to grow. With the state declining to provide basic services 
for these settlements, civil society networks funded by religious charitable groups 
stepped in to provide services, infrastructure, hospitals, education, security, and 
more. During this time, political discourse began demonizing informal areas as 
breeding grounds for Islamic fundamentalism. By the close of the 1980s, the 
growth rate of informal settlements had surpassed that of formal areas in Egypt. 
Between 1986 and 1996, the growth of informal construction in Egypt was esti-
mated at 3.2% per year, compared to 1.1% in formal districts, while the popula-
tion growth rate in informal settlements reached 3.4% per year, compared to 0.3% 
in legal areas (Payne, 2005).
In the early 1990s, another policy shift occurred. Attempting to capitalize on 
existing housing stock in informal areas, the government undertook to upgrade 
informal settlements. The 1992 National Program of Urban Upgrading classified 
informal areas based on their potential for upgrade (1,201 areas) or for eviction 
(20 areas). It also began to provide basic infrastructure and municipal services in 
almost all informal settlements in the GCR. Meanwhile, the presidential decree 
for the ‘Citizen’s Right to Appropriate Infrastructure’ focused on providing 
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a combination of infrastructural improvements, social services, and physical 
restructuring in ‘safely built’ settlements (Hassan, 2012).
In 1996, the al-Shura Council (the upper house of representatives) produced 
a report arguing for an integrated approach to the problem of informal settle-
ments (Khalifa, 2011). Governmental policies consequently shifted from a singu-
lar focus on physical upgrading, to plans that integrated informal neighbourhoods 
within the formal city. During the early 2000s, this notion of ‘integration’ came 
to replace the concept of ‘upgrading’. Integration included three basic aspects. 
Firstly, physical integration involved opening roads, connecting infrastructure 
networks and public services, and integrating informal areas in the city’s offi-
cial maps. Secondly, social integration sought to promote social development. 
Thirdly, juridical integration involved property regularization, land titling, and 
the resolution of land tenure issues, as a means to complement citywide cadastral 
needs to enable property tax collection (Hassan, 2012).
In the mid-2000s, policy shifted again. With the Ministry of Local Develop-
ment counting 1,171 informal areas with a total population of 15 million in 2007 
(Payne, 2005), a new approach was undertaken to control informal growth by 
planning the fringes of the city before they could be occupied by informal con-
struction. From 2004 to 2008 the government implemented an informal settle-
ment belting programme (Tahzim al-‘Ashwa’iyat) intended to restrict the growth 
of informal settlements through the construction of formal housing in strategic 
regions (Tadamun, 2016).
In 2008, the Informal Settlement Development Facility (ISDF) was established 
to coordinate efforts and finance the development of informal areas. The ISDF 
initiated a significant ideological shift in the government’s approach to informal 
urbanization, notably by modifying the vocabulary used to describe informality. 
Common terms such as ‘Slums’, ‘Informal Settlements’, or ’ʻAshwa'iyat’ were 
replaced by two distinctive terms: ‘Unsafe Areas’ and ‘Unplanned areas’. Unsafe 
areas are characterized as subjecting people to life-threatening conditions, such as 
inappropriate housing, exposure to health threats, or tenure risks, while unplanned 
areas are usually noncompliant with planning and building laws and regulations 
(Nassar & Elsayed, 2018). Thus, informality could be defined on the basis of 
either legal status and/or physical conditions (Piffero, 2009). The ISDF’s approach 
to unsafe areas was either to remove and rebuild in situ, or to relocate residents 
(Hassan, 2012). In high land-value areas, informal settlements were removed and 
people relocated, in many cases to unsuitable areas.
The current period (since the 25 January 2011 revolution), is marked by 
large-scale national construction of new housing projects using public funds, 
and alternative approaches to informality undertaken by new urban practices. 
While international organizations (e.g., Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit GIZ, Agence Française de Développement [AFD], and United 
Nations Women) are funding research and implementation of projects promoting 
in situ upgrading grounded in participatory engagement of neighbourhood resi-
dents, new urban practices (e.g., CLUSTER, Takween, Madd, and 10Tooba) are 
attempting to address informality as part of the solution, rather than the essential 
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problem, facing large metropolises today. Collectively, this research on the inter-
action between formal and informal zones is contributing to a redefinition of 
informality.
Methodology and framework
The core of this project took the form of fieldwork conducted in three cities, 
which were selected based on their relative size, location, and specific socioeco-
nomic characteristics: Cairo, the capital; Alexandria, Egypt’s second largest city; 
and Minya, a regional centre.
Informing our fieldwork process was a literature review on informality in 
Egypt and globally, utilizing academic sources, and government and international 
reports to extract statistical information, data, district boundaries, and more. In 
each city, the team identified and collaborated with local individuals and groups 
to compile literature, maps, and additional background material. The team identi-
fied practitioners, academics, community leaders, and experts in relevant fields of 
study in each city, utilizing local contacts to facilitate analyses on the ground, and 
to review findings.
CLUSTER utilized Cairo as a pilot for further field encounters, building on our 
experience undertaking urban research and design interventions in the city since 
2011. CLUSTER’s urban research methodologies aim to engage stakeholders in 
all stages of research. Such an approach seeks to promote an alternative mode of 
participatory planning and urban governance, which is particularly pertinent in 
Egypt, where elected city or district councils do not exist. Since 2011, CLUSTER 
has been documenting rapid political and urban change in Cairo, raising questions 
concerning informal economies and the right to the city, while focusing on the 
spatial manifestation of these practices.
CLUSTER’s research team conducted its first fieldwork stage in Cairo in 
August and September of 2017; Alexandria in October; and Minya in November 
of the same year.
The team’s proximity to and familiarity with Cairo enabled it to use the city as 
a pilot for the development of a set of four variables, which were used to exam-
ine the specificities of the formal-informal interface within each case study, and 
developed as an analytic framework for the comparative analysis. These four vari-
ables are:
• Borders: elements that separate the formal from the informal urban fabric. 
Borders can refer to infrastructural elements such as walls, railway lines, or 
artificial waterways (canals), or can result from topographical features. In the 
context of this research, borders are critical elements that impact the flow, or 
lack thereof, between formal and informal areas.
• Crossings: physical means to overcome borders, including features like rail-
way crossings, bridges, and tunnels. Whether built formally by the state, or 
informally by the community, crossings address a need for accessibility or 
flow, and often act as magnets for both informal and formal activities.
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• Activities: develop along the borders separating the informal and formal sec-
tors of the city. Some activities mainly serve the needs of residents in the 
informal sector – such as tuktuk networks connecting residents to planned 
components of the traffic network. Other activities serve both the formal and 
informal sectors, such as markets (formal or informal), often found around 
transportation hubs.
• Flows: the movement of goods, labour, or capital between or across both 
formal and informal sectors.
In each city, we examined earlier four variables at three different scales, from the 
macro to the micro-level. Each scale focused on different aspects of the formal-
informal interface.
• City scale: providing a macro overview of the relationship between the for-
mal and informal, this scale generally looks at urban corridors, transportation 
axes, infrastructural lines, topographical changes, urban fabrics, patterns of 
expansion, and overall density.
• District scale: focusing on select neighbourhoods where the symbiotic rela-
tionship between the informal and formal is relevant, this scale casts an eye 
to border lines, linkages, patterns, and footprints in terms of density, services, 
and flows across areas.
• Node scale: utilized to study the intersection between multiple axes where 
the informal and formal connect, this micro-scale examines the people tra-
versing the formal-informal interface, and the activities arising around cross-
ings and transfer points.
Based on a preliminary cycle of fieldwork in Cairo, and using the four variables 
and three scales of analysis as a coherent framework, the team was then deployed 
to Alexandria and Minya to examine the formal-informal interface in both cities.
In undertaking a comparative analysis of the three cities across the four vari-
ables (borders, crossings, activities, and flows), we sought to investigate two key 
questions:
• Despite existing physical borders, do the experiential flows and nodes at 
crossings challenge the formal-informal separation?
• What alternative planning policies could be adopted to foster integra-
tion and build on the complementarity between formal-informal modes of 
development?
Pictograms representing interface typologies were utilized throughout the research 
as a means to abstract a complex web of relations and facilitate a comparative 
analysis, such as the ones used in Figures 3.4 and 3.8.
Following fieldwork, we processed research materials, maps, images, and 
interviews, and employed visualization strategies to give shape to the patterns 
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Figure 3.2 Comparative Framework
Source: CLUSTER, 2018
analysed in the three cities. In this final stage, we also examined the opportunities 
interfaces provide to challenge formal-informal divisions.
Case studies: findings
Cairo
Located along the Nile Valley, Egypt’s capital city is the country’s cultural, politi-
cal, and economic centre. The GCR is comprised of three Governorates: Cairo, 
Giza, and Qalyubiya (which includes the district of Shubra al-Khayma). The 
GCR is the 16th largest metropolitan area in the world, with a 2017 population 
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of over 19,846,000, and an annual growth rate of around 2.2% since 2000 (World 
Population Review, 2018). The presence of industrial zones in the cities of Sixth 
of October and Tenth of Ramadan (both part of the GCR), have contributed 
to the capital’s role as a key manufacturing centre (Euromonitor, 2017; UCL, 
2003). In 2016, Cairo accounted for 33% of Egypt’s total gross domestic product 
(Euromonitor, 2017).
For centuries Cairo has expanded through successive waves of development 
and ever-increasing urbanization. Today, informality is one of Cairo’s defining 
features, and its dominant mode of urbanization. With the informal economy esti-
mated to incorporate over half of Cairo’s labour force, and informal neighbour-
hoods constituting 52.7% of Greater Cairo’s residential areas (World Population 
Review, 2018), distinctions between formal systems and informal practices have 
blurred.
Formal-informal interface: three scales
Our analysis of Cairo, based on case studies conducted at three scales (city, dis-
trict, node), identifies ways in which informality has contributed to the capital’s 
urbanization process, and how informality manifests within Cairo’s multilayered 
fabric.
City scale
Despite Cairo’s size and complexity, broad trends in the organization of the for-
mal and informal sectors emerge at the city scale:
• Cairo is characterized by an historic core, around which a ring of informal-
ity has progressively developed since the 1960s. Through expansion, for-
merly rural enclaves became part of its formal urban agglomeration (e.g., Mit 
‘Uqba within Muhandisin). Informal construction also occurred along urban 
corridors (e.g., along Hilwan Road to the south, and Pyramids Road to the 
southwest).
• Cairo is a mega-city, with infrastructural systems such as highways, railways, 
and major roads forming its dominant borders (e.g., al-Isma‘iliya Canal in the 
north and al-Autostrad to the east). In some cases, these infrastructural lines 
produce a sharp divide between formal and informal areas (e.g., between Ard 
al-Liwa and al-Muhandisin in the west, and Nasr City and ‘Izbat al-Hajjana 
in the east). In other cases, the formal-informal border is blurred, such as at 
the intersection of infrastructural lines, as is the case at Ghamra Station (a 
complex transport hub examined in this study; see Figure 3.4).
• Formal road infrastructures at the periphery of informal neighbourhoods are 
largely not connected to the road networks within informal areas, limiting 
access for residents of informal neighbourhoods to main transportation ser-
vices, and by extension, access to education, employment opportunities, and 
health services.
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District scale
Through fieldwork, four district-scale areas were analysed: Ard al-Liwa, Hilwan, 
Ghamra Station, and ‘Izbat al-Hajjana. In Ard al-Liwa, the strict division of for-
mal and informal areas that can occur along infrastructural borders is evident 
where the railway line separates this informal area from the formal area of al-
Muhandisin (Figure 3.5). Crossings, including pedestrian stairs and vehicle 
bridges, are distributed along this boundary to enhance the connection between 
the areas. Multiple public services, transportation hubs, commercial and enter-
tainment activities can be found in the spaces adjacent to these crossings.
Node scale
At the node scale, the critical relationship between people’s needs and govern-
ment response can be seen through the evolution of physical infrastructure, as in 
the case of the railway crossing in Ard al-Liwa. Isolated from adjacent areas due 
to the presence of the railway tracks, Ard al-Liwa was linked to al-Muhandisin via 
an informal crossing. However, due to frequent train accidents, the government 
closed this crossing, replacing it with formal bridges for cars and pedestrians. This 
evolution from informal to formal exemplifies how local demand and community-
built solutions can be capitalized on by the government to improve mobility and 
accessibility across the network.
Analytical tools
BORDERS AND CROSSINGS
In Cairo, infrastructural lines form some of the main borders. In some cases, these 
boundaries mark a deliberate state effort to delineate formal and informal zones, 
as with the construction of the Ring Road in the late-twentieth century. However, 
over time, informal development around these ‘borders’ transformed them into 
mixed formal-informal urban corridors.
Isma‘iliya Canal in northern Cairo constitutes an important fixed border, as it 
separates not only the formal and informal areas, but also demarcates the Cairo 
and al-Qalyubiya Governorates. Other canals in Cairo have either been infilled 
and developed or are in the process of being urbanized. As such, peri-urban irri-
gation canals are often rendered irrelevant once agricultural land is lost through 
urbanization, thereby increasing the likelihood these canals will be incorporated 
into the urban fabric, as in the case of al-Zumur Canal.
Topographical borders define some informal areas in Cairo. In such cases, 
local, incremental community efforts, such as the building of staircases, serve to 
mount otherwise impassable geographical barriers. Government upgrading efforts 
of informal areas often involve the reconstruction of such informal stairways, 
using more durable materials, and adding handrails. As excluded communities 
reclaim their rights to the city through makeshift solutions, the interfaces between 
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formal and informal areas develop beyond spatial barriers symbolic of structural 
division, to present opportunities for connection and reclaimed agency.
Cairo’s complex traffic and transit network has given rise to compound cross-
ings that include pedestrian, overpass, and flyover crossings, and in some cases 
informal street-level crossings. Frequently, these formal and informal cross-
ings act as hyper-junctures, where layers of public transit, including metro and 
regional train lines, intersect with informal transit networks, such as microbuses 
and tuktuks.
ACTIVITIES AND FLOWS
Cairo’s dynamic transport hubs and crossings function as nodes concentrating 
activities and flows of capital, labour, and goods between the informal and formal 
sectors. Formal and informal modes of transport generate significant pedestrian 
traffic in these areas, accounting for the correlation between street vendors and 
transport hubs.
Figure 3.5 Railway Border between Ard al-Liwa and al-Muhandisin
Source: Authors
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Alexandria
Alexandria is Egypt’s second largest city, with a population of about 4.9 million, 
increasing at an average annual rate of 2.3% since 1999 (Population of Alexan-
dria, 2017). Alexandria accounts for 40% of Egypt’s industry, and approximately 
80% of the country’s imports and exports move through its large seaport (Shoup, 
2017). Situated on the Mediterranean Sea, and in close proximity to numerous 
lakes, Alexandria attracts over 3 million visitors per year (Al Masalla, 2010).
Urban informality in Alexandria mainly emerged in the 1960s, when formal 
construction declined nationally, while migration to major cities like Alexandria 
increased. The majority of informal urban construction took place on agricultural 
land, without adequate urban infrastructure, as can be observed in Burj al-‘Arab 
al-Jadida and around Lake Maryut.
Today, 50% of Alexandria’s residential areas are informal. Occupying a net 
surface area of 34.2 km² (Soliman, 2002) and housing an estimated 1.5 million 
people, informal areas are high-density with poor road conditions, and lack com-
munity services and utilities (e.g., paved streets, adequate access to healthcare, 
education, and community facilities [Barthel et al., n.d.]). As such, informal areas 
in Alexandria are largely dependent on services from the formal areas, with resi-
dents in informal areas often relying on neighbouring areas to access services 
like secondary education. Urban sprawl and the densification of informal areas 
have exacerbated the inequality in access to services. Meanwhile, the continued 
influx of migrants from neighbouring areas to Alexandria has also increased land 
speculation, leading to the demolition of numerous historical buildings to make 
way for new developments.
Formal-informal interface: three scales
CITY SCALE
Successive periods of development over the twentieth century have reshaped Alex-
andria’s urban development, expanding urban areas from the old central districts 
(Wasat, Jumruk, and Gharb) towards the northeastern (al-Muntazah, Sharq) and 
southwestern (al-Amiriya) districts that today comprise modern Alexandria. Sev-
eral patterns delineating the formal-informal interface in Alexandria are evident:
• The city’s linear urban development has resulted in the creation of multiple 
urban layers: from older to newer housing, higher- to lower-income neigh-
bourhoods, and formal to informal modes of development.
• Socioeconomic inequalities are spatially inscribed in the city: upper-class 
residential areas have developed along the coast, south of which are the 
middle-class districts, with low-income areas typically constructed infor-
mally, behind the railway track and south of al-Mahmudiya Canal.
• Urban informality expanded the city mainly to the south of the Mahmudiya 
Canal and the railroad, and is characterized by the construction of urban 
blocks following the pattern of agricultural subdivisions.
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DISTRICT SCALE
Case studies were conducted on three districts: al-‘Asafra, al-Hadra, and Mina 
al-Basal.
The district of al-Hadra exemplifies the postindustrial transition that is chang-
ing the face of Alexandria through the conversion of old factories and warehouses, 
thus altering the area’s development from industrial to mixed-use.
Meanwhile, the Mahmudiya Canal is set to be filled and turned into a road in 
the context of the ‘Artery of Hope’ national project. Despite this transformation, 
the canal remains both a separator and a connector of the formal and informal. It 
connects by linking the formal industrial areas north of the canal with the more 
informal, mixed-used development, craftsman shops, and small workshops in the 
south, through symbiotic flows in terms of production lines and distribution.
NODE SCALE
Alexandria’s linear development has created a sequence of nodes at crossings 
along the railway tracks and canal. In al-‘Asafra, a sequence of railway crossings 
along the tracks are formed by staircases and pedestrian bridges. In addition to 
these formal crossings, several informal crossings over the railway illustrate the 
permeability of this border. Near these crossings, activities such as commercial 
kiosks and tuktuk and microbus stops have been established.
Analytical tools
BORDERS AND CROSSINGS
In Alexandria, infrastructural borders between the formal and informal include 
roads, tramway lines, and the railway parallel to the coast. Other borders are cre-
ated by waterways, such as al-Mahmudiya Canal in the southwest. These borders 
are crossed by bridges, overpasses, and a few tunnels, which together form a 
complex of nodes.
Informal crossings, such as the informal railway crossings in al-‘Asafra, have 
evolved in response to local demand. In some cases, the government has formal-
ized such crossings to address safety concerns, in response to accidents that have 
occurred. For example, in Mina al-Basal, a pedestrian bridge was constructed in 
2016 by the Alexandria Governorate, to link Kafr ‘Ashri to the main road, fol-
lowing several accidents involving students seeking passage by informal ferry to 
schools on the other side.3
ACTIVITIES AND FLOWS
In Alexandria, crossings are the dominant exchange points of activities and flows 
between the formal and informal sectors. Street vendors, often located at cross-
ings, serve those waiting for tuktuks, buses, and taxis. Further, the location of 
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industrial zones to the south and west of the formal districts of Alexandria marks 
them as areas in transition. This transition can be seen both in geographical terms, 
as the formal districts transition to informal sprawl to the south, as well as tem-
poral terms, as many of the old factories and warehouses are being demolished or 
converted, giving way to new mixed-use developments, contributing to a further 
blurring of the formal-informal interface.
Minya
The City of Minya is located in Upper Egypt, on the western bank of the Nile, 
241 km south of Cairo. It is the capital of the Minya Governorate, a rural gover-
norate which represents approximately 6.5% of Egypt’s total agricultural land. 
According to the 2012 residential census, 256,732 people reside in the city’s total 
area of about 11km2 (Populationcity.com, n.d.).
Throughout the nineteenth century, investment in large urban infrastructures 
(e.g., al-Ibrahimiya Canal and the railway line) contributed to the city’s urban 
expansion towards the Nile, as well as to the south and west. In the twentieth 
century, the city expanded largely to the north, where administrative offices and 
economic activities were located.
In 1960, Minya became the capital of the governorate, and some neighbouring 
regions were included within the formal city borders. Areas adjacent to the historic 
city centre were upgraded, and residents relocated. During the period from 1977 to 
1995, urban expansion continued towards the western region, where both formal 
and informal buildings were developed on the numerous agricultural plots available.
A population increase followed Minya’s physical urban expansion, particularly 
after the founding of the Minya University, which prompted the relocation of 
many services to the northern part of the city, and led to an increase in immigra-
tion from surrounding villages.
Formal-informal interface: three scales
CITY SCALE
The interface between formal and informal urban development in Minya is deline-
ated by the Ibrahimiya Canal, which divides the old planned district from recent 
informal development on agricultural land, marking a sharp distinction between 
the two conditions. Other characteristics of the formal-informal interface in 
Minya include:
• Northern expansion from the city centre has been driven by new district and 
investment plans, while southern expansion has been driven by private and 
informal development.
• Except for a few industrial installations and associated public housing, devel-
opment west of the canal is mostly informal, with persistent links to agricul-
tural land and a rural economy.
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• The area between the old core in the city centre and informal development 
to the south includes public housing projects encroached upon by informal 
areas, making it impossible to delineate clear boundaries between the formal 
and informal urban conditions, even on the block scale. Informal areas con-
tinue to expand to the southwest of the city, immediately adjacent to formal 
areas.
• Formal housing has been built surrounding rural villages, creating a belt of 
formal infrastructure that converts rural villages into informal enclaves.
DISTRICT SCALE
Formal and informal urbanization patterns were explored at the district scale in 
four informal districts: Abu Flu, Damaris, Maqusa, and ‘Ishash Mahfuz.
At this scale, the stark juxtaposition of formal-informal areas is evident. The 
district of Abu Flu features institutional and civic development (museum, parks, 
etc.) and private high-end housing along planned roads, as well as informal 
developments built around the former hamlet of Abu Flu. The close proximity of 
the different types of development creates stark juxtapositions: the tourist attrac-
tion of Akhenaten Museum sits less than 100 metres from the informal village 
of Abu Flu.
NODE SCALE
Minya has different types of crossings over the al-Ibrahimiya Canal and railway 
(Figure 3.8), some for vehicles and pedestrians, and others in the form of fuel 
infrastructure and pipes. The crossings not only connect the two banks of the 
waterway barrier, but also serve as conduits for flows of people, goods, services, 
and capital.
A wide range of activities is concentrated around each crossing, ranging from 
transportation hubs to informal markets and local services.
This study illustrates how all of these nodes tend to specialize according to 
context; for example, the Minya University pedestrian bridge was established to 
connect the Faculty of Dentistry on the western side with the areas of al-Akhsas, 
Ard al-Sultan, and Damaris. On both sides of the bridge there are Minya Youth 
Houses for students, as well as services such as print shops and stationary stores 
targeting university students.
Analytical tools
BORDERS AND CROSSINGS
Minya expanded linearly along the Nile and is bordered by the Eastern Desert 
Road and the Western Desert Road. The city has three compound urban separa-
tors: the Agricultural Road, which cuts through the city from north to south, the 
railway, and Ibrahimiya Canal, all of which run parallel to one another. The canal 
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circumscribes the expanding city, demarcating the formally built city on one side 
from the largely informal development on the other.
ACTIVITIES AND FLOWS
Like Alexandria, Minya’s formal-informal interface is most visible at crossings 
throughout the city, where flows of goods, people, and capital contribute to flour-
ishing markets. The flow of people to formal areas is driven by the presence of 
job opportunities and services, and is facilitated by the availability of public and 
private transportation. The flow of people to informal areas is driven by the low 
prices of goods and raw materials.
The complex layering of crossings can, in cases, limit the diversity of activities 
and flows. For example, staircases leading to pedestrian bridges are inconvenient 
for the elderly and people with disabilities. Street vendors posted along and under-
neath the staircases sometimes impede the dense flow of people.
Figure 3.8 Crossings Along the al-Ibrahimiya Canal in Minya
Source: CLUSTER, 2018
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Comparative analysis
City overview
Conducting a comparative analysis of the formal-informal interfaces in Cairo, 
Alexandria, and Minya, our methodology sought to arrive at a comprehensive 
understanding of the relationships between informal and formal areas in different 
urban contexts. To do this we analysed four variables (borders, crossings, activi-
ties, and flows) at three scales (city, district, node).
Adjusting the lens of analysis from macro to micro, we surfaced various 
dynamics that are essential to understanding the interaction between informal and 
formal areas, and which challenge a dualistic vision of the city. While the macro 
view presents what appears to be a fragmented urban fabric that is starkly divided 
between formally organized neighbourhoods and ostensibly spontaneously and 
haphazardly constructed areas, a closer micro-examination reveals a range of 
urban orders with different organizing principles and levels of ‘planning’.
At the micro-scale, we see how ‘crossings’ facilitate a wide array of activities 
and flows (of people, labour, and capital) between the informal and formal, and 
how these crossings help to overcome formal urban borders and resultant spatial 
segregation.
We now return to the two key questions driving this comparative analysis of 
three cities across the four variables of borders, crossings, activities, and flows:
• Despite existing physical borders, do the experiential flows and nodes at 
crossings challenge the formal-informal separation?
• What alternative planning policies could be adopted to foster integra-
tion and build on the complementarity between formal-informal modes of 
development?
On borders
Borders are defining boundaries that demarcate one area from another. Borders 
can also be compounded by additional barriers: for example, a railway may 
run parallel to a highway or a waterway. These compound borders often create 
less permeable interfaces, as people must bypass multiple obstacles to cross 
Table 3.1 General profile comparing the three cities under study
Cairo, capital city Alexandria, second Minya, city in 
largest city upper Egypt
Population 19,846,0004 4,930,0005 287,7236
Density (inhabitants/km2) 45,0007 30,0008 26,1579
Informal residential areas 52.7%10 50%11 32%12
Dwellers of informal areas 60%13 40%14 56%15
Source: Multiple (see endnotes)
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them. We divide border conditions into the following three types: infrastructure, 
topography, and waterways.
Infrastructure
These include physically constructed borders such as a railway, or highway, some 
of which were constructed with the intent of marking the edge of the city limits. 
Unlike topography, these borders are dynamic, marked by temporal traffic and 
intermittent crossings. Infrastructure like railways and highways usually have 
a buffer zone, resulting in a wider barrier, while also accommodating informal 
activities along those edges. Borders such as these usually pose safety issues and 
risks to cross, unless formally bridged by over- or underpasses.
Comparing the three cities, we found that railways and highways consistently 
acted as critical separators between formal and informal areas. In Cairo and Alex-
andria, the railways were constructed at the cities’ outer limits in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. As the cities expanded, these former borders 
became urban corridors traversing and reinforcing the formal-informal divide. 
In Cairo, infrastructure borders are generally compounded, combining layers of 
railways, highways, and in some cases, metro lines. In Minya, these infrastruc-
ture borders are distinct, and continue to clearly separate the formal city from the 
largely agricultural hinterland. In the industrial port of Alexandria, multiple infra-
structural lines (tram and train) have been built parallel to the sea, thus reinforcing 
the segregation between the northern and southern strips of the city.
Topography
Natural borders created by changes in elevation, topographical borders may be 
dangerous, as informal development along hilltops can lead to hazards and risks 
of rockslides.16 Topographical borders bar the movement of people, since cross-
ings require vertical circulation systems, such as stairs, ramps, escalators, or ele-
vators. As such, they often pose exclusionary barriers to elderly citizens or those 
with special needs.
In both Cairo and Minya, we found topographical borders located in the eastern 
parts of the city. In Cairo, the Muqattam Hills act as a powerful urban separator, 
while in Minya, the hilly topography of the Eastern Plateau creates a natural edge 
to incremental expansion eastwards. Minya’s topographical border is not con-
sidered as restrictive a barrier as the Muqattam Hills, in the sense that informal 
development leapfrogs the Eastern Plateau, extending further east to New Minya. 
There is no topographical change in Alexandria that affects the border condition 
of the city.
Waterways
Borders created by waterways (e.g., rivers, canals) cannot be traversed with-
out an artificial crossing, which requires both capital and technical resources to 
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build. The banks of waterways, which are in the public domain, are often occu-
pied by informal activities, including small ferries, storage areas, and leisure 
activities.
In Cairo, Alexandria, and Minya, rural to urban transformation is linked to 
the presence of canals originally built for irrigation purposes. In Minya, where 
rural activities remain dominant, waterways continue to be functional and well-
maintained. By contrast, in Cairo and Alexandria, canals are being filled or tun-
nelled (e.g., al-Zumur Canal in western Cairo, and the potential redevelopment of 
al-Mahmudiya Canal in Alexandria). These border transformations influence the 
relationship between formal and informal areas, changing the nature of crossings 
and the activities taking place around them.
POLICY-ORIENTED LESSONS LEARNED CONCERNING BORDERS
Opportunities Infrastructural lines such as railways and roadways tend to be 
more stable as borders than waterways, which can be filled or tunnelled and ren-
dered obsolete. In many cases, waterways are converted into infrastructural lines, 
thus transforming from one type of border to another, rather than being utilized 
for service or green corridors. Topography has proven to be the most uncompro-
mising type of border, only bypassed by the construction of stairways and ramps. 
Topographic edges can nonetheless offer rare opportunities for city views and 
potential recreational sites above the city smog.
Risks and challenges Some borders pose a security risk when crossing (e.g., 
accidents have been caused by the train passing through the border to Ard al-Liwa 
in Cairo, or at crossings on the al-Mahmudiya Canal in Alexandria). Topographic 
borders often pose the biggest risks; for example, in the case of a rock collapse 
in al-Duwayqa in 2008, the result of informal development built along the cliff’s 
edge without a proper drainage network or infrastructure.
Towards a successful policy Policies need to take into consideration the physi-
cal aspects and environment of each border, and identify the best and safest ways 
to create crossings. Successful strategies may entail turning borders into zones 
of exchange and interface, by either increasing crossing points (and thus render-
ing borders more permeable), and/or turning urban corridors along these borders 
into development zones, including parks and greenways in highly dense districts, 
which would be accessible to both sides of the (former) borders.
On crossings
Crossings connect informal and formal zones, and themselves may have formal 
or informal origins. Informally built crossings may sometimes be upgraded by 
the government, utilizing more durable materials. Conversely, formal crossings 
are often followed by informal adaptations. Formally built pedestrian overpasses 
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bridging railways, for example, are generally encroached upon by informal mar-
ketplaces on both ends, and sometimes along the crossings themselves.
The sheer size and complexity of infrastructures in Cairo and Alexandria con-
tribute to the presence in both places of multi-junction crossings, which in turn 
structure the relationship between formal and informal areas. Comparatively, 
Minya’s connections are simpler, due to the city’s relative size and infrastructure 
network.
Infrastructure
Unlike the multi-nodal urban pattern of Cairo, Alexandria and Minya are char-
acterized by linear urban developments, parallel to the sea and the Nile respec-
tively. Crossings in both Alexandria and Minya tend to follow established traffic 
corridors built perpendicular to the waterfront, extending into the narrow street 
networks of informal areas. This is visible in Minya’s infrastructure detailed in 
Figure 3.8.
Topography
Cairo and Minya share the eastern hills as borders and limits to urban expansion. 
In the Muqattam Hills and their extended plateaus in Cairo, a number of stair-
ways connect the planned districts below to informal housing on top. In Minya, 
a planned suburb has been developed beyond the eastern hills, connecting to the 
city core (which is both formal and informal) through a main artery. Alexandria 
has no significant topographical borders dividing informal and formal areas.
Waterways
Comparisons of waterway crossings in the three cities of Cairo, Alexandria, 
and Minya highlight the differences between Minya’s largely rural economy on 
agricultural land, and Cairo and Alexandria’s industrial complexes. Crossing al-
Ibrahimiya Canal in Minya are flows of rural products, as well as individuals 
seeking access to services lacking in the informal peri-urban area. Alexandria 
has a wide variety of crossings, including bridges for pedestrians and vehicles, as 
well as informal ferry crossings. In Cairo, most waterway canals within the urban 
agglomeration have been filled and transformed into traffic arteries.
POLICY-ORIENTED LESSONS LEARNED CONCERNING CROSSINGS
Opportunities
• Adapted to the flow of goods and people: a crossing that acts as a major node 
is one that accommodates dense flows and welcomes a wide array of activities 
and services. An example is Ghamra Station in Cairo, which accommodates 
kiosks, informal commercial activities, seating areas, and flows of people.
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• Adapted to needs: crossings must be adapted to the needs of residents, with 
ramps, escalators, and facilities for the elderly and people with disabilities. 
Crossings are more inclusive if they provide seating spaces, such as al-
‘Asafra crossing in Alexandria.
• Adapted to the context: the environment surrounding a crossing can have a 
significant impact. For instance, crossings in Minya, a city of predominantly 
agricultural industry, must include space for the transportation of cattle and 
large carts of fresh produce.
Risks and challenges
• Some crossings are unsafe for pedestrians. For instance, street-level cross-
ings of railway lines and highways, such as the Ring Road in Cairo, are very 
dangerous and have repeatedly witnessed accidents.
• Some formally built crossings are not adapted to the needs of the residents, 
in which cases there have been informal responses to adapt them. This was 
the case in the renovation of the pedestrian crossing from Ard al-Liwa to 
al-Sudan Street, where authorities built a three-metre wide pedestrian bridge 
to replace the preexisting 30-metre wide street-level crossing. Ten times 
narrower than the previous crossing, the new bridge was subject to many 
stresses, and heavy traffic was a factor in the breakdown of the sole escalator 
leading to the pedestrian bridge.
• Old and deteriorating infrastructures are safety hazards.
Towards a successful policy To ensure connectivity across borders, a compre-
hensive policy plan must ensure that multiple crossings are placed along the bor-
ders. Key connection nodes should be identified as a way to alleviate pressure on 
traffic. Furthermore, crossings should be adapted to the needs of residents and 
to the context in which they are built. Studies of flows should be undertaken to 
determine the appropriate size and structure of crossings. In sum, crossings should 
act as nodes for development opportunities, connecting both sides, rather than 
operating as bottlenecks hindering flows and limiting traffic.
On activities
Nodes are bustling with energetic social and economic activity due to their stra-
tegic locations at the intersection of formal and informal neighbourhoods (Fig-
ure 3.9). Our field research identified several categories of activities at these 
formal-informal intersections.
Informal markets
Informal markets are often located near crossings and transportation hubs, due to 
the flow of pedestrians. They may be semipermanent (booths, kiosks, or stands) 
or mobile and easily disassembled, and may be arranged in a linear fashion along 
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the street, or in marketplace agglomerations. Markets vary in type, selling a range 
of products, including fresh produce, accessories, clothing, and more.
Transportation hubs
Transportation hubs at the intersection of formal and informal areas are typically 
organized informally, with rules set and enforced by individuals who mitigate dis-
putes. These hubs act as transfer points between informal and formal areas, which 
include differing modes of transport. For example, as one moves from informal to 
formal areas, the number of tuktuks decreases, as they are illegal and not adapted 
to wide roads and highways.
Municipal services
Due to the absence of municipal services in informal areas, nodes act as the first 
point of service provision accessible to residents of informal areas, with official 
services such as police checkpoints, post offices, and ATMs located in these areas. 
The land surrounding public infrastructure lines such as highways, railways, 
canals, electrical lines, and oil and gas pipelines, is reserved for maintenance or 
possible expansion. Therefore, a legal buffer zone is created around these major 
infrastructure lines, which is used for public services, while it is simultaneously 
encroached upon by informal activities.
Entertainment services
As critical sites of interaction, crossings are prime locations for entertainment 
services such as Ferris wheels, amusement parks, and games for children. Enter-
tainment services may be built on private land in a deliberate effort to prevent 
alternative uses by people, or as temporary installations on public land during 
seasonal festivities and celebrations.
Waste disposal
Municipal dumpster pickup points are often located in the interfaces between for-
mal and informal areas. When dumpsters are absent or removed, these sites can 
accumulate waste.
POLICY-ORIENTED LESSONS LEARNED CONCERNING ACTIVITIES
Opportunities Nodes act as centres for the exchange of goods and services and 
are sites of formal and informal transport and entertainment facilities. The activi-
ties concentrated around nodes allow residents from underserved informal areas 
to access needed services and goods.
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Risks and challenges The interface along railways and similar borders risk being 
turned into waste disposal areas, contributing to pollution, and raising questions 
of security for children. Another challenge presented by these sites is increased 
traffic congestion, if activities are not properly managed.
Figure 3.9 Activities and Flows
Source: CLUSTER, 2018
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Towards a successful policy Considering each node as a planning and develop-
ment package can foster linkages and flows around traffic hubs. Such urban inter-
ventions at the node scale can act as a form of urban acupuncture, transforming 
sites of exclusion into opportunities for integration.
On flows
Flows trace the movement of residents between informal and formal areas, high-
lighting the social and economic interconnections between these areas (Fig-
ure 3.9). Our field research identified three types of flows: goods, labour, and 
capital.
Goods
In the movement from informal to formal areas, the flow of raw materials and 
fresh produce is typical, along with manufactured products such as wood, met-
alwork, and clothing. Raw materials may also be sent from formal areas to be 
manufactured in informal areas, then sold to the formal sector, as exemplified in 
the supply chain for small workshops in the furniture industry in Ard al-Liwa. 
Conversely, manufactured industrial goods such as air conditioners, cars, and 
pharmaceutical products move from formal to informal areas.
Labour
Most jobs in informal areas are held by neighbourhood residents. Some workers 
in informal areas do not work in the informal sector, instead finding employment 
in the formal service economy (such as in domestic services), while others work in 
universities, government, schools, hospitals, and so on. Examining the reverse 
flow, we find workers from health clinics, municipal services, or religious institu-
tions moving from the formal to informal sector.
Capital
Informal to formal flows of capital occur through investment in formal educa-
tional and health institutions, or through capital used to purchase manufactured 
goods. Formal to informal flows occurs through revenue of labour in the formal 
market, capital to purchase goods and services in informal areas, capital invested 
in the construction industry and real-estate economy, and capital invested in 
infrastructure building and urban services. Investment from government (through 
different ministries, such as the Ministry of Health and Education, Local Devel-
opment, and Social Solidarity) and international agencies (e.g., German Inter-
national Development Agency GIZ, AFD, UN-Habitat, and the World Bank) 
provide services for low-income residents, and also contribute to flows of capital 
entering the informal sector.
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POLICY-ORIENTED LESSONS LEARNED CONCERNING FLOWS
Opportunities Based on a comparison of flows, we can identify opportunities to 
facilitate movement between zones that are conducive to the integration of infor-
mal and formal areas. Flows from informal to formal areas are more frequent than 
the reverse, as there are essential services, such as administrative and educational 
services, as well as job opportunities, that can only be accessed in formal zones. 
Flows vary in relation to activities in surrounding areas. For instance, in Minya, 
flows of goods from peri-urban informal areas to formal areas contain a concen-
tration of agricultural products, such as fresh produce. In Alexandria’s industrial 
areas, flows include raw materials such as wood or metal. In informal areas where 
garbage is recycled, such as Manshiyat Nasir and Ard al-Liwa in Cairo, there is a 
flow of domestic waste from formal to informal areas. This material is then recy-
cled and redistributed.
Risks and challenges Overemphasizing the directionality of certain flows may 
perpetuate a division between labour and service zones. Further, while perme-
ability may be posited as a desirable urban quality, the spillover of activities into 
areas for which these undertakings are not zoned may result in undesirable ten-
sions and conflicts. Further, one-directional flow from informal to informal areas 
indicates a draining of resources that might otherwise be potentially invested in 
local development.
Towards a successful policy An integrated policy not only entails improving 
physical connectivity across borders, but also improving the distribution of ser-
vices within neighbourhoods. The two-way movement of flows between informal 
and formal areas should be leveraged to promote the interdependence of these 
city sectors. Borders should be made more porous and crossings more efficient 
to promote flows of goods as well as services. Services (e.g., municipal, health, 
and financial) should be distributed across all zones to promote equal opportunity 
and access.
Conclusion and reflections
This research seeks to challenge an understanding of the city as divided along 
informal and formal lines, and to provide policy recommendations that promote a 
vision of an integrated city. Attempting to recontextualize informality in relation 
to the formal, we seek to understand the interconnections between informal and 
formal urban areas (Figure 3.10).
We utilized the variables of borders, crossings, activities, and flows to compare 
and highlight similarities and differences between the three cities, and to illumi-
nate larger questions around how to challenge the perception of a dualistic city; 
how to promote integrated urban policy; and how this comparative framework can 
be extended for use in other African cities.
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Employing different levels of analysis to examine the formal-informal interface in 
the context of Cairo, Alexandria, and Minya, our major findings can be summarized as:
• Informal processes are both diverse and intrinsic to the expansion of urban 
centres in the global South.
• Borders shape and continue to segregate the urban fabric in many ways, but 
they are also shaped and mediated by crossings. That is, where crossings 
meet borders, the formal-informal interface itself becomes a central node, 
where generative activities and sites such as marketplaces, kiosks, transpor-
tation hubs, and meeting places are likely to be found, and where flows of 
capital, labour, and goods take place.
• Despite the non-dualistic nature of this interface, governments and munici-
palities continue to adopt policies that treat formal and informal spaces and 
activities as if they were distinct parts of different cities.
Towards challenging the dualistic city
Throughout this chapter we have attempted to highlight elements that constitute 
and define the formal-informal interface. In the following section we propose 
three key concepts to frame this interface as a way to understand the city and 
challenge a dualistic perception.
1  The boundaries between the formal and informal blur around  
central crossing nodes
The connection between formal and informal is amplified at key nodes, where 
major borders intersect with crossings. In all three cities, crossings that inter-
sect compound layers of infrastructural and/or natural borders represent hyper- 
junctures, where informal activities thrive, and economic opportunities are created 
(e.g., the Ghamra Station in Cairo or downtown Minya Bridge).
Such crossings are often key nodes in the multimodal transportation system, 
including everything from tuktuk services to microbuses, public buses to metro 
lines. Within these spaces we see stands and kiosks established to sell fresh produce, 
manufactured goods, personal services, and much more. Also, emergent here is their 
relevance as social spaces, often providing entertainment for families and children.
2 The formal and informal are interconnected
As seen in Cairo, Alexandria, and Minya, formal and informal areas exist in con-
trast to each other, but also as intertwined patchworks, where borders can be hard 
to define. The formal and informal are interconnected as a result of different pro-
cesses, including:
• The juxtaposition of contrasting layers of urbanization, such as industrial 
installations, high-end development projects, state-owned developments, 
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public housing, and informal development. Together these layers create a 
complex matrix of housing types that can coexist within a single area.
• The tendency of informal developments to encroach upon formal structures 
(such as public housing in Minya, industrial buildings in Alexandria, or his-
torical areas in the south of Cairo), which in turn adapt to the informal.
• Formal urban development expanding to engulf rural settlements, in what 
used to be the outskirts of the city, rendering those settlements as informal 
enclaves, as is especially visible in Minya.
• The fragmented nature of formal planning encourages informal development 
in the interstices between formal developments, as seen in the unplanned 
spaces between state-owned lands and military barracks in northeast Cairo.
Finally, the formal-informal distinction is not only spatially blurred, but also 
economically and socially interconnected through flows of capital and labour. 
The informal economy’s impact is felt throughout all three cities, and to varying 
degrees at all scales, particularly around crossings.
3  The urban experience from both the formal and informal reflects 
continuity and complexity rather than division and contrast
The journey between the formal and informal parts of these three cities can be 
characterized by continuity and complexity. We argue that residents’ lived urban 
experience cuts across notions of separation produced by the spatial borders 
attempting to delineate formal and informal areas.
As depicted in CLUSTER’s collage (Figure 3.11) and animated video ‘Objects 
in the Mirror are Closer than They Appear’,17 which both depict the typical daily 
commute from the informal periphery to Cairo’s formal city core, the transition 
from the informal to the formal is marked by common elements, such as the pres-
ence of street vendors, informal fruit and vegetable stands, and vendors in the 
metro. The video also highlights the existence of informal practices within the 
heart of the formal city, emphasizing the theme of continuity over contrast. Illus-
trating the interface connecting formal and informal areas, the animation seeks 
to challenge perceived distinctions between the two, highlighting instead their 
interconnected nature.
Towards an integrated urban policy
An integrated urban policy that enhances the permeability of borders, if well-
implemented, could help overcome city fragmentation. It could also serve to 
improve equality and spatial inclusion (Mohamed et al., 2014) by countering the 
social segregation wrought by urban expansion that has cut off peripheral neigh-
bourhoods from city networks (Nagati & Stryker, 2013).
To mend this fragmentation, we propose authorities adopt policies that enhance 
the permeability of borders at the formal-informal interface. By fostering con-
nections instead of separations, we submit, a wider ripple effect may positively 
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influence the urban fabric of adjacent neighbourhoods. We argue for an integra-
tive policy that builds upon relationships between informal and formal neighbour-
hoods, and addresses the current territorial disparities.
Three main principles of proposed policy changes are as follows:
1 Revise district boundaries to include both formal and informal areas
Current development plans rarely consider informal areas in relation to surround-
ing neighbourhoods, thus reinforcing the divide between formal and informal 
areas. Instead, urban works should be surveyed and planned across a wider geo-
graphic area that intentionally includes both planned and unplanned areas, ensur-
ing an equal distribution of services throughout. These new inclusive boundaries 
should be carefully accounted for when collecting census district data, to ensure 
that skewed data and misrepresentations do not occur.
2 Increase the porosity of borders between informal and formal areas
This study found that borders represent critical connection points that can foster 
movement of people and flows through the construction of crossings and develop-
ment of infrastructure. As such, policy development should treat borders as areas 
of opportunity to link planned and unplanned areas.
3 Identify nodes as key points of urban interventions
The development of nodes as sites for urban acupuncture could positively impact 
both informal and formal areas. CLUSTER has piloted such development efforts, 
beginning in 2012 with our public-participatory proposal for a community park in 
the informal neighbourhood of Ard al-Liwa, located near a crossing, to the formal 
neighbourhood al-Muhandisin. This project is organized around lateral connec-
tions between the formal and informal sides, aiming to restructure the relationship 
from one of marginalization and dependency to one of integration and interde-
pendence. Such pilot interventions at these nodes could be scaled-up to develop 
integrated urban planning visions (Nagati & Elgendy, 2013).
Over the years, a number of CLUSTER’s design projects and pedagogical pro-
grammes have focused on the interface between formal apparatuses and informal 
practices, including the Urban Solid Waste workshop held in 2012, the Ard al-
Liwa Community Park 2012–15, the Ard al-Liwa Youth Centre design proposal 
in 2018, and CLUSTER’s ALFABRIKA Creative Lab, opened in 2019. ALFAB-
RIKA brings students and young designers together with local craftsmen through 
an exchange between design ideas and new technologies, on the one hand, and 
grounded practice and apprenticeship, on the other. ALFABRIKA acts as an 
inclusive space that fosters sustainable solutions, while supporting young design-
ers, students, local craftspeople, and creative industries, through workshops, 
exchange, production, and exhibitions.18
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Further, CLUSTER has undertaken extended pedagogical engagements in 
informal areas, such as Housing Cairo: The Informal Response, a collaboration 
led by MAS Urban Design ETH Zurich, which set new precedents to engage 
informality on its own terms (Angélil et al., 2016). Acknowledging the value of 
creative informal solutions, CLUSTER’s extended work on learning from infor-
mality has sought to decode the seemingly ‘spontaneous’ urbanism in Cairo, and 
develop tools to contribute to improving living standards in informal neighbour-
hoods without disrupting their ecosystems. This approach must be viewed against 
the state’s approach of demonizing, demolition, relocation, and replanning.
Towards a comparative framework between African cities
This study further seeks to lay the groundwork towards a framework for compara-
tive urban research across African cities. Such a framework could serve as an entry 
point to confront, compare, and bring forth the particular challenges that emerge 
in informal areas, while avoiding the traps of localism and cultural relativism.
The study and framework also offer a practical step towards changing percep-
tions of urban informality, calling for the inclusion of informal areas as a focus of 
urban policy. Most importantly, learning from the comparative experience of Afri-
can metropolises, it seeks to inform alternative policies to better use the formal-
informal interface as a key entry point to advance urban integration.
In the context of the African Urban Research Initiative (AURI), our proposed 
next step is to further develop the analytical tools and comparative methods set 
out here, through a joint research collaboration between the cities of Lusaka 
(Zambia), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Cairo, Alexandria, and Minya (Egypt), 
and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania).
The proposed research has three main goals:
1 To study the specificities of the question of the formal-informal interface in 
different African cities and regions, in order to identify patterns and propose 
local solutions.
2 To challenge the global discourse of the New Urban Agenda, by offering 
local codes and performance-based standards in an attempt to localize Sus-
tainable Development Goals and Millennium Development Goals.
3 To establish a framework for further comparative research by developing a 
clear methodology and procedure through joint workshops, an exchange of 
tools and experiences, and the co-production of knowledge.
To this end, a joint research endeavour has been initiated with researchers from the 
cities of Cairo, Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, and Ouagadougou, and a series of work-
shops undertaken. A preliminary workshop in Dar es Salaam in October 2018 
aimed to exchange research methodologies and set the roadmap for a comparative 
framework to illustrate the formal-informal processes beyond their binary defini-
tions. A second workshop in Lusaka in May 2019 included relevant stakehold-
ers and policymakers, and sought to establish a common research framework. 
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In December 2019, a third workshop in Cairo focused on the development of a 
joint research paper, consolidating the research teams’ comparative findings on 
the formal-informal interface. (Figure 3.12).
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squatter settlement of despair. World Development 18(2), pp. 165–181; Lisa Peattie & 
Jose A. Aldrete-Haas (1981). ‘Marginal’ settlements in developing countries: research, 
advocacy of policy, and evolution of programs. Annual Review of Sociology, 7(1), 
pp. 157–175.
 3 While Kafr ‘Ashri is not an informal area, but rather a historic residential neighbour-
hood surrounded by large industrial and institutional hubs, the stark contrast between 
its urban fabric and street network and that of its surroundings marks its inclusion 
in this comparison relevant, despite the historical roots of its evolution and thus 
definition.
 4 Total population of the Greater Cairo Region (World Population Review, 2018).
 5 Total population of Alexandria in 2016 (Population2017.com).
 6 Estimated population in 2017 based on the 2012 population census with 1.66% growth 
per year (Populationcity.com).
 7 Density of Cairo, not considering the Greater Cairo Region (CAPMAS, 2017).
 8 Population per sq. km. (Alexandria Fact Sheet, 2013).
 9 Density based on our calculations: area (11km2)/total population.
 10 Informal residential areas represent 52.7 percent of Greater Cairo’s residential areas 
(Soliman, 2002).
 11 Informal residential areas represent 50 percent of Alexandria’s residential areas (Soli-
man, 2002).
 12 In the absence of available data, the percentage of informal residential areas was esti-
mated by calculating the area of informal neighbourhoods on the land use map, divided 
by the total area of Minya city.
 13 In 2009, 60% of the Greater Cairo population were inhabitants of informal areas (Kip-
per & Fischer, 2009).
 14 The population of the informal housing areas is estimated at over 1,584,000 people, 
which represents 40% of the total population of the city (Barthel et al., n.d.).
 15 Percentage of population of Minya living in informal areas (Ministry of Housing, Util-
ities and Urban Communities, 2006).
 16 As in the famous case of a rockslide in September 2008 in Duwayqa, an informal area 
to the east of Cairo, where the official number of casualties was estimated to be 119 
dead and 55 injured.
 17 The video is available on CLUSTER Cairo’s YouTube channel. www.youtube.com/
watch?v=iytq_pTCOe4
 18 Urban Solid Waste workshop was a workshop in collaboration with Basurama, local 
architects, urban artists, and the zabbalin (traditional trash collecting community) 
exploring the structural forms available in garbage, and their potential reuse towards 
an engagement within local Cairo communities. Ard al-Liwa Youth Centre is a design 
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proposal for the local youth centre located at the edge Ard al-Liwa and one of its 
vehicular and pedestrian connections to al-Muhandessin. ALFABRIKA is a fabrication 
lab located in Ard al-Liwa, created for the purpose of bridging the gap between formal 
design practice and local craftsmanship through multiple programmes and workshops.
References
Alexandria Fact Sheet. (2013). SUP Alex 2032, vol. 1. Cited in: Barthel, P.A., Davidson, 
L. & Sudarskis, M. (n.d.). Alexandria: regenerating the city: a contribution based on 
AFD experiences. Paris: Agence Française de Développement (AFD). Retrieved: https://
inta-aivn.org/images/cc/Transmed/AlexandriaContribution.pdf
Al Masalla. (2010). Alexandria attracts 3 million visitors annually. Al Masalla-Official 
Tourism [online]. Retrieved: http://almasalla.travel/alexandria-attracts-3-million-visi 
tors-annually/ [Accessed on 1 April 2018]
AlSayyad, N. (2004). Urban informality as a ‘new’ way of life. In: Roy, A. & AlSayyad, 
N. (Eds.), Urban informality: transnational perspectives from the Middle East, Latin 
America, and South Asia. Lanham: Lexington Books, p. 8.
Angélil, M., Malterre-Barthes, C. & Cluster and Something Fantastic. (2016). Housing 
Cairo: the informal response. Berlin: Ruby Press.
Barthel, P.A., Davidson, L. & Sudarskis, M. (n.d.). Alexandria: regenerating the city: a con-
tribution based on AFD experiences. Paris: Agence Française de Développement (AFD). 
Retrieved: https://inta-aivn.org/images/cc/Transmed/AlexandriaContribution.pdf
CAPMAS Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics. (2017). Statistical year-
book 2017. Cairo: CAPMAS.
Center for Sustainable Development. (2013). Input for Egypt’s strategy for dealing with 
slums. Cairo: American University in Cairo.
CLUSTER. (2018). Formal-informal interface: Comparative analysis between three 
Egyptian cities. Cairo: CLUSTER. Unpublished report.
Euromonitor. (2017). Cairo city review [online]. Retrieved: www.euromonitor.com/cairo-
city-review/report [Accessed on 10 October 2018]
Evin, A. (Ed.). (1985). The expanding metropolis: coping with the urban growth of Cairo. 
Singapore: Concept Media, Aga Khan Award for Architecture.
Hasan, A. (1989). Technical review 1989 of East Whadat upgrading program. Aga Kahn 
Architectural Award, pp. 1–21. Retrieved: https://www.akdn.org/project/architecture- 
and-plurality
Hassan, G.F. (2012). Regeneration as an approach for the development of informal set-
tlements in Cairo metropolitan. Alexandria Engineering Journal, 51(3), pp. 229–239.
Khadr, Z. & Bulbul, L. (2011). Egyptian red crescent in Zeinhum: impact assessment of com-
prehensive community development model for slums upgrading. Cairo: Social Research 
Center, The American University in Cairo.
Khalifa, M. (2011). Redefining slums in Egypt: unplanned versus unsafe areas. Habitat 
International, 35(1), pp. 40–49. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2010.03.004
Kipper, R. & Fischer, M. (Eds.). (2009). Cairo’s informal areas between urban challenges 
and hidden potentials. Cairo: GTZ Egypt and Participatory Development Programme in 
Urban Areas.
Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities. (2006). Arab republic Egypt 
national report: third united nation conference on housing and sustainable urban devel-
opment (HABITAT III). Cairo: Ministry of Housing. Retrieved: http://Habitat3.Org/Wp-
Content/Uploads/Egypt-Final-In-English.Compressed-1.Pdf
80 Omar Nagati and Beth Stryker
Mkandawire, T. & Soludo, C. (1999). Our continent, our future: African perspectives on 
structural adjustment. Dakar, Senegal: Council for the Development of Social Science. 
Retrieved: www.idrc.ca/sites/default/files/openebooks/855-4/index.html
Mohamed, A.A., Van Nes, A., Salheen, M.A., Khalifa, M.A. & Hamhaber, J. (2014 Decem-
ber 14–16). Understanding urban segregation in Cairo: the social and spatial logic of a 
fragmented city. In: Smart, sustainable and healthy cities: proceedings of the 1st inter-
national conference of the cib Middle East and North Africa research network. Abu 
Dhabi: CIB Middle East and North Africa Research Network.
Nagati, O. & Elgendy, N. (2013). Ard al-Liwa park project: towards a new urban order 
and mode of professional practice. Planum: The Journal of Urbanism, 1(26), pp. 64–74. 
Retrieved: https://issuu.com/planumnet/docs/ctbt_planum_n.26-2013_section_4
Nagati, O. & Stryker, B. (2013). Archiving the city in flux: Cairo’s shifting landscape since 
the January 25th revolution. Cairo: CLUSTER.
Nassar, D.M. & Elsayed, H.G. (2018). From informal settlements to sustainable communi-
ties. Alexandria Engineering Journal, 57(4), 2367–2376. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
aej.2017.09.004
Payne, G. (2005). Getting ahead of the game: a twin-track approach to improving existing 
slums and reducing the need for future slums. Environment and Urbanization, 17(1), 
pp. 135–46.
Piffero, E. (2009). Beyond rules and regulations: the growth of informal Cairo. In: Kipper, 
R. & Fischer, M. (Eds.), Cairo’s informal areas between urban challenges and hid-
den potentials. Cairo: GTZ Egypt and Participatory Development Programme in Urban 
Areas, pp. 21–27.
Population of Alexandria. (2017 February 27). Population of 2017.com [online]. Retrieved: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20171008072720/http://populationof2017.com/population-
of-alexandria-2017.html [Accessed on 10 October 2018]
Populationcity.com. (n.d.). Retrieved: https://web.archive.org/web/2019*/populationcity.
com [Accessed on 10 October 2018]
Séjourné, M. (2009). The history of informal settlements. In: Kipper, R. & Fischer, M. 
(Eds.), Cairo’s informal areas between urban challenges and hidden potentials. Cairo: 
GTZ Egypt and Participatory Development Programme in Urban Areas (PDP), pp. 17–19.
Shoup, J. (2017). The Nile: an encyclopaedia of geography, history, and culture. Santa 
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 101.
Simone, A. (2002). The dilemmas of informality. In: Parnell, S. & Pieterse, E. (Eds.), 
Democratising local government: the South African experiment. Landsdowne: Univer-
sity of Cape Town Press, p. 294.
Sims, D. (2010). Understanding Cairo: the logic of a city out of control. Cairo and New 
York: The American University in Cairo Press.
Soliman, A. (2002). Typology of informal housing in Egyptian cities: taking account of 
diversity. International Development Planning Review, 24(2), pp. 177–201.
Soliman, A. (2004). Tilting at sphinxes: locating urban informality in Egyptian cities. In: 
Roy, A. & AlSayyad, N. (Eds.), Urban informality: transnational perspectives from the 
Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia. Lanham: Lexington Books, pp. 171–208.
Soliman, A. (2007). Urban informality in Egyptian cities: coping with diversity. Fourth 
Urban Research Symposium. Retrieved: www.scribd.com/document/116736161/
Soliman-Urban-Informality
Tadamun. (2015). Adequate housing approach as a targeting tool for local development. Retrieved: 
www.tadamun.co/adequate-housing-approach-targeting-tool-local-development/? 
lang=en [Accessed on 31 December 2015]
Formal-informal interface 81
Tadamun. (2016). Coming up short: Egyptian government approaches to informal areas. 
Retrieved: www.tadamun.co/coming-short-government-approaches-informal-areas/? 
lang=en [Accessed on 10 October 2018]
University College London (UCL). (2003). Understanding slums: case studies for the 
global report on human settlements. London: University College London, Development 
Planning Unit.
UN-Habitat. (2010). State of the world’s cities: bridging the urban divide. Nairobi: United 
Nations Human Settlements Programme.
Viquez Abarca, R. & Hernandez Garcia, J. (2017). Public space, between regulations and 
informality: a tale of two cities, San José (Costa Rica) and Bogotá (Colombia). Revista 
Rupturas, 7(1), pp. 75–87.
World Population Review. (2018). Egypt population [online]. Retrieved: http://worldpopu 
lationreview.com/countries/egypt-population/ [Accessed on 10 October 2018]
4  Dialogues on informality
Land sharing as a sustainable 
approach to tenure security in 
Kiandutu informal settlement  
in Thika town, Kenya
Peter Ngau and Philip Olale
Introduction
Lack of access to land and poorly defined tenure rights continue to characterize 
informality in urban areas in Africa. In most African countries, conventional land 
administration systems (land titling and individual ownership) that are inappropri-
ate for their tenure context and unsustainable financially or in terms of available 
capacity remain dominant (Clarke, 2009). As a result, the overwhelming major-
ity of African urban land transactions takes place in informal land markets (UN-
Habitat, 2010).
In spite of a growing acknowledgement of the importance of secure land tenure, 
in practice, establishing land rights in informal settlements often is a protracted 
engagement that pits the government against landowner(s) and slum dwellers. In 
the ensuing contestations, the government (at either national or local level) must 
also contend with its responsibility to maintain order and safety by exercising 
policing power and control over planned developments. The result is that the gov-
ernment finds itself in a stalemated position where it is unable to fully support the 
claims of either landowners or slum dwellers. Consequently, landowners cannot 
evict slum dwellers and proceed with development plans, while slum dwellers – 
facing the omnipresent threat of eviction – remain limited in their ability to invest 
in housing improvement initiatives.
However, a growing emphasis on participatory and inclusive approaches tar-
geting housing, infrastructure services, community assets, and social capital may 
offer new options in contemporary development discourse. The shift is captured 
both in theoretical works on urban planning (Friedmann, 1987; Healey, 2006; 
Watson, 2002) as well as more recently in the global development frameworks 
and conventions adopted since 2015. For instance, both the 17 Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs) of Agenda 2030 – which include stand-alone goals on 
inequality (SDG 10), justice (SDG 16), and inclusive, safe, resilient, and sus-
tainable cities and human settlements (SDG 11) – and the subsequently adopted 
New Urban Agenda were formulated through extensive processes of consultation 
(Rudd et al., 2018).
These approaches move planning from a narrow, technical, and procedural focus, 
towards rights-based and collaborative models for achieving common purposes in 
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the shared spaces of our fragmented societies. Moreover, while previous develop-
ment agendas such as the Millennium Development Goals did not mention land 
directly, the SDGs include six goals with a significant land component, ranging 
from goals on poverty (SDG 1), hunger (SDG 2), gender equity (SDG 5), and life 
on land (SDG 15), in addition to SDGs 11 and 16 mentioned earlier. However, 
without good land governance and well-functioning land administration systems 
in place, these goals will remain only that (Enemark, 2016, pp. 3–4).
Focusing on Kiandutu informal settlement in the town of Thika, Kenya, this 
chapter presents the findings of a co-production approach to seeking solutions for 
improving tenure security and land governance. Building on a long-standing col-
laboration with stakeholders in the Municipality of Thika, the Centre for Urban 
Research Innovations (CURI) at the University of Nairobi organized a ‘CityLab’ 
to explore the benefits and challenges to land sharing as a sustainable approach to 
tenure security for urban slum dwellers occupying public land.
Context
The urban land challenge in Africa
The majority of urban dwellers in Africa lack secure access to land. This absence 
does not just have an impact on housing conditions, but also on people’s levels 
of poverty and access to services and health, all of which are compounded by the 
effects of rapid urbanization and climate change. Land challenges for informal 
dwellers manifest in many ways – including restricted access to land, inequalities 
in landownership, and insecurity of tenure – and have resulted in environmental, 
social, economic, and political problems, including deterioration of land qual-
ity, squatting and landlessness, disinheritance of groups and individuals, urban 
squalor, and conflict (UN-Habitat, 2010).
Various scholars have argued for the need to improve tenure security for the 
urban poor so that they have sustainable access to land, and, in turn, incentives 
towards investment and improvement of their housing and living environment 
(Olale, 2015; Durand-Lasserve & Royston, 2002). Long considered an essential 
public good and basic foundation for development, land and shelter are widely 
seen as preconditions to securing basic living conditions and livelihood oppor-
tunities, as well as a means of reducing poverty and gender inequality (Rakodi, 
2014). Komjathy et al. (2001) define access to land as the right or opportunity to 
use, manage, or control land and its resources. ‘Access’ thus refers to the ability to 
use land and other natural resources, to control resources and transfer rights to the 
land, and to take advantage of other opportunities such as access to credit.
Scholars such as De Soto (2000) have argued that property rights play a key role 
in shaping economic decision-making and increasing productivity of those living 
in informal settlements. While some rights can be accessed without necessarily 
possessing formal landownership (e.g., the right to use, occupy, and develop/
cultivate/produce, and the right to access basic services, including sanitation), 
key levers like formal credit can only be accessed with formal title as collateral. 
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Thus, enhancing tenure security for informal settlement residents is integral to a 
range of different policies and interventions, such as land titling programmes and 
urban upgrading, many of which are supported by extensive international funding 
(Buckley & Kalarickal, 2006).
However, practice shows that land tenure is a relative and contested concept. 
With different perceptions and understandings on the ground, and a range of actors 
and practices involved, policy interventions around land tenure have resulted in 
varied and unintended outcomes (Payne, 2002; Payne et al., 2009; Napier et al., 
2013). Meanwhile, most African countries continue to adhere to conventional 
land administration systems, such as land titling and individual ownership, which 
are inappropriate to the African tenure context and unsustainable financially and 
in terms of capacity to administer (Clarke, 2009). Moreover, stagnancy in the 
management and administration of land remains a massive challenge facing Afri-
can governments and cities today (Durand-Lasserve, 2004).
Resolving land rights in informal settlements is a protracted engagement that 
usually involves the government, landowner(s), and slum dwellers. In cases where 
informal settlements have arisen on private land, private landowners generally 
take the view that government must protect their legal rights, and assist in clearing 
slums so the landowners can use their land as they see fit. In many other cases, 
informal settlements have arisen on public or government-owned land. In both 
cases, slum dwellers variously argue that they have a claim to the land through 
prolonged habitation, that they have nowhere to go without losing their means of 
livelihood, that the law is unjust if so many must suffer so that a few may ben-
efit, and that the government has both a social and constitutional responsibility to 
provide them with proper housing. Such claims illustrate the global shift towards 
rights-based approaches to development, which recognize de facto land access, 
occupation, and the use of urban space as matters of urban citizenship in the con-
text of a ‘right to the city’ (Vogiazides, 2012).
While most African governments formally adhere to both legal and rights-based 
understandings of land tenure in their constitutional laws and urban policies, this 
often does not translate to practice. In best case scenarios, this leads to the contin-
ued growth of informal settlements. In the worst cases, governments opt for the 
eradication of slums, replacing them with planned housing developments (Huchz-
ermeyer, 2011). In the ensuing contestations, governments often find themselves 
in the awkward position of being both the landowner and a supposedly neutral 
arbiter and protector of citizen’s rights. Further, the government, at either national 
or local levels, also has a responsibility to maintain order and safety through 
planned development, where government exercises its police power/development 
control.
Arising from these conflicting rationalities, a dialogue-oriented approach is 
germane in offering pragmatic solutions to land governance, especially when it 
is clear that none of the parties is willing to surrender its claims or positions. This 
study provided such a dialogue-oriented approach to unlocking tenure security in 
Kiandutu informal settlement in Kenya, through an exploration of the concept of 
‘land sharing’ in a local CityLab.
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Tenure security in urban Kenya: the post-colonial challenge
Kenya has a population of 47.6 million persons based on 2019 population cen-
sus data (KNBS, 2019). The previous census in 2009 showed the population at 
38.6 million, an increase from 28.7 million in 1999, 21.4 million in 1989, and 
15.3 million 1979 (GoK, 2009). The urban population was last estimated at 
14.5 million, with an annual growth rate of 4.2% (KNBS, 2009).1 Of Kenya’s 
urban population, about 65% live in informal settlements (Olale & Opiyo, 2017). 
In Nairobi, the capital city, about 60% of the population lives in over 180 different 
informal settlements. This phenomenon of rapid urbanization facilitated by both 
natural factors (natural population growth within the urban areas) and exogenous 
factors (forced rural-urban migration or urban-urban migration due to a plethora 
of factors including poverty, joblessness, and conflict) has led to the contemporary 
growth of informal settlements in Kenya (Tacoli et al., 2015).
Increasing urban populations in Kenya continue to put pressure on infrastruc-
ture and other basic services such as housing, water, sanitation, and land. Unlike 
other basic services, however, land is a fixed asset, and therefore captive to its use 
(i.e., no longer available for any other use). This complexity particular to land 
increases the need for land management administration tools and policies whose 
creativity and sustainability can match the rapid rate of urbanization.
According to the Constitution of Kenya 2010, every person has the right to 
accessible and adequate housing, and a reasonable standard of sanitation. How-
ever, it has become increasingly difficult for the government to provide sufficient 
affordable housing units for the urban poor. Kenya Vision 20302 notes that the 
government is only able to meet 23% of the annual demand of 150,000 afford-
able housing units. The lack of appropriate and affordable housing has forced 
thousands into overcrowded and expanding informal settlements, and even left 
many homeless. Factors such as rapid population growth, stringent planning regu-
lations, restrictive building standards, high costs of infrastructure, poverty, and 
perhaps most fundamentally, lack of affordable land, compound the problem.
Article 60 of Kenya’s Constitution establishes equitable access to land as 
a principle in which land is held, used, and managed (GoK, 2010). Since the 
adoption of the 2010 Constitution, Kenya has further ratified several global 
development agreements, such as Agenda 2030 and the New Urban Agenda, 
and adopted a series of institutional and policy frameworks to implement these 
agendas in the field of housing and basic services, urban and human settlements 
infrastructure, land, urban and regional planning, urban economy, environmen-
tally sustainable and resilient urban and human settlements, and urban govern-
ance (GoK, 2017).
Despite all this, lack of access to land and poorly defined tenure rights continue 
to characterize informality in Kenya’s urban areas. While some 66% of the total 
urban population lives in informal settlements, conventional recognized systems 
like land titling and individual ownership only apply to just over a third of cases. 
This leaves the majority of Kenya’s urban citizens to the uncertainties defining 
the informal land administration system. In fact, Kenya’s National Land Policy3 
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recognizes the absence of security of tenure and planning as the essence of ‘infor-
mal’, ‘spontaneous’, or ‘squatter’ settlements (GoK, 2009).
Kenya’s current land question is rooted in its colonial history, and three dis-
tinct but interrelated processes that shaped land management provide important 
context (Sorrenson, 1967). The first process was the alienation and acquisition 
of land in preparation of the establishment of a colonial state. What followed 
was the imposition of English property law, with its support of title and private 
property rights in those alienated areas. Those processes gave rise to distinct but 
related sets of problems regarding access and control of land, thereby laying the 
basis for today’s complex land matrix. In urban areas, this matrix is characterized 
by limited access to land, unsuitable tenure systems, and increasing illegal settle-
ments in the form of slums. Meanwhile, those who can access titled land tenure 
use it as a store of wealth against which they leverage financial assistance such as 
loans, making tenure security a fundamental principle of housing rights advocacy 
in informal settlements, as well as legal protection against forced eviction, harass-
ment, and other threats that symbolize rising urban inequalities (Syagga, 2011).
Defining land sharing
Land sharing is a negotiated agreement between landowners, developers, and land 
occupants, to partition and share a plot of land, even in the absence of legal tenure 
(Angel & Boonyabancha, 1988). The practice of land sharing first emerged in 
Bangkok in the context of a booming property market that led to intense conflicts 
between landowners and landholders (Rabé, 2010; Angel & Boonyabancha, 1988; 
Boonyabancha, 2005; D’Cruz et al., 2009).
Land sharing becomes a useful option between landlords and slum dwellers 
when the intentions of a landlord to repossess the land become clear to the resi-
dent, and the resident decides to resist or contest the imminent eviction or loss 
of the land they occupy (Angel & Boonyabancha, 1988). According to Parry 
(2015), land sharing is a compromise solution, whereby the owners of land that 
is encroached upon and the community that lives there collectively agree to split 
the land between them. Parry (2015) further elaborates that in this scenario, the 
community buys, leases, or receives one portion of the contested land for free, 
while the more commercially attractive part of the site is returned to the devel-
oper or owner. The notion of land sharing advanced by Parry (2015) is similar 
to that discussed by Rabé (2005), who notes that in Cambodia, land sharing also 
cedes the most commercially viable portion of the land to the landowner, with the 
remaining portions leased, sold, or given to land occupants for legal occupation.
Although the land-sharing option is not suitable for all cases of land-use con-
flict, it can be a flexible and successful strategy. Using this approach, the owner 
of land occupied by an informal settlement is encouraged to lease or sell part of 
the property to the occupants at a rate below market value, allowing the owner 
to recover and develop the remaining land. Parry (2015) also observes that the 
land-sharing approach catalyses occupants to take the initiative to considerably 
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improve their settlements. In most cases of land sharing, the slum dwellers organ-
ize themselves into a viable organization, initiate negotiations with the landowner, 
and then share the land – allocating the prime parcels of land to the owner, and 
using the remaining land for their housing. The housing development that arises 
under this arrangement is generally more organized than in cases where land is 
occupied without engaging the residents or landowner (Srinivas, 2015).
Finally, land sharing offers part of a solution for a larger problem, in that land-
sharing arrangements can serve as a step towards providing universal access to 
housing, while also creating an opportunity to remodel the city in a more partici-
patory and inclusive way (Abott, 1996). However, to be successful, land sharing 
must be accompanied by reforms to regulate the land market, restrict land uses, 
allow higher building standards, and enable implementation of incremental devel-
opment (Montressor, 2015).
The Kiandutu CityLab project
The Kiandutu CityLab is part of a larger research drive undertaken by the Centre 
for Urban Research Innovations (CURI), at the University of Nairobi in partner-
ship with stakeholders in the Municipality of Thika, Kenya over the last eight 
years. The overall purpose of the larger project is to facilitate the considera-
tion and adoption of policy strategies that can respond sustainably to the lack 
of affordable shelter and to land-access constraints faced by the urban poor. The 
collaboration, which goes back to 2011, has involved the community of the Kian-
dutu informal settlement, the NGO Muungano Support Trust (MuST), the Thika 
Municipality, and the University of Nairobi represented by CURI. The commu-
nity living in Kiandutu are members of the Federation of Slum Dwellers in Kenya 
called Muungano wa Wanavijiji, while MuST is a member of Slum Dwellers 
International (SDI).
The collaboration emerged in 2011 with the Kiandutu community and MuST’s 
mutual interest in the upgrading of the informal settlement through processes such 
as mobilization, enumeration, group savings, demonstration of housing improve-
ment, and advocacy for tenure security. The Thika Municipality and County 
Government of Kiambu were also interested in improving urban public services 
such as water supply, sanitation, electricity, and solid waste management in Kian-
dutu. However, while the former Thika Municipality (pre-2013) and the first 
County Government of Kiambu (2013–2018) were positively engaged with the 
programme for slum upgrading and land tenure security in Kiandutu settlement, 
the current County Government of Kiambu (2018-present) has been hesitant to 
engage in the partnership for slum upgrading.
As a member of the Association of Africa Planning Schools (AAPS), CURI/
DURP intends to transform urban planning education and practice in Africa by 
equipping upcoming urban planners with the relevant skills and methodology to 
address the challenges facing the African city. That is, using participatory commu-
nity planning studios so that young planners (students) and community members 
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can actively engage in problem solving and urban revitalization of informal set-
tlements. The university team thus supports community mobilization and slum 
upgrading by deploying scientific and technical skills for mapping settlements 
and infrastructure services, conducting household surveys, and preparing layout 
plans for informal settlement upgrading.
From 2015–2016, with support from the Global Land Tools Network (GLTN) 
Urban CSO Cluster Project, CURI, working with partners SDI and AAPS, con-
ducted a literature review and rapid survey on alternatives to land access in 
Kiandutu (Olale & Opiyo, 2017). Through rapid research, we gathered existing 
literature and secondary data from local SDI civil society partners. The survey 
report showed the status of the land and the available approaches towards land 
access in Kiandutu settlement. Using this data, we prepared a policy brief to 
advise the Kiandutu community on the various options it could leverage to access 
land and improve tenure security, which included land sharing. Prior to the report, 
the community had engaged in endless contestation over land tenure in an ad hoc 
manner with various stakeholders since 1969.
While the report represented the first structured basis for a discussion on 
sustainable tenure security, it also became clear that it was primarily based on 
existing policy and legal frameworks and discussions with Kiambu County (the 
custodians of the land). In other words, it lacked adequate input from the com-
munity members living in the informal settlement. As such, we saw the need for 
a dialogue-based participatory framework on land sharing, which would become 
the Kiandutu CityLab. The questions at the heart of the CityLab dialogue, and to 
which the bulk of this chapter is addressed, are:
• What are the prospects for land sharing in Kiandutu informal settlement?
• How do existing land-use systems and structures in Kiandutu informal settle-
ment influence a land-sharing approach?
• What might an acceptable physical-planning model based on the principles 
of land sharing look like in terms of densification, mixed-use housing layout, 
housing reconstruction, infrastructure, and amenities provision?
Methodology
CityLabs have emerged as forums for practical learning that provide participants 
with hands-on understanding of urban challenges, especially from a spatial plan-
ning perspective. Scholl and Kemp (2016) argue that CityLabs may be used to 
generate ideas for city projects and to explore visions of sustainability, democ-
racy, and devolution of public tasks and responsibilities. CityLabs can also be 
oriented towards actions such as idea-generation and evaluation, and/or to experi-
ment with new forms of urban planning (Scholl & Kemp, 2016).
The Kiandutu CityLab commenced in November 2017 with a literature review, 
followed by community sensitization and stakeholder identification, which were 
complete by January 2018. While all partners attended the preparatory meet-
ings at the CityLab’s initial phase (through January 2018), the intensification of 
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campaigns for the national, county, and local elections across the country caused 
county officials, politicians, and local administrators to withdraw from the joint 
stakeholder workshops, stating that ‘the land question’ was too emotive to engage 
in during a campaign period.
Nonetheless, a series of three CityLab workshops targeting Kiandutu infor-
mal settlement residents in Thika town were organized in March 2018 within 
Kiandutu settlement (at Muungano Hall). Workshop participants were chosen by 
gender and age, creating one workshop for women, one for youth, and one for 
men, each with 12 participants. The aim was to enable optimal engagement in a 
free atmosphere, and to better capture divergent and sometimes gender-specific 
tenure issues. Participants came from all the settlement’s villages, and included 
individuals from the set criteria (i.e., structure owners/landlords, tenants, business 
operators, service providers, and community leaders).
The workshops all included two main sessions: a general discussion session 
and a planning session. During the general discussion session, participants were 
taken through various models of accessing tenure security, including resettlement, 
community land buying, adverse possession, and land sharing. The discussion 
was however centred on the land-sharing option, which was extensively explained 
to the participants, who were later solicited for their ideas and responses with 
regard to the land-sharing process and its applicability in Kiandutu settlement. 
The planning session mainly focused on the land-use planning aspects of the land-
sharing process, including aspects of survey, densification, and housing layout/
reconstruction. During this session, participants used a printed base map to show 
their preferred areas for settlement, to be issued back to the County Government.
The outputs from the workshops included an articulation of the stakeholders’ 
ideas about land sharing, especially from a youth- and gender-based lens. The 
data were collected through note-taking and also recorded using a Dictaphone, 
and later transcribed and organized in themes based on the workshop discussion 
questions. The resultant data from the workshops were triangulated to arrive at 
common themes of argument from the three workshops.
The following sections provide background and historical context to the Kian-
dutu informal settlement, its land governance, and settlement characteristics, 
before turning to the outcomes of the CityLab workshops.
Background to Kiandutu informal settlement
With a total area of 110 acres, Kiandutu is the largest informal settlement in Thika 
town, from which it is located two kilometres to the southeast. It lies within Hos-
pital ward, Thika Town Constituency, just off Garissa Road (A3). Administra-
tively, Kiandutu falls under Kianjau Sub-Location of Thika Sub-County, Kiambu 
County (Figure 4.1).
Currently Kiandutu is made up of ten villages: Biashara, Centre Base, Kianjau, 
Mikinduri, Molo A, Molo B, Mosque, Mtatu A, Mtatu B, and Stage Wariah (Fig-
ure 4.2). Started as a milk depot in 1978, Biashara village later developed into a 
business hub for the settlement, and is the location of Kiandutu market. Kianjau 
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Figure 4.1 Location of Kiandutu
Source: CURI, 2013
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village was previously known as Nyakinyua, named after a women’s group that 
operated a community water point. Mikinduri village was named after a type of 
indigenous tree by the Kikuyu people, who in 1963 formed Kianjau Farmers’ Coop-
erative Society. These Cooperative Society members are believed to be the ‘origi-
nal’ settlers of Kiandutu, and their children and grandchildren form the majority of 
Kiandutu residents. People displaced during the political clashes in Molo area of 
Kenya in 1997 founded Molo village, while Muslims who constructed a mosque 
in 1978 started Mosque village. Stage Wariah village was named after its Somali 
residents, who settled there after establishing a market for goats and sheep.
Kiandutu’s climate is moderate tropical, with typical average temperatures of 
25°C during the day and an average annual rainfall ranging between 900 mm and 
1,250 mm. Kiandutu’s topography slopes northwest to southeast, where Molo vil-
lage is located, making Molo flood-prone in heavy downpours.
History
Kiandutu settlement was established in 1969, when cooperative societies began 
buying land from European settlers after independence. The Europeans who were 
rearing cattle and growing coffee on the land surrendered it to their workers, who 
formed the Kianjau Cooperative Society. The Society’s mandate was to construct 
new structures and collect rent. After a modest start in which many members built 
homes for themselves and began letting some rooms, further housing developments 
took the form of mud tenements, which were built with little space between them.
In the early 1970s, the national government acquired 100 acres of the Kianjau 
Cooperative Society’s approximate 800 acres, compensating cooperative mem-
bers with land in Makongeni Phase IV estate. Government intended to use those 
100 acres – which constitute the current site of Kiandutu settlement – to establish 
an army barracks. However, army officials declined the government’s offer of 
the 100 acres, instead establishing barracks farther along Garissa Highway, away 
from the Thika town centre. The Municipal Council of Thika thus took custody of 
the 100 acres, and began subdividing and selling it to private individuals. At this 
point, Kianjau Cooperative Society members raised grievances about the replace-
ment land they had received in Makongeni Phase IV estate, which they said was 
smaller than the Kiandutu plot. Due to this dispute, some members of the Cooper-
ative Society refused to leave Kiandutu, while others who had left for Makongeni 
Phase IV estate returned.
This resulted in two separate communities being forced to share informally 
subdivided land, a situation that has led to conflicts between the residents and 
the government. The designated custodian of the land at the time, the Municipal 
Council of Thika4 was pulled into legal battles over access to the land.
Settlement population and demography
Establishing an accurate population size for any informal settlement is never 
a straightforward affair. This is due both to the dynamics of residency for the 
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majority of slum dwellers, and the variations in methodology used for data col-
lection. Unsurprisingly, Kiandutu settlement lacks a single consistent population 
count. The last national population census in 2009 reported a population of 13,240 
residents and 5,086 households. The latest figures from a 2011 enumeration by 
Muungano Support Trust (MuST), a slum dwellers organization, indicated an 
estimated population of 17,337, with 8,307 households. A settlement enumera-
tion carried out in 2015 by Slum Dwellers International Kenya reported a total 
population of 14,532 residents, with 5,693 households. The variation in popula-
tion size is attributed to the dynamic changes in informal settlements, such as 
high turnover of tenants, who either move to other settlements or return to their 
villages, especially during official government census-taking. Demographically, 
Kiandutu’s population mirrors the national pyramid, with the majority of the pop-
ulation below 15 years (CURI, 2013).
Using an annual informal settlement growth rate of 5%, and holding all fac-
tors constant, Kiandutu’s total population is expected to reach 43,809 by the year 
2030, resulting in a population density of 47,515 persons per km² on the cur-
rent 0.922 km² (92.2 acres) area covered by the settlement (Figure 4.3). Such an 
increase will not only create overwhelming space contestation, but also strain 
existing infrastructure. With no currently recognized form of tenure security for 
residents, settlement improvement may prove unattainable, putting the sustain-
ability and health of this community at great risk.
Land administration and management
Land administration and management in Kiandutu is based on existing formal and 
informal institutional dynamics. The formal institutions include a full spectrum 
of both the national and county government structures, with the Chief serving as 
the most local-level of representation.5 Within the informal settlement, the Chief 
is usually assisted by village elders representing each village cluster. Meanwhile, 
the informal institutions are largely constituted by various interest groups, such as 
association of tenants, structure owners, Community Based Organizations (e.g., 
Muungano Wa wanavijiji), and service providers such as water vendors.
Today Kiandutu informal settlement occupies public land that falls under 
the custody of the County Government of Kiambu. Under its first (2012–2017) 
administration, the County Government demonstrated willingness to engage in 
a land-sharing approach with the community, offering to provide community 
facilities and utilities (as discussed earlier). However, a new County Government 
administration was elected in 2017, and this administration has not shown the 
same level of political will or appetite for enabling land-sharing arrangements.
Currently, Kiandutu lacks a structured, formal land-management and tenure 
system. Each cluster of residents in the different villages have laid claim to the 
land where they reside. Such claims are based on land as currently occupied, 
albeit with no official government-issued ownership documents. All land transac-
tions, from subdivision to allocation, occur informally through a ‘gentleman’s 
agreement’ in which payment is presented in exchange for possession or use of a 
94 Peter Ngau and Philip Olale
Fi
gu
re
 4
.3
 K
ia
nd
ut
u 
Pr
oj
ec
te
d 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
G
ro
w
th
So
ur
ce
: C
U
R
I, 
20
13
Dialogues on informality 95
piece of land. Such ‘ownership’ can only be legitimized by the elders/chiefs in the 
village, who were the land’s original settlers. With the settlement’s growth over 
time, inhabited areas have extended into private land adjacent to the settlement.
Because Kiandutu lacks any structured or centralized system of land manage-
ment, landownership record systems are also a challenge. By law, details of own-
ership and use must be recorded in a title deed registration system that is linked to 
cadastre information (GoK, 2012).6 However, the reality in Kiandutu is that this 
is not happening, and the established ‘owners’ ultimately determine the use and 
boundaries of a piece of land, with no legally recorded proof of these details. This 
has led to haphazard subdivisions, the development of informal structures without 
accompanying infrastructure provision, and frequent and deep conflict between 
occupants and owners.
Settlement morphology, density, and typology
Having grown organically, Kiandutu settlement lacks a structured pattern, though 
development mostly aligns with existing roads and footpaths (e.g., Athena Road, 
which is the main access road along Kiandutu’s northwest edge, and directly links 
to Garissa Road). These and other primary roads and footpaths act as the main 
corridors for activities such as business, recreation, and transportation. Commer-
cial activities are mostly found along the main arterial routes that lead to the main 
road and Mtatu village. Mtatu A&B, Stage Wariah, and Mosque are Kiandutu’s 
busiest villages, harbouring its major commercial activities, which decrease as 
one moves from west to east (i.e., from Mtatu to Molo), or as distance increases 
from Thika town.
The settlement has been built on irregular blocks of land, whose delineation 
corresponds with the road grid structure. The blocks generally measure about 385 
square meters. Building structures form organic clusters with an average of eight 
units per block measuring between eight and 36 square metres each. Building ori-
entation is predominantly northeast-southwest and northwest-southeast in terms 
of the longer axis of structures.
Building densities are higher in the northern and western parts of Kiandutu 
(e.g., Mtatu, Mosque, and Stage Warrior villages), and lower on the southern and 
eastern parts (e.g., Molo and parts of Mikinduri villages) (Figure 4.4). The unit 
densities at village level range from a low of 54 to a high of 136 units per acre. The 
most congested villages are found closer to the main road, and are characterized 
by closely built, iron-sheet structures that each contain at least eight households.
Kiandutu’s predominant house typology is terrace (row) housing, consisting of 
3–12 single rooms in a line, with the rows of rooms arranged back-to-back. With 
an average structure containing eight rooms (units), the average unit density for 
Kiandutu informal settlement is 84 units per acre. The housing units are laid out 
in a parallel or interlocking formation, sometimes producing residual clusters with 
micro-courtyards (popularly referred to as the ‘plot’ type). There are also smaller 
and relatively newer house in-fills, with a randomized orientation. The average 
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size of a room in the settlement measures 3m x 3m, with those used for businesses 
tending to be smaller.
The average occupancy per room is four persons. There are also special types 
of buildings serving as community facilities (churches, classrooms, eateries, 
etc.), whose sizes exceed that of a single room. The housing structures are pre-
dominantly temporary: single floor of either unfinished earth (94%) or cement 
floor finish; walls of mud (52.7%) or wood (30.4%), and roofs of galvanized 
iron sheets (98%).
The majority of the residents (53%) are tenants paying rent (from Ksh500–
2,500). The majority (53%) pay between Ksh500–1000, while 37% pay rent of 
Ksh500. Rent values are determined by the house condition and the unit loca-
tion, with structures that have services like electricity and those close to the roads 
attracting higher rent value.
Infrastructure and utilities
Access to infrastructure and other basic amenities is a challenge in Kiandutu. 
Although piped water is provided by Thika Water and Sewerage Company 
(THIWASCO), access is not provided at household level, and over 90% of the 
households rely on communal water points. The settlement’s main water access 
challenges are high costs and an underdeveloped water reticulation network.
Figure 4.5 Temporary Housing in Kiandutu
Source: Authors
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In terms of energy access, 75% of residents access electricity for lighting (the 
majority being informal access), and 25% have no electricity at all. For cooking, 
20% use paraffin and 60% charcoal as fuel.
There is a lack of storm water drainage and solid waste management facilities. 
Residents heavily rely on pit latrines for sanitation, with over 60% sharing. Infor-
mal methods are used in solid waste disposal, such as indiscriminate dumping/
burning of waste.
Findings
On land sharing
The CityLab was held with the Kiandutu community and other stakeholders to 
discuss various models and options for tenure security, including resettlement, 
community land buying, adverse possession, and land sharing. That said, the City-
Lab centred on the land-sharing option, which was extensively discussed with 
regard to its applicability and potential process in Kiandutu settlement. During 
the discourse, participants noted that they would be willing to support the land-
sharing option and process, provided the proper channels for community engage-
ment and negotiations were put in place, and gentrification could be avoided. Key 
issues raised by stakeholders in the CityLab are discussed in more detail next.
Perceived legitimate versus legal ownership
Kiandutu presents a classic case of perceived legitimate ownership versus legal 
ownership. Some residents perceive themselves as legitimate landowners, as 
they were the original settlers after the purchase from colonial settlers in 1969. 
However, the law only recognizes title deeds as proof of individual ownership of 
land. In Kenya, a title deed also serves as a precondition for building develop-
ment approval and all forms of land transactions. The fact that none of Kiandutu’s 
residents possesses a registered title deed has ultimately led to the settlement’s 
informal status, despite many residents having lived there for generations with a 
sense of perceived ownership. This issue of perceived ownership came up in the 
women’s forum, where a participant stated: ‘Kiandutu is the only home we know, 
most of us were born and found ourselves here, we have nowhere else to go and 
our families are here as well’.
Impact of land tenure on investment
Lack of secure tenure is known to discourage residents from investing either in 
improvements to their household environment, or in home-based activities that 
could alleviate poverty. The study saw this dynamic playing out in Kiandutu, 
where residents have made no attempts to improve their shelter conditions. Kian-
dutu residents live in semi-permanent, structurally unsound buildings constructed 
from mud or rusty galvanized iron. Economic investments in the settlement are 
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Table 4.1 Summary of infrastructure-services conditions in Kiandutu
Infrastructure/ 
service
Coverage/ Quality Key actors/ 
Providers
Challenges
Water Piped water available; 
over 90% rely on 
Communal Water 
Points
Thika Water 
and Sewerage 
Company
■ High Cost
■ Reticulation Network
Transport 70% Reliance on non- 
motorized/para-transit 
facilities
Private/Informal 
Undertakers; 
Self Initiatives
■ Poor Road Network
■ Lack of Space for 
Reticulation
Sanitation Reliance on pit latrines, 
with over 60% sharing; 
lack of storm drainage 
and solid waste 
management facilities
Community/
Self; County 
Government of 
Thika (Sewer 
Development)
■ High Cost
■ Lack of Space for 
Reticulation
■ Accessibility/
Servicing
Health Informal within 
settlement; formal 
health centre outside 
the settlement; up to 
75% rely on informal 
provision within 
settlement for primary 
health care
Private 
Undertakers 
in Settlement; 
Public & 
Private 
Outside 
Settlement
■ High Cost
■ Traditional/ 
Uncertified 
Interventions
■ Retrogressive 
Community Attitudes
■ Accessibility
Education 93% of school goers 
attend formal 
education; only 
5% attend formal 
secondary school; one 
public primary school 
within Kiandutu 
Settlement
Public and 
Private 
Undertakers
■ Poor Infrastructure 
Conditions 
■ Substandard Quality 
of education
■ High Cost
Solid Waste Informal methods; 
indiscriminate 
dumping/ burning of 
waste
Community/Self ■ Lack of Infrastructure
■ Retrogressive 
Community Attitudes
Energy 75% access electricity 
(majority being 
informal access);  
20% use paraffin and 
60% charcoal as fuel
Public 
Undertakers; 
Illegal 
Middlemen/
Brokers/ 
Connectors
■ High Cost
■ Lack of Space for 
Reticulation
■ Accessibility/
Servicing
■ Environmental 
Concerns
Security 12 lighting masts at 
strategic positions; 
only one street 
furnished with 
lighting
Public 
(Police) and 
Community-
led
■ Fear of Victimization
■ Poor Accessibility/
Navigation
■ Lack of Infrastructure
Source: CURI, 2013
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limited to small shanties used as retail shops and groceries, or water vending 
shops that are similarly structurally unsound. Participants highlighted this sce-
nario in the workshops, expressing fear of investing in the settlement due to their 
insecure tenure status. One participant from the men’s forum argued:
This is not my place, it belongs to the government, so I cannot say it is my 
home because this land does not belong to anyone. If I am told to move away, 
I will move because it is not our home, as we do not have the title deed for 
us to settle here.
Similarly, a youth workshop participant noted:
We cannot build storey or high-rise houses because we are uncertain if we 
will be here tomorrow. But if we are assured and everyone is given a title 
deed, we can build such storey buildings
Fears around land sharing
Generally, residents’ lack of secure tenure had a negative impact on their initial 
acceptance of the land-sharing approach, due to long-standing fears about los-
ing the limited rights they do have to the land. Participants in all three work-
shops expressed concern over the likelihood of rich individuals infiltrating and 
then excluding them from the process. They also noted the possibility that the 
list of land-sharing beneficiaries could be changed, and other persons not resid-
ing in the settlement could be introduced to benefit. The fears raised by Kiandutu 
community have also been witnessed in other informal settlement upgrading pro-
grams. These fears and perceptions impeded the community’s acceptance of the 
land-sharing concept, initially causing people to state a preference for the more 
conventional securing of tenure through titling, despite the difficulties inherent to 
that process.
Morphology, density, and land sharing
Differing village structures and varying population densities impacted participants’ 
attitudes towards the land-sharing approach. For example, some workshop partici-
pants felt that should they adopt land sharing, the less densely inhabited village 
clusters should be taken by the County Government, as the process of relocation 
would then cost less. There was general agreement that the County Government 
should consider taking areas that are inhabitable due to steep slopes, susceptibility 
to flooding, and proximity to the railway line (e.g., parts of Molo Village).
On planning considerations
In the workshops, the CURI team explained that as a policy option, land sharing 
offers slum settlement dwellers faced with imminent eviction and tenure insecurity 
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a strategy by which they can organize, lobby, and bargain for a share of the land 
they already occupy. Such bargaining would occur with the landowner (either a 
private entity or the state). Following negotiations, the landowner can agree to sell 
or lease all or part of the land in question to the slum dwellers.
Because Kiandutu is located on public land, any such negotiations would need 
to comply with Section 12 of the Land Act 2012, which provides that the National 
Land Commission may, on behalf of the national or county governments, allocate 
public land by way of, among others, applications confined to a targeted group 
or groups of persons, in order to ameliorate their disadvantaged position. This 
provision provides sufficient legal grounds for the Kiandutu community and the 
County Government of Kiambu to negotiate a land-sharing deal.
For a land-sharing option between Kiandutu residents and the County Govern-
ment to be viable, the workshops identified five further principles as fundamental:
The informal settlement community must be well-organized
Organization will enable the community’s ability to bargain effectively in the 
negotiations for land sharing. Land sharing is not successful where communi-
ties are weak, as once implemented, a plethora of challenges can arise around 
numerous issues, including resale of some houses (which then command a higher 
market value); conflict over beneficiaries; and noncompliance to the land-sharing 
agreement.
A 2013 CURI study found that only 15% of all adults in Kiandutu are members 
of formal community organizations. The study attributed these numbers to the 
fact that Kiandutu, like many informal settlements in Kenya, is a community with 
high levels of apathy and low levels of trust and unity – suspicion is common and 
exacerbated by poor leadership and various forms of corruption. It is our conclu-
sion that this attitude together with different priorities at both individual and col-
lective levels can compromise collective action as a possible strategy to enhance 
collective initiatives.
A clearly documented land-sharing agreement  
must be in place
The land-sharing agreement must be negotiated, clearly documenting aspects 
such as the portion of land allocated to the landlord and community, the preferred 
tenure, how the land will be managed and administered by the parties, and how 
conflict will be resolved, among other issues. Negotiating a land-sharing agree-
ment is usually a protracted process requiring the commitment of an informed and 
well-organized community leadership.
Residents must accept that densification will occur
Land-sharing agreements will rehouse the community over a smaller total area, 
and therefore require higher/increased residential densities. The community 
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has to accept the likelihood of vertical densification, and the fact that they 
will not all occupy an individual and independent piece of land. This vertical 
densification argument was discussed and supported across the three CityLab 
workshops.
Residents must accept that reconstruction will be required
The increase in density and the need to clear part of the site usually necessitates 
the reconstruction of houses (Figure 4.6). This was discussed in the men’s work-
shop, with a participant noting that if land sharing is to be adopted, the most 
suitable model would be multistorey housing developments. The need for both 
densification and reconstruction necessitates the preparation of a Special Area 
Physical Development Plan that clearly illustrates details such as the level of den-
sification, plot ratios and setbacks, preferred housing typologies, etc.7
Based on our analysis of the preferred scenarios expressed by the CityLab par-
ticipants, Figure 4.6 illustrates a possible outcome of a negotiated land-sharing 
planning process. In this outcome, the County could potentially recover 
49 acres, while the remaining 51 acres would go to the community. Such a 
planning process would take time and require support from the County Govern-
ment, which is also responsible for development control. Additionally, support 
would be needed to facilitate the adoption of planning and building standards 
that are appropriate to an informal settlement, but would not adversely compro-
mise public health.
Figure 4.6 Land Sharing Scenario
Source: Authors
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Capital is needed
The land-sharing processes discussed earlier all require capital – either from the 
community’s domestic savings or in the form of loans from outside sources – 
and the ability to access capital will be tied to the community’s organizing and 
mobilizing capacity. Resource mobilization in Kiandutu is currently focused on 
income-generating activities, savings, and establishing a revolving fund. Mobiliz-
ing networks such as Kiandutu Residents Association and Muungano wa Wanavi-
jiji (the federation of slum dwellers) already exist, but membership remains low 
and needs to grow to a settlement-wide scale. For a land-sharing agreement to 
work, there is a need for increased sensitization and a fairly good level of coordi-
nation, cooperation, and buy-in for community-based initiatives.
Analysis, recommendations, and lessons
Implications of a land-sharing solution for Kiandutu
Land sharing is as simple as it is complex. Its simplicity stems from the existence 
of two (or more, in certain situations) contesting parties, who want to reach an 
amicable solution to the challenge of ownership and tenure security. Complexity 
arises in the process, which requires a united community voice, lengthy negotia-
tions, and subsequent land surveying and settlement planning. All of these pro-
cesses demand resources, both in time and finances. The Kiandutu CityLab found 
that land sharing as a way to attain sustainable security of tenure will likely be 
more complex than simple, due to the following key issues:
Lack of understanding of land-sharing concept
Although land sharing is not an entirely new concept, it has not been widely applied 
in Africa and specifically Kenya. Although the land-sharing approach offers the 
prospect of a ‘win-win-win’ solution for all main parties involved, informal set-
tlement residents occupying government land often continue to prefer individual 
tenure through titling over land sharing. That said, the process of titling requires 
formal surveys and a rigorous land management and regulatory framework – an 
expensive prerequisite that many informal settlement dwellers cannot afford. In 
addition, it should be noted that titling may be detrimental to some households 
living in informal settlements, especially those with vulnerable legal and social 
status; for example, tenants/subtenants on squatter land, newly established occu-
pants who are not considered eligible, single young men and women, and female 
heads of households.
While the experience of case studies, such as those in India and Thailand, may 
prove a useful starting point, it is worth noting that tenure issues in informal 
settlements in Kenya specifically, and sub-Saharan Africa generally, tend to be 
more contentious. In the case of Kiandutu settlement, the lack of understanding 
of the land-sharing concept was distinctly revealed. For example, the community 
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wondered why they should share the land, despite a common understanding that 
it is public land. In addition, while typical land-sharing agreements return the 
more commercially attractive part of the site to the registered landowner (in 
this case, Kiambu County Government), community members in Kiandutu pre-
ferred to give the County the least attractive or economically viable land in the 
settlement.
Concerns and fears of externalities from  
the land sharing process
Slum dwellers live in perpetual fear of eviction and therefore understandably 
approach any external intervention with a sceptical eye. The Kiandutu community 
viewed land sharing as a lengthy process, during which they feared the settlement 
might be opened to land grabs by affluent members of the wider society, and sub-
sequently lead to gentrification. They also feared the possibility that approaching 
the government with the idea of land sharing would reignite the government’s 
interest in repossessing the land. Finally, the community also raised concerns 
over the possibility that its poor and marginalized members ultimately would be 
excluded from the land-sharing process, should it be adopted.
Lack of trust in public processes
Trust in governance, public processes, and public actors and institutions is funda-
mental to legitimize state action, and the lack of trust presents a massive obsta-
cle to public policy and development. Studies have shown that citizens’ mistrust 
of public process emanates from widespread corruption in public institutions in 
Africa (Armah-Attoh et al., 2007). The land-sharing process entails the govern-
ment acting as a third-party beneficiary between the community and the land-
owner. However, in the case of Kiandutu, the County Government of Kiambu is 
also the landowner.
The land-sharing process also requires surveying, planning, densification, 
and/or resettlement, which all necessarily involve public institutions. Accord-
ing to the Kiandutu community, government involvement in tenure negotiations 
and housing initiatives would make these processes susceptible to corrupt deals 
made in ‘top offices’. As such, the community fears that such deals could con-
demn them to losing the land or getting locked out of any benefits accruing from 
the process.
Lack of a strong community organization
Land sharing relies on strong community organization and the community’s abil-
ity to negotiate effectively with the landowners to create a ‘win-win’ situation 
for both parties (Parry, 2015; Srinivas, 2015). In the CityLab workshop, Kian-
dutu community members said that they lacked a strong community organization, 
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which will likely be required to champion negotiations. Currently the only vis-
ible organization is Muungano wa Wanavijiji, which only has a few members, 
and cannot effectively represent the whole community’s issues when called upon. 
In the women’s workshop, it was noted that there is a need to develop a shared 
vision, given that other organizations exist within the community (besides Muun-
gano), and they all have different goals pertaining to land matters. The lack of 
strong community organization also impedes the community’s ability to raise the 
necessary funds for a land-sharing process.
Structure owners/landlords-tenants dichotomy
In Kiandutu, a landlord-tenants dichotomy exists, and we found that landlords (or 
more accurately ‘structure owners’, who in Kiandutu can own a structure without 
having title to the land) felt entitled to a bigger share of the potential land-share 
plots than the tenants. The landlords’ sense of entitlement stems from having set-
tled earlier, being in-born (seeing their claim as a birth right), or having invested 
in the settlement. By the same token, tenants felt entitled to the land they reside on 
in Kiandutu, with some having rented for a lengthy period of time.
Recommendations
These recommendations were mainly derived from the Kiandutu CityLab com-
munity engagements. They represent the knowledge, expertise, thoughts, sen-
timents, and feelings shared by the community concerning land sharing as a 
sustainable approach to tenure security in Kiandutu. These sentiments were then 
supplemented by existing literature and case studies on successful land-sharing 
approaches in settings similar to Kiandutu.
Promote broad-based community involvement/participation
The participation of the Kiandutu community in improving the quality of its 
settlement is an important resource that must be tapped for this settlement’s 
long-term sustainability. This will be in line with global agreements such as the 
New Urban Agenda, which have been locally adopted to promote equity and 
inclusion in human settlement development and urban poverty mitigation meas-
ures. Ideally, community participation cuts down the high cost associated with 
traditional community development approaches, monetary and human-power 
constraints, and supports the realization that local solutions can be effective. 
In addition, community participation provides an opportunity for developing 
solidarity in the struggle against oppression and resultant marginalization in the 
community. In light of this, special emphasis must be made to develop ways to 
ensure that the needs of marginalized groups in Kiandutu are taken into consid-
eration throughout the entire land-sharing process so that no one is excluded 
from the benefits.
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Redefine the role of third parties in fostering  
a strong community organization
Strong community organization is an important ingredient in the negotiations that 
are integral to the land-sharing process. This is because community organizations 
present a unified front to the landowner during negotiations, discouraging the lat-
ter from exploiting differences among residents, and/or attempting to buy off cer-
tain community members (Rabé, 2010). More often than not, community strength 
increases through alliances with local organizations, NGOs, human rights groups, 
political parties, and other groups that may give the community cause more vis-
ibility (Rabé, 2010).
Given the current situation in Kiandutu and its existing intra-community 
dichotomies, the role of nongovernmental and voluntary organizations must be 
emphasized in mobilizing the people into an organization, training and educat-
ing them, forming a link with the authorities, and in various other catalytic ways 
(Srinivas, 2015).
Develop an effective community financing strategy
The land-sharing process requires finances for surveying, planning, and redevel-
oping the settlement. In Kiandutu, options for financing may be two-fold: the resi-
dents may opt to let the government finance the housing redevelopment, and pay 
that back through rent; or the community may join to pool resources and finance 
the process. Whichever financing model the Kiandutu community opts for, it is 
imperative to centre it on a firm foundation of community-based savings and/or 
loan systems along with County Government commitments.
Community organization
As mentioned, for land sharing to succeed, strong community organization with a 
clearly defined vision and leadership structure that the community trusts to nego-
tiate on its behalf is vital. However, like many informal settlements, Kiandutu 
currently lacks such organization. Because the existing community groups have 
different interests, dialogue initiatives must be carefully crafted to ensure that they 
do not become a source of conflict in these small and disaggregated groups.
Create checks and balances in the existing  
institutional structures
The institutions involved in the process (including the national and county govern-
ment departments) must commit to transparency and ensure public participation 
and involvement. These efforts must also be coupled with strong commitments to 
accountability and public information sharing. This helps to ensure the sustain-
ability of the land-sharing effort, and reduces the possibility that laudable goals 
are subverted by other interests.
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Ensure and implement a holistic approach to land sharing  
as an option to tenure security improvement
During the planning phase of the process, intensive and efficient land-use planning 
that promotes economic growth and empowerment of the Kiandutu community is 
a necessity. As noted by Montressor (2015), there should also be comprehensive 
reforms geared towards regulating the urban land market, restricting land uses, 
and enabling incremental upgrading of the settlement.
Lessons from CURI CityLab
As a method of co-production, the CityLab approach requires effective participa-
tion from both the government agencies and the informal settlement dwellers. 
Key factors – political, institutional, as well as social and community-organization 
based – that affected the success of Kiandutu Settlement CityLab are listed here, 
in the hopes that they might inform future similar efforts.
Strong community collaboration
Since 2007, CURI, which started as a project called Urban Innovations Project 
(UIP), has worked with various informal settlements including Kiandutu through 
collaborations with local community organizations, NGOs, international partners, 
and government agencies. Through continuous engagement with the Kiandutu 
community and these other stakeholders, CURI succeeded in building trust and 
being seen as a neutral partner. The success of the Kiandutu Settlement City-
Lab co-production process hinged on this acceptance and trust on the part of the 
community.
Timing
Given Kenya’s historical injustices, land is a very emotive issue, and the Kian-
dutu settlement presents a typical case of perceived land injustice. The CityLab 
dialogues informing this study were held against the backdrop of a national elec-
tioneering period – a period when any discussions centred on land issues were 
liable to solicit suspicion or volatile reactions. Planning for future similar CityLab 
work should therefore factor in the political environment, and devise methodolo-
gies that can mitigate against political influence. One way to do this would be to 
ensure that such projects do not coincide with election years.
Changes to political leadership
While Kenyan national elections are held every five years – often bringing a shift 
of power(s) and resultant personnel changes in key government institutions – land 
sharing is a lengthy process that may extend beyond the five-year term of any 
given administration. It is important to note that when personnel change, the new 
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team may not necessarily be amenable to the previous government’s interests and 
priorities. Such shifts may unnecessarily frustrate the land-sharing process, poten-
tially leading to an impasse.
Conclusion
There is an urgent need to address and resolve the formal-informal sector division 
and resultant poor relations that collectively constrain efforts to advance informal 
settlement upgrading in Kenya today. This shift will require practical, negotiated 
approaches to tenure security, access to land rights, and tenure regularization, 
which also understand and respond to local conditions and factors. The aim of 
this CityLab was to co-produce an innovative approach to securing land tenure 
through land sharing. Even though land sharing has the potential to unlock the 
current tenure situation in Kiandutu, its adoption as a policy strategy still faces 
challenges. These challenges emanate from the majority of the slum dwellers 
being unaware of the actual mechanisms of land sharing; the enormity of the 
resources needed for successful implementation of a land-sharing agreement; and 
the degree of mistrust from the community towards government. There are also 
challenges that relate to the County Government of Kiambu as the legal custo-
dian of the land. It was noted that support of tenure regularization in Kiandutu 
depended on the goodwill of specific officers, and not through a deliberate county 
programme. The issue here is that when such officers leave either due to transfer 
or regime change (following the five-year cycle of elections), supportof the com-
munity process would also dissipate.
Despite these significant obstacles, a major takeaway from this CityLab was 
that Kiandutu slum dwellers are willing to engage in land sharing as an innova-
tive way of securing their tenure. Providing a framework that can be leveraged by 
both the national and county governments in Kenya, this CityLab thus presented 
an option for tackling land access constraints faced by the urban poor in securing 
respectable, sustainable shelter. Key to this success was the presence of a trusted 
third party that is seen as neutral in the land contestation question, and thus could 
create an atmosphere conducive to participatory and inclusive dialogue. However, 
this CityLab also demonstrated that the community always prefers to own the 
land in its entirety, and that any other approach to securing tenure such as land 
sharing would only succeed after the community is convinced that it is the only 
viable option.
The CityLab provided the Kiandutu community and the technical experts 
involved with platforms for knowledge and information exchange. Able to engage 
in deeper discussions with the community about their daily challenges and how 
they felt these could be addressed, the technical experts were able to rationalize 
their expert opinions with those of the community, especially concerning sce-
narios for a potential land-sharing outcome. The Kiandutu community similarly 
benefited from receiving technical input about land sharing directly from pro-
fessionals engaged in such processes. Through the workshops, the community 
members were trained in the tenets of the land-sharing approach, their roles in the 
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process, and potential benefits. This enabled the community to gain vital skills 
germane to the implementation and monitoring of progress and change within 
their settings, should the land sharing approach be adopted. The CityLab under-
scored that communities living and experiencing tenure security challenges are 
the actors best suited to inform and document changes taking place in the settle-
ments before and after any interventions. The CityLab methodology also offers 
government (national and county), partner organizations, and technical experts 
a platform to gauge the effectiveness of a proposal and intervention for tenure 
regularization, helping to ensure that policy intervention for slum dwellers are 
negotiated and co-produced.
Finally, the Kiandutu CityLab demonstrated the urgent need to add new meth-
odologies to the university planning curriculum and training framework for urban 
studies. Such a new framework should target a better appreciation of urban infor-
mality through continuous discourse and engagement with key stakeholders. In 
sum, the research presented in this chapter demonstrates the value of and need 
for a more practical and effective type of university training for urban planners in 
Africa; this necessarily involves the academy opening to communities to facilitate 
direct contact and experiential learning to enrich the relevance of the curriculum 
and the overall contribution of the university to societal development, which in 
turn will further the agenda of inclusive and sustainable urban development on 
the continent.
Notes
 1 The Government is yet to release disaggregated 2019 data based on urban rural 
population.
 2 Kenya Vision 2030 is the government’s development blueprint. Covering the years 
2008–2030, its aim is to transform Kenya into a newly industrializing, middle-income 
country, providing all citizens a high quality of life in a clean and secure environment 
by 2030.
 3 Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2009.
 4 This land is now public land under the custody of County Government of Kiambu, based 
on the devolved system of government under the Constitution of Kenya 2010.
 5 The Chief is considered a representative of national government.
 6 An official register showing details of ownership, boundaries, and value of real property 
in a district, made for taxation purposes.
 7 Special Area Physical Development Plans are affected by the Physical Planning Act, 
Section 23, which mandates the declaration of areas with unique development potential 
or problems as Special Planning Areas.
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5  Urban infrastructure  
and inequality
Lessons from Cairo  
and Johannesburg
Deena Khalil and Margot Rubin
Introduction
Africa has been making significant strides in regards to many development and 
economic indicators, but the continent continues to face gaps in its infrastructure 
and service provision. According to the latest African Economic Outlook report, 
Africa’s infrastructure needs face a financing gap of between US$68–108 billion 
(AfDB, 2019). Many African cities continue to face challenges in keeping up with 
the pressures of growing population sizes and the concomitant growing demand 
on water, sanitation, and electricity provision. As stated by the World Bank, ‘In 
many African countries, only the upper 5 to 10 percent of the population can 
afford the cheapest form of formal housing’ – a reality that results in 60–70% of 
Africans residing in housing provided by the informal sector (World Bank, 2015). 
While many institutional reports focus on national level infrastructure, service, 
and housing provision, or rural-urban disparities, less attention has been devoted 
to intra-city inequalities.
This chapter seeks to examine spatial inequality in African cities in research and 
practice, looking at Cairo and Johannesburg. Specifically, the chapter explores the 
primary factors contributing to inequality, how spatial configurations and inequal-
ity correlate, the connection between informality and inequality, and how govern-
ance affects the spatial distribution of services and inequality.
The motivation for the chapter arises from intersecting research, theoriza-
tions, and contemporary debates, all of which recognize inequality as a central 
feature of cities in regions both north and south of the Sahara. As Obeng-
Odoom (2015, p. 551) notes, ‘inequality everywhere is on the rise, but in Afri-
can cities, the rise is meteoric’. Though the body of literature on inequality 
in African cities is large, its focus has been primarily on economic measures 
of inequality (e.g., Gini coefficients and GDP growth) rather than inequality’s 
complex spatiality, and the different ways it manifests across various spaces 
in the same city. However, these gaps are beginning to be addressed: a 2017 
World Bank report on 64 African cities noted the large discrepancies in ser-
vice provision within African cities, and how these inconsistencies signal the 
relationships that exist between poverty, spatial and political marginalization, 
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and service provision (Lall et al., 2017). Graham and Marvin (2001) speak of 
a ‘splintered urbanism’ in which those who can afford to, ‘bundle’ themselves 
into settlements with good (often private) services and infrastructure, leaving 
poorer urban residents to spatially marginalized islands of deprivation with 
limited provision.
Adopted in 2015 as part of Agenda 2030, the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG) recognize the importance of addressing inequality 
through the inclusion of a special goal to ‘reduce inequality within and among 
countries’ (SDG 10), and incorporate indicators that distinguish between gender, 
age, disability, and geographic location when assessing infrastructure and service 
provision. However, the main focus of inequality as understood in the SDG is on 
social inclusion and inclusive growth (Fukuda-Parr, 2019). Moreover, while there 
are stand-alone goals on infrastructure (SDG 9) and cities (SDG 11), SDG report-
ing usually takes place at the national level, meaning intra-city inequalities and 
the ways in which they affect the vulnerability of certain population groups to the 
impact of, for instance, climate change, are often not taken into account (Reckien 
et al., 2017).
Similarly, the academic literature still largely ignores the recursive relationship 
between service provision and inequality: that is, how a lack of public services 
not only is indicative of inequality within cities, but, we would argue, also is key 
to embedding inequality (see McFarlane & Rutherford, 2008; Graham, 2010). In 
other words, the lack of service provision is not only a manifestation or measure 
of inequality, but also a producer of social inequality, embedding and entrenching 
inequality within cities through a set of provision practices.
As McFarlane and Rutherford (2008) highlight, infrastructure decision-making 
is embedded in political ideologies and agendas. Decisions made for or against 
a specific infrastructural intervention further solidify positions of power. This 
process highlights how material infrastructure can simultaneously connect and 
disconnect, and also showcases the embedded sociopolitical nature of material 
infrastructures. Therefore, the role of infrastructure cannot be seen as politically 
neutral, given that an active decision is made to provide in some areas, and not 
in others.
This chapter seeks to engage with the spatiality of service provision and its 
relation and contribution to urban inequality, examining case studies in Johan-
nesburg and Cairo. By mapping and understanding the spatiality of services, we 
aim to clearly see both where inequality is most pronounced, and by extension, 
where interventions are most needed to combat the multigenerational and long-
term impacts of service deficits.
From a methodological perspective, we endeavour to respond to the chal-
lenge of new comparative urbanism, which calls for comparisons between 
contexts and cities that have traditionally not been found in conversation with 
each other (Ward, 2010; McFarlane, 2014; Brenner & Schmid, 2015; Rob-
inson, 2011). Ward (2008) argues that by looking at one context through the 
lens of another, new questions or ways of seeing processes, paradigms, and 
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practices emerge, forcing us to rethink our analytical frames. In addition, we 
wish to contribute to the construction of new ‘South-South’ knowledges, out-
side of the traditional paradigms of thought, responding to an emerging call to 
move away from dominant North-South comparisons (Robinson, 2005, 2011; 
Watson, 2009).
This chapter thus reexamines questions of urban inequality, using infrastructure 
and service provision as both indicators of inequality, as well as contributors to 
inequality. More specifically, we look at infrastructure/services and inequality in 
Cairo, Egypt and Johannesburg, South Africa, using a comparative lens to deepen 
our thinking around these questions. Exploring water, sanitation, and electricity 
provision, as well as tenure and housing provision at the urban scale – and particu-
larly within informal settlements and areas of high deprivation – this chapter uses 
the spatial distribution of different services and forms of infrastructure as a way of 
examining the spatiality of urban inequality.
Conceptualizing poverty and inequality
The following section explores some of the conceptual underpinnings in the 
relationship between infrastructure provision, inequality, and governance. It 
engages with three main thematic areas: the centrality of infrastructure and 
embedded poverty; the question of power and politics, and how decisions are 
made regarding infrastructure provision and distribution; and lastly, the spatial-
ized nature of infrastructure, which is a manifestation of urban governance rela-
tions, as well as an indication of the location of poverty and privilege in cities 
of the South.
Currently, infrastructure provision and access are seen as a measure of inequal-
ity, and not as a contributing factor to deepening inequality. In line with McFar-
lane and Rutherford’s (2008) argument that infrastructure can simultaneously 
connect and disconnect, this chapter argues that access to infrastructure is both a 
measure of and contributor to inequality, as seen through the examples of Johan-
nesburg and Cairo.
The centrality of infrastructure
Infrastructure in the global South is often viewed through the unequal struggles to 
access reliable forms of various services, with very few cities achieving the reli-
ability of infrastructure that renders services invisible or taken for granted (Gra-
ham, 2010). This struggle for equal access to infrastructure and its subsequent 
services, forms a central part of this chapter’s focus.
Access (or lack thereof) to infrastructure – and thus services, such as water, 
sanitation, and power – makes a material difference in the quality of people’s 
lives, their daily existence, as well as their aspirations and potential for address-
ing intergenerational poverty. Poor access to water, sanitation, and power have 
natural and clear impacts on the health and well-being of residents who have to 
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make do without these services (Satterthwaite, 2001). These impacts are also felt 
differentially: women and children – usually responsible for water collection, 
disposal of waste, and other domestic chores that increase physical vulnerability 
and extend the working day – often bear the brunt of the lack of infrastructure 
provision.
That said, linear relationships between poverty, inequality, and the impacts 
of lack of infrastructure cannot be drawn. As Graham and Marvin (2001, p. 11) 
explain, ‘such large technological systems (Summerton, 1994) or technical net-
works (Offner, 1993) are closely bound up within wider socio-technical, politi-
cal, and cultural complexes, which have contingent effects in different places 
and different times’ (see Tarr & Dupuy, 1988; Joerges, 1999). Thus, when it 
comes to the relationship between infrastructure and inequality, the quality and 
material existence (or lack thereof) of infrastructure is just one aspect of the 
question. The larger issue is how lack of infrastructure not only reflects existing 
inequality in daily life, but also contributes to continued inequalities, causing 
the institutional, political, and social structures that entrench these issues to 
surface.
The centrality of governance in determining inequality
Infrastructure decisions can serve as a way of understanding aspects of urban 
governance. That is, if governance is seen as the process through which multi-
ple actors from various sectors – in collaboration and contestation – shape and 
manage a city (Pierre, 2014) and urban politics, decisions made around infra-
structure can provide insight into the structure and nature of power and power 
relations in cities. McFarlane and Rutherford (2008) posit that where infrastruc-
tural decisions are made in any urban context, there is an immediate and inher-
ent mobilization of political ideals and political ideologies. This relationship 
to power shows that infrastructure is not neutral, but rather an additional form 
of political expression (McFarlane & Rutherford, 2008). Where infrastructure 
is placed, and for whom, is a highly politicized choice that reflects the power, 
status, and social standing of various groups, illustrating respective abilities to 
leverage support from the state and other institutions or not. The location, siting, 
and provision of infrastructure should also be located within an understanding 
of other material contestations. According to Graham and Marvin (2001, p. 18), 
‘social biases have always been designed into urban infrastructure systems, 
whether intentionally or unintentionally. In Ancient Rome, the City’s sophis-
ticated water network was organized to deliver first to public fountains, then 
to public baths, and finally to individual dwellings, in case of insufficient flow’ 
(Offner, 1999, p. 219).
Questions around infrastructure and related socioeconomic rights are fur-
ther complicated within the context of informal settlements or potentially ille-
gal locations, which can lack legal claim to service provision. Harris (2011) 
and Chatterjee (2004) further note that differentiation in legal status means 
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not just differential ability to access service provision, but, in fact, differential 
ability to have one’s rights to access basic services and amenities recognized 
at all. In contrast, middle income and higher income residents are seen as 
rights-bearing legitimate citizens, and are able to access and utilize the for-
mal institutions of the state to represent their needs, access resources, and 
influence decisions that affect them (Rubin, 2014). Such differential exclu-
sion perpetuates the poverty and inequitable treatment that poorer and infor-
mal communities face, and so deepens their reduced status within these urban 
environments.
The spatial nature of inequality
Spatial inequality is in many ways one dimension of overall inequality. 
Despite this, as Kanbur and Venables (2005) note, spatial inequality becomes 
increasingly significant when it aligns with political tensions, which under-
mine social and political stability. Through a historical lens, it is clear that 
there are many factors which have resulted in almost all cities having sites 
of wealthier and poorer households. How this geography manifests, and what 
it means to the lives of its residents, is key to understanding the causes and 
implications of inequality within a given city. History has played a key role 
in the location of communities and their access to services. In cities with 
colonial origins or strong colonial influences, formal urban areas designed for 
‘Europeans’ or imperial residents saw lower densities and better provision of 
services than those earmarked for indigenous populations (Andersen et al., 
2015; Buire, 2014). South African cities (like Johannesburg), which remain 
in many ways stubbornly spatially segregated, are a clear example (Turok & 
Parnell, 2009).
Separated by cordon sanitaires, or buffer strips and transport routes, colonial 
rulers created spatial divisions in municipalities, and with them, distinct hierar-
chies of infrastructure provision. Additionally, unlike the ‘bundled’ or generalized 
service provision offered by public entities or monopolies in northern cities, cit-
ies in lower-income countries generally have had diverse suppliers and forms of 
supply, the result of which is that most have never achieved universal access to 
service provision (Zérah, 2008).
Today we are seeing new forms of infrastructural segregation and separa-
tion, some of which is related to the privatization and corporatization of infra-
structure (Coutard, 2008). Graham and Marvin (2001) discuss a ‘splintering 
urbanism’, stating: ‘a parallel set of processes are underway within which 
infrastructure networks are being ‘unbundled’ in ways that help sustain the 
fragmentation of the social and material fabric of cities’ (2001, p. 33). This 
conceptualization argues that the elite can access premium services, often pro-
vided by international service providers, which ‘bypass’ those who cannot 
afford their services. Located on the periphery of existing cities, such pri-
vately developed new towns or suburbs are thus built, complete with superior 
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infrastructures that often bypass the older and often failing public service pro-
visions. All of this serves to construct patchwork landscapes of access and 
denial, further layered by other spatial processes, such as the peripheral or 
marginalized location of ‘auto-constructed’ communities, informal settle-
ments, and poorer households (Caldeira, 2017). The result of these multiple 
processes is a historically rooted spatialization of unequal access, which con-
tinues to be driven by contemporary commercial motivations located in pri-
vatization and new formulations of access.
Research methodology
This chapter is the product of a larger research project conducted jointly by Tak-
ween Integrated Community Development in Cairo and Wits University CUBES/
SA&CP in Johannesburg between July 2017 and June 2018.
To produce this research, we conducted a literature survey and combined sec-
ondary data on the spatial distribution of services across Cairo and Johannes-
burg – creating a ‘bird’s-eye view’ of the spatial distribution of services: housing, 
water, sanitation, and electricity. The research conducted in Cairo builds on the 
Planning [in] Justice: Spatial Analysis for Urban Cairo study, published in 2018 
by Tadamun: The Cairo Urban Solidarity Initiative (a joint initiative by Takween 
Integrated Community Development and the American University in Washington, 
D.C.) (Tadamun, 2018). We also conducted a closer examination of inequality in 
the case-study areas of East Madinat Nasr (EMN), Cairo, and Soweto, Johannes-
burg, by deepening the use of the available secondary sources. EMN is a relatively 
large district with a wide range of income levels, including relatively upscale 
neighbourhoods alongside one of Cairo’s largest informal areas. Soweto, equally, 
is home to a diverse range of income groups, and has received vast amounts of 
government funding to upgrade its services and infrastructure, but these remain 
unevenly distributed.
Data on Cairo’s distribution of housing and utilities was drawn from the 2006 
national census, produced by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and 
Statistics (CAPMAS). Johannesburg data was drawn from the Quantec ser-
vice, which offers comparable data between the 1996, 2001, and 2011 national 
censuses.1
The Johannesburg team also utilized maps and data from the City of Johannes-
burg’s nodal review exercise, which was carried out in response to a legislative 
requirement that mixed-use, mixed-intensity nodes are identified for planning and 
investment purposes (CoJ, 2018a). We created the maps in this chapter using the 
data noted earlier and GIS software.
Aside from the data retrieval mentioned earlier, the teams sought to consider 
and engage with new comparative urbanism; i.e., the systematic study of simi-
larities and differences between cities and urban processes, particularly look-
ing at cities whose very different histories and economic and political systems 
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do not invite comparison (Nijman, 2007). Attempting to develop ‘knowledge, 
understanding, and generalization at a level between what is true of all cities and 
what is true of one city at a given point in time’ (Nijman, 2007, p. 1), the two 
teams worked closely to codevelop research questions, research instruments, 
and a common language for understanding inequality. The teams met via Skype 
and used online platforms to develop questionnaires, research frameworks, and 
sets of indicators that were appropriate in both contexts. Through the research 
process, we also came to appreciate the relational comparative approach that 
Ward (2010) advocates for, where we ‘use different cities to pose questions 
of one another’ (2010, p. 480), and get ‘away from searching for similarities 
and difference between two mutually exclusive contexts’ (2010, p. 480). In this 
manner, specific outcomes or phenomena in one city provoked us to ask related 
questions in the other.
Findings: context and background to service provision
Johannesburg
Population and informality
Growing at 3.24% per annum between 2010–2015 (UN-Habitat, 2014), South 
Africa’s largest and most populous city is home to between 4.43 to 9.4 million 
people (the difference being that between the official city border [StatsSA, 
2011] and the entire urban agglomeration [UN-Habitat, 2014]). The City gov-
ernment is divided into seven administrative regions (see Figure 5.1), each of 
which is operationally responsible for the delivery of services to its constitu-
encies. Policy and strategic decisions are taken centrally within the Johannes-
burg Metropolitan Municipal council. The City’s poverty and livelihood data 
demonstrate high levels of need, with over 40% of the employed population 
earning below R3,200 a month (US$235) and one quarter of the City’s popula-
tion unemployed (StatsSA, 2011). However, poverty throughout the city is not 
homogenous, and regions that host economic nodes record higher individual 
and household incomes than do those areas on the city’s periphery, which are 
home to large townships and informal settlements (Karuaihe, 2015). In addi-
tion, economic diversity exists within different regions, where poverty and 
wealth coexist in relatively close proximity (see Figure 5.2). Johannesburg 
further offers a highly attractive environment for national and cross-border 
migrants, most of whom cannot find or afford accommodation in the formal 
sector. As a consequence, there have historically been a number of informal 
settlements around the City (estimated at 189 in 2013) accommodating about 
9% of the City population.
Interestingly, the number of dwellings in Johannesburg’s informal settlements 
has dropped considerably in the ten-year period between 2001–2011, declining 
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by over 8,000 households, and contributing 4% less to the city’s household 
composition. That said, informal units in backyards or on the premises of other 
houses increased by almost 58% over the same period (CoJ, 2016; Gardner & 
Rubin, 2016).
Figure 5.1 Structure of Johannesburg’s Regions
Source: CoJ, 2012
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Institutional structure and responsibility
As designated by the Constitution, a local government like the City of Johannes-
burg (CoJ) is an autonomous sphere of government, separate but equal to national 
and provincial spheres. While each sphere of government has its specific set of 
responsibilities, they also share certain joint responsibilities (e.g., human settle-
ments). This division of responsibilities can and historically has caused some 
tensions between the spheres, as seen in the realms of planning, land-use man-
agement, and housing provision. Of particular relevance to this chapter are the 
tight constraints South African legislation puts on public expenditure, with the 
state prohibited from investing in services on land that it does not own (or with 
which it does not have an agreement with the landowner), or on land that has not 
been formally designated as residential. Because informal settlements often do 
not meet these criteria, until recently, many have not been able to receive state-
provided infrastructure.
The sharp turn in the South African bureaucracy to New Public Management 
(Cameron, 2015) in the 2000s, under which many services were corporatized, 
has further complicated service provision. Following its financial crisis in the late 
1990s, the CoJ established separate municipal owned entities (MOEs) responsible 
for service delivery on a citywide basis. These city-owned entities include Joburg 
Water, City Power, and the refuse removal company, Pikitup, among others. Man-
aged by local government, these entities are all intended to function as commer-
cial companies: billing for services, collecting revenues, assuming debt for capital 
projects, and making capital expenditures with board approval to improve and 
extend services. Although such corporatized entities were expected to more effi-
ciently ensure quality delivery and recover costs, this has not been the case for 
all of the MoEs, and in 2016 the Democratic Alliance and Economic Freedom 
Fighter coalition leading the council chose to bring many of these functions back 
in-house. With the late 2018 dissolution of that coalition and return to an African 
National Congress mayor (Geoff Makhubo), the future of these entities remains 
uncertain.
That said, structured basic services are a key income source for the CoJ. Within 
this structure, local government must ensure access and provision of basic ser-
vices to all urban residents, which means finding a budget to pay for or subsi-
dize costs. Generally, the city has accomplished this through cross-subsidization 
mechanisms, which allow for taxes and rates generated in wealthier wards and 
suburbs to pay for infrastructure costs and services in the city’s poorer areas. 
Although cross-subsidization has been a vital part of paying for services across 
the CoJ, it remains insufficient to meet the demand.
The seeming paradox at play – on one hand, the need for cost recovery, and on 
the other, a constitutional pledge guaranteeing citizens the right to these services – 
has led to a number of court cases. Since 2009, the Constitutional Court deter-
mined that the CoJ and all South African municipalities must provide residents 
with minimum quantities of free water, sanitation, and power (SERI, 2018). Exact 
amounts and details around how these services are provided and administered 
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have been a matter of contention, leading to further litigation, social movements, 
and protests.
In sum, Johannesburg’s current service delivery situation presents a promis-
ing but complicated narrative in which older, ‘previously white suburbs’ con-
tinue to enjoy high levels of service provision and a very good quality of life, 
while older ‘black townships’ indicate generally good but uneven service provi-
sion thanks to massive state investment. However, despite Constitutional Court 
rulings, the city’s highly contested informal settlements still experience uneven 
service provision, and many lack satisfactory levels of water, sanitation, and/
or power.
Cairo
Population and informality
Cairo is home to 10% of Egypt’s total population (CAPMAS, 2017), or more 
than 9.7 million inhabitants residing on an area of 188,982 km2. One of the 
world’s more densely populated cities, its chaotic landscape has been the 
focus of many studies throughout the last few decades. According to Sims 
(2012), ‘Two-thirds of the city’s population now live in neighbourhoods that 
have sprung up since 1950, devoid of any planning or control, and which are 
considered by officialdom as both illegal and undesirable’ (2012, p. 3). Such 
uncontained growth has led to encroachments onto state and private lands 
and the rise of a parallel system of informal services, some of which employ 
illegal connections to public services and facilities. Unsurprisingly, the spatial 
distribution of access to services is highly uneven, with some areas enjoy-
ing very good access to high quality services, and others struggling to access 
services that are of generally poor quality. In regards to poverty, according to 
Cairo’s 2013 national poverty map, 18.3% of the population lives below the 
national poverty line (set at a mean annual expenditure of EGP 7,240). This 
seems a relatively low percentage compared to other governorates in Egypt 
(e.g., Qena Governorate, where the poverty rate is 60%), but the distribu-
tion of poverty within Cairo is highly unequal, especially when expanding the 
focus to look at the Greater Cairo Region (GCR), which encompasses Cairo, 
Giza, and Qalyoubeya Governorates (with poverty rates of 18.3%, 32.3%, and 
22.3%, respectively).
Institutional structure and responsibilities
Egypt’s National Constitution (Arab Republic of Egypt, 2014) guarantees the right 
of all citizens to basic services, including infrastructure and social services such 
as healthcare and education. As in South Africa, Egypt’s institutional structure 
for urban administration includes both national and local levels of governance. 
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Figure 5.2 Cairo’s Administrative and Spatial Structure
Source: Authors
Central institutions include ministries, each of which is responsible for a different 
aspect of high-level governance for service provision. For example, the Minis-
try of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development (MHUUD) is responsible for 
setting policies related to housing, potable water, and urban planning, while the 
Ministry of Planning (MoP) is responsible for developing Egypt’s annual national 
socioeconomic plan.
At the local governance level, the highest spatial and administrative unit is the 
governorate, which is responsible for service provision governance, and imple-
ments policies and plans that are set at higher levels of government (Figure 5.2). 
Within the governorate office, line ministries are represented by directorates (e.g., 
the Cairo Governorate Directorate of Housing represents the Ministry of Housing 
within Cairo), and the directorates are responsible for much of the local manage-
ment of services and budgeting.
Egypt is divided into 27 governorates. Fully urban governorates like 
Cairo are divided into spatial units of municipalities, each of which is fur-
ther divided into subdistricts.2 Cairo is divided into four geographical areas 
(eastern, western, northern, and southern), each of which contain a number of 
municipalities.
Local governance becomes complicated when looking at the chain of com-
mand. Although the governorates are responsible for the day-to-day manage-
ment of local services and local budgeting (through the municipalities and 
the directorates, which represent line ministries within the governorate), the 
directorates do not actually report to the governor (who is the appointed head 
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of the governorate), but rather to their respective ministries, from which they 
also receive their budgets. Thus, the institution directly responsible for local 
service management does not answer to its own administrative head (i.e., the 
governor), but rather to the relevant national level ministry. This fragmenta-
tion within the urban governance system – as well as the number of insti-
tutions involved in urban management – has created an infamously messy 
institutional system, where responsibilities of the various institutions some-
times overlap (Khalil et al., 2018). The consequence of this fragmented and 
overlapping system is a service-provision scheme that is incredibly inefficient 
and often ineffective in providing residents with sufficient, good quality, and 
reliable services.
Further complicating matters is the fact that utility services such as water, sani-
tation, electricity, and natural gas are provided through publicly-owned national 
holding companies. These entities operate largely autonomously, without interfer-
ence from the governorate/directorate, and are accountable only to their respective 
national ministries. Although fully owned by the Egyptian state, these companies 
operate as commercial entities, meaning they are mandated to cover their costs 
and generate a profit.3
Analysis
In this section we present the outcomes of the secondary data analysis that we 
conducted, in the form of maps showing access to different services across the 
cities of Cairo and Johannesburg. The maps shed light on service distribution 
throughout the two cities, revealing how certain services are more equally distrib-
uted than others. All the findings and analysis provided in this section are based 
on secondary sources.
Income and poverty
The collection and comparison of poverty and income data is problematic. First, 
there is a strong tendency for respondents’ to keep income data private, meaning 
people may not provide entirely accurate information. Second, comparing data 
between the two countries is complicated by the fact that the data sets come from 
different dates and scales. In Johannesburg, a full census is only undertaken every 
10 years, which, considering the rate of growth, means that data are quickly out-
dated. Cairo’s data is in some cases more up to date, but not available at the same 
(finer) geographical scale as Johannesburg’s. Finally, although we converted both 
data sets for income into the same currency, comparisons were complicated by the 
fact that these numbers do not provide insight into the differences of cost of living 
and expenditures that poorer people have to endure in each context. Thus, poverty 
and income are difficult to use as measures of inequality, and especially hard to 
compare.
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Johannesburg
Earlier work from the National Income Dynamics Study provides some context 
about poverty in the CoJ: in 2011, 50% of households in the city were earning 
less than R3,543 a month (citywide median), 40% less than R2,487, 33% less 
than R2,224, and 25% less than R1,751 (CoJ, 2018b). Meanwhile, Figure 5.3 
spatializes more recent data on income, taken from the Gauteng City Region’s 
2017/2018 survey. Beginning with the CoJ municipality at the centre, one can 
discern the higher income patterns in the north, and poorer communities located 
to the south and far north.
Cairo
Figure 5.4 shows how poverty rates compare across Greater Cairo’s different 
municipalities; the numerical data is even more striking when we compare the 
highest and lowest poverty rates: 70.6% in Al-Ayyaat municipality and .7% in Al-
Nozha municipality. The mean expenditures are equally striking, with the lowest 
expenditure level of EGP 3,511 in Al-Ayyaat, compared with the highest expendi-
ture level of EGP 19,323 in Al-Nozha. There is also a strong relationship between 
the distribution of poverty and informality, as the darkest areas on the map fall 
within Giza’s peri-urban periphery, which has been informally transitioning from 
agricultural land into urbanized housing.
Housing market: tenure and informality
In this section we examine certain dimensions of access to housing in the two 
cities, such as different forms of tenure, housing conditions, and informality. In 
doing this, we are setting the context for discussing the relationship between 
inequality and basic services, since inequality in service access manifests most 
clearly in informal areas. However, we are also looking at housing itself as a basic 
service, and thus are curious to see how its distribution and equality of access 
manifests in both cities.
Johannesburg
Statistics are difficult to come by, but according the CoJ’s Spatial Development 
Framework, in 2012 there were an estimated 164,939 informal structures, and 
about 320,652 families living in backyard dwellings (CoJ, 2016). In the CoJ, 
informal dwellings are located in two types of areas. Firstly, low-income areas 
(either old townships or newer ‘RDP’ settlements), where informal stock is situ-
ated in the ‘backyard’ of the main ‘formal’ dwelling (Gardner & Rubin, 2016).4 
Secondly, informal settlements, which are areas consisting almost exclusively of 
shacks or informal dwellings made of temporary materials, and are mostly located 
on the city’s peripheries.
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Correlating Figure 5.3 with Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6, we see that informal 
settlements are primarily inhabited by the poor majority. Taken together, these 
figures also indicate the high population densities and low incomes common to 
informal settlements, old townships, and the inner city alike (and in contrast to 
formal, higher-income areas) (Hamann et al., 2018).
Figure 5.4 Poverty Rates in Greater Cairo
Source: Tadamun, 2016
128 Deena Khalil and Margot Rubin
Figure 5.5 Formal, Informal, and Traditional Tenure in Johannesburg, 2011
Source: Authors
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Figure 5.6 Tenure in the City of Johannesburg
Source: Authors
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Figure 5.6 shows clusters of tenure types within the CoJ. One of the high-
est concentrations of rentals is found in the area around Johannesburg’s original 
Central Business District (CBD). Known as a reception area for the highly mobile 
cross-border and national migrant demographic, the CBD and inner city mostly 
offer rental opportunities in the form of multistorey buildings, where apartment 
sharing and subletting are prevalent. Other rental concentrations are found in 
Soweto, Diepsloot, and other townships, where rentals generally take the form of 
backyard dwellings. The distribution of rentals across Johannesburg (in the inner 
city and backyards across the city) reflects the spatial location of poorer house-
holds that are renting properties.
The highest concentration of properties that are owned and fully paid off are 
located in the townships. Interestingly, this is not an indicator of wealth, but rather 
of the apartheid and post-apartheid housing strategies that supplied low-income 
households with sub-economic units and full title deeds. Although these proper-
ties are owned, they are difficult to leverage, and thus few households are willing 
or able to use them as collateral (Finmark, 2004). Meanwhile, the highest concen-
trations of properties that are owned but not paid off are found in the older white 
suburbs, reflecting the mortgages that these households were able to secure for 
their relatively more valuable properties (as compared with those in the townships 
or inner city).
Cairo
Cairo’s housing market is dominated by apartments, followed by one or more 
rooms within shared housing units (Figure 5.7). Shacks and backyard dwellings 
are rare in Cairo, underscoring the fact that most informal areas in Cairo consist 
of apartment buildings quite similar to those in formal areas. The main factors 
distinguishing informal areas from formal ones are the lack of state-led planning, 
and in most cases, the lack of formally registered tenure documents. Furthermore, 
many buildings in informal areas are in violation of building codes, and illegally 
located on agricultural land. Finally, services in informal areas tend to be of lesser 
quality and quantity, and housing often tends to be of poorer quality in regards to 
materials used and adherence to safety standards and building codes.
Looking at tenure in Cairo (Figure 5.8), two things become clear: firstly, the 
great extent to which Cairenes depend on the rental market to access housing; and 
secondly, that spatial distribution of ownership versus rental corresponds with 
income. That is, ownership is more predominant in Cairo’s better-off districts 
(located in the middle, east, and south of the city) as compared with the city’s 
poorer districts in the west, where rental is more common.
Figure 5.9, which depicts rates of overcrowding in Cairo, almost mirrors the 
distribution of rental and ownership in Figure 5.8. The rate of overcrowding in 
Cairo’s poorer western districts can be easily contrasted with the much lower rates 
seen in Cairo’s middle, and especially eastern, districts – once again mirroring 
poverty levels seen in Figure 5.4.
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Access to basic services
In terms of levels of access, Table 5.1 shows both cities’ population’s access to 
main infrastructure facilities (water supply facilities, sources of electricity, and 
sewage facilities), according to their most recent respective national censuses 
(2016 for Egypt, and 2011 for South Africa). Access to these fundamental ser-
vices is useful in providing an idea of the average levels of access in the two cities, 
which can easily be contrasted with the local levels of access demonstrated later 
in the chapter.
Cairo and Johannesburg generally indicate similar patterns of electricity and 
water access, with both at first glance appearing to enjoy significant coverage. 
However, informal areas show the largest number of residents using off-grid 
means, demonstrating a clear lack of access in informal settlements. The remain-
der of this section demonstrates the extent and limits of these services.
Unlike many cities in Africa, Johannesburg residents and Cairenes generally 
enjoy relatively good access to piped water and sanitation. This is largely due to 
the fact that access to both is guaranteed by the Constitutions in both countries 
(as well as Prime Ministerial Decree 886/2016 in Egypt, which outlines provi-
sions for informal buildings to apply for water and electricity meters). However, 
closer examination once again reveals stark differences at the local level, with 
informal settlements being the least well-served in both cities. In Figure 5.10 and 
Figure 5.11, we see the same patterns persisting in both cities: most formal house-
holds have access to piped water, either to the home or the stand, while areas 
where water is communal (shared taps) coincide largely with areas of informality. 
Table 5.1 Provision of services in Cairo and Johannesburg
Service Type of access/provision Cairo (2016) Johannesburg (2011)
Water Access to in-house tap water 98.5% 91%
Access to inside building tap water 0.9% n/a
Access to outside building tap/ 0.2% 7%
Communal water on private  
stand
Other: households using water 0.4% n/a
pumps, wells, rain water, bottled 
water
No access to water n/a 1.4%
Energy Access to the public electricity 99.87% 87%
network
Electric generator 0.06% n/a
Gas/Kerosene/Paraffin or other 0.03% 11.5%
Wood/coal n/a 0.3%
Renewable (e.g., Solar) 0.019% n/a
Other (e.g., animal dung) 0.01% 0.7%
Source: Authors
Urban infrastructure and inequality 135
Figure 5.10 Access to Piped Water in Johannesburg, 2011
Source: Authors
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In Cairo, this relationship is made even more explicit, as the most concentrated 
cluster of shared taps lies in Munsha’at Nasir, Cairo’s largest informal area.
As for electricity access, using the energy source for lighting as a general proxy 
for access to energy, a general trend emerges clearly (Figure 5.12): Johannesburg’s 
older areas and townships have access to and utilize on-grid power sources, while 
in informal settlements, candles are the chief source of lighting, thus indicating a 
different level of access. Although there is significant informality within Johan-
nesburg’s older areas and townships (i.e., backyard accommodation and inner-
city shared rooms in ‘bad’ buildings), many of these units and households are 
still hooked into the formal power grid, either legally or illegally. In this regard, 
the map demonstrating electricity provision is slightly misleading, as it indicates 
broad state provision, when the reality is that near-to-universal coverage has been 
achieved through other modes, such as illegal connections and self-provisioning.
Turning to Cairo, Figure 5.13 confirms government officials’ (within Cairo’s 
electricity companies) claims that virtually all of Cairo is connected to the electricity 
network, including informal areas (which find ways to informally connect). Even in 
neighbourhoods such as Ayn Shams, Al-Marg, East Madinat Nasr, and Al-Basatin, 
where the map shows some red dots indicating off-grid methods of energy access 
(e.g., kerosene, butane gas, etc.), the number of residents employing these off-grid 
methods is very low. As with the map of electricity access in Johannesburg, Cairo’s 
data on electricity access does not distinguish between formal and informal access 
(i.e., illegally tapping into the public network without going through the electricity 
company), thus presenting a misleading picture of universal public access, which in 
reality is achieved by people accessing electricity through illegal means.
Case studies: a finer-scale spatial analysis
The earlier sections have offered a sense of access to infrastructure, service provi-
sion, and distribution in the aggregate, offering a picture of the distribution and 
limitations at the city scale, and indicating inequalities at the intra-urban scale. 
However, when narrowing the focus to a more fine-grained set of case studies, a 
set of further dynamics and complexities emerge.
Looking at Soweto (Johannesburg) and East Madinat Nasr (Cairo), we see 
that even municipal data (like that showcased by the maps shown earlier) has yet 
another more-localized level that can expose further hidden inequalities. Addi-
tionally, the following case studies, which examine access within certain munici-
palities/neighbourhoods, reveal how patterns of service delivery can provide more 
insight into the complex relationship between services, inequality, and informal-
ity, and also potentially illuminate why inequality is so entrenched in some areas, 
and thus how it can be addressed.
Case-study: Soweto
Located 16 kilometres from Johannesburg’s city centre, Soweto traditionally 
housed the cheap black labour pool that serviced the city’s white population. It 
138 Deena Khalil and Margot Rubin
Figure 5.12 Source of Lighting Johannesburg, 2011
Source: Authors
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was only in 1963 that its 29 separate precincts came to be called SOWETO, an 
acronym drawn from the descriptor, ‘South Western Townships’ (Harrison & Har-
rison, 2014). The state provided housing as well as basic services and amenities 
to Soweto residents from its inception. However, the quality of the infrastructure 
was always inferior to that found in residential areas intended for white South 
Africans or those classified as Indian and ‘coloured’. Very few roads connected 
Soweto to the rest of the city, an intentional choice that ensured the township 
could literally be closed off in times of political turmoil. By the end of apartheid 
in the mid-1990s, Soweto’s population of approximately three quarter of a million 
people remained underserviced in almost every way.
Soweto today is home to about 1.3 million people (StatsSA, 2011), or over 
40% of the CoJ’s population. That population is highly differentiated, with at 
least 600,000 people (nearly half) in poverty (CoJ, 2011), alongside a signifi-
cant middle-income population (most wealthier Sowetan residents have left the 
area [Chipkin, 2012]). Since 2000, substantial investment and significant spatial 
transformation have occurred in Soweto, including the improvement of roads, 
clinics, sanitation, and power (Rubin et al., forthcoming). According to Harrison 
and Harrison (2014), in the early 2000s, 35% of Johannesburg’s budget went to 
Soweto. In 2012/2013, 52% of the CoJ’s expenditure for investment in priority 
areas went into Soweto (CoJ, 2012, p. 94). Although these funds have addressed 
infrastructure backlogs in water, sanitation, and electricity provision, as well as 
tarring roads and establishing a bus rapid transit system (Rubin, Todes & Mabin, 
forthcoming), inequities persist.
The tenure maps (Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6) in the previous sections show that 
many houses in Soweto are owned and paid off. However, as already mentioned, 
ownership and secure tenure have limited benefits in this area. Studies conducted 
by the Finmark Trust (2004) indicate that although the units are owned, the hous-
ing market in Soweto is stagnant. Unlike the traditionally white and wealthier 
northern parts of the city, where mortgages are common, we see here an unwill-
ingness from banks to undertake loans against these units, making one suspect 
that old red-lining6 practices are still in effect.
In the case of Soweto, although the 2011 Census shows that only 55% of 
Soweto residents had piped water inside their dwellings, around 93% had electric-
ity for lighting, and around 91% had access to a flush toilet connected to a sewer-
age system. This discrepancy seems to support the notion that while Soweto is 
being formalized, some issues remain disguised (StatsSA, 2011). To wit, between 
2001–2015, the number of backyard units in Soweto increased by as much as 
4,000 dwellings per square kilometre (GCRO, 2018); considering that most back-
yard units share ablutions, water access, and power with the main dwelling, the 
number of households with access to power, water, and sanitation is probably 
not reflected in the general statistics, as many backyard households share utility 
connections. Thus the higher densities could mean that there is overcrowding, 
overuse of insufficient services for the population in question, and resultant health 
issues and social concerns that remain hidden in the seemingly positive numbers 
concerning access to services.
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Case-study: East Madinat Nasr (EMN)
East Madinat Nasr (EMN) is a district in Cairo’s eastern region, and became a 
municipality in 1999 when the Madinat Nasr district was split into East Madi-
nat Nasr and West Madinat Nasr. Covering 227,350 km2, its built area is only 
6,907 km2, and in 2017 its population stood at 634,818 (Cairo Governorate, 
2017a). Originally a vacant piece of desert, Madinat Nasr (‘City of Victory’) was 
established by President Gamal Abdul Nasser as part of a broader plan to create 
a new modern city adjacent to Cairo. Official statements promised that the new 
city would provide improved housing and services, host modern facilities such as 
a football stadium and convention centre, and that many ministries would relocate 
there. Although the new housing for Madinat Nasr primarily targeted upper- and 
middle-class Egyptians, several ‘masakin’, or social housing blocks, were also 
built in certain parts of Madinat Nasr as part of Nasser’s efforts to establish him-
self as head of a revolutionary regime for the people (El-Shahed, 2015). Today 
EMN is split into 18 subdistricts (Cairo Governorate, 2017b). Two thousand six 
census data paint a picture of a relatively well-off neighbourhood with relatively 
low rates of illiteracy (6.7%) and unemployment (4.5%) (CAPMAS, 2006).7
According to Egypt’s urban governance system, the governorate distributes to 
each municipality a local development budget earmarked for built environment 
maintenance, and EMN enjoys relatively good access to its share of that budget. 
Comparing EMN’s budget to two other municipalities with similar populations, it 
is clear that EMN is relatively fortunate (Table 5.2).
Furthermore, 2006 census data show 74% of residents in EMN own their 
homes, which corresponds with EMN’s reputation as a middle-class area. Census 
data also show good access to services across the whole of EMN (electricity, 
water, and sanitation access rates are very high at 99%, 95%, and 98%, respec-
tively), which is reflected in the maps throughout this chapter.
However, despite its relatively large per capita share of the local development 
budget, as well as the high level of access to services, EMN is home to intra-
district inequalities that are obscured in the municipality-level data. Many of 
these inequalities are concentrated within one of EMN’s most significant pock-
ets of poverty: the Ezbet El-Haggana subdistrict, which is also one of Egypt’s 
largest informal areas. Data on Ezbet El-Haggana’s population varies widely: 
Table 5.2 Budget comparison of EMN, Helwan, and Ein Shams districts
District Population size Local budget 2017/2018 Per capita budget
Helwan 521,239 EGP 2,028,966 EGP 3.89
(USD 113,286)
Ein Shams 614,391 EGP 3,676,000 EGP 5.98
(USD 205,248)
EMN 634,818 EGP 6,965,000 EGP 10.97
(USD 388, 888)
Source: Authors, based on Cairo Governorate (2017a) data
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from 67,165 (the 2006 census) to 400,000 (Soliman, 2002) to 1 million (data col-
lected by local NGO, Al-Shihab Foundation for Comprehensive Development). 
However, an examination of satellite imagery, or even a simple visit to this area 
spanning approximately 3km2 (Bremer & Bhuiyan, 2014), reveal the 2006 census 
figure to likely be a severe underestimation.
Looking at some comparisons between Ezbet El-Haggana subdistrict and the 
whole of EMN (see Table 5.3), we gain some insight into what the maps provided 
throughout this chapter disguise.
According to CAPMAS (2013), across all of EMN’s subdistricts, a total of 
14,135 residents live below the poverty line. From this total, 6,817 live in Ezbet 
El-Haggana, meaning that almost half of the municipality’s poor live in one sub-
district, while the other half is spread out over the other 17 subdistricts. A com-
parison of Ezbet El-Haggana to the four subdistricts adjacent to it is even more 
striking, as its neighbours record poverty rates of 0.2%, 1.9%, 2.2%, and 1.9% 
respectively, compared to Ezbet El-Haggana’s poverty rate of 10% (CAPMAS, 
2013).
Looking at the data on housing, as shown in Table 5.3, Ezbet El-Haggana’s 
overcrowding rate is much higher than that of the average in EMN (1.24 and 
1, respectively), and in fact constitutes the highest of all of EMN’s subdistricts. 
Figure 5.14 The Borders of Ezbet El-Haggana
Source: Google Earth
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Table 5.3 Living conditions in EMN compared to Ezbet El-Haggana
Overcrowding Poverty rate Tap outside of Number of Illiteracy
(CAPMAS, (CAPMAS, housing unit schools (CAPMAS, 
2006) 2013) (CAPMAS, (CAPMAS, 2006)
2006) 2006)
Ezbet 1.24 10% 9% 2 29.6%
El-Haggana 
subdistrict
East Madinat 1 2.5% 5% 62 6.7%
Nasr (EMN) 
municipality
Source: Authors
Furthermore, while the percentage of EMN families living in accommodation 
other than an independent housing unit (i.e., a room, shack, tent, or graveyard)8 
is 4.7%, in Ezbet El-Haggana that percentage is markedly higher at 11.2% (CAP-
MAS, 2006). Regarding access to basic services, the percentage of people who 
do not have a tap inside their homes is somewhat higher in Ezbet El-Haggana 
than the average percentage in EMN (9% and 5%, respectively). Meanwhile, the 
percentage of those who have access to the public electricity network is quite high 
within Ezbet El-Haggana at 98% (the average in EMN is 99%).
The data comparing the EMN average percentages to those within the Ezbet 
El-Haggana subdistrict show that intra-municipal inequalities reflect the inter-
municipal inequalities showcased in the maps displayed throughout this chapter. 
In other words, while access to basic services (water and electricity) appears to be 
relatively evenly distributed, access to adequate housing conditions displays far 
higher levels of inequality in certain areas like Ezbet El-Haggana, which is classi-
fied as both informal and ‘unsafe’.
Indeed, one of the crucial considerations this case study raises is around infor-
mality. Although there is a lack of government data on formality/informality of 
tenure at the municipal level, different state institutions produce various lists con-
cerning informal areas. These lists classify Ezbet El-Haggana as an informal area, 
with the Informal Settlement Development Facility (ISDF) further classifying 
part of it as an ‘unsafe’ area. The ‘unsafe area’ label is an official classification 
encoded in Egypt’s 2008 Universal Building Law, to identify places with physi-
cally unsafe characteristics, such as locations in the path of potential rockslides or 
significant numbers of buildings prone to collapse. Within EMN, the only unsafe 
areas are two clusters of homes within Ezbet El-Haggana, which are located under 
high-voltage electricity cables, with severe health repercussions for residents. 
This again points to the fact that despite Ezbet El-Haggana’s high level of access 
to water and electricity, the neighbourhood still suffers from significant challenges 
in regards to housing conditions.
What does this case study data tell us about the relationship between ser-
vices/infrastructure, inequality, and informality? Firstly, that access to basic 
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infrastructure/services – namely water and electricity – cannot be considered an 
indication of good housing conditions, as the two do not necessarily go hand in 
hand. Secondly, that the relationship between informality and poor housing is 
much stronger than the relationship between informality and lack of services. Ser-
vices were shown to be distributed quite evenly throughout Cairo and throughout 
EMN, while housing was found to be much poorer within EMN’s informal area. 
Finally, we conclude that the relationship between informality and inequality is 
strong but not at all straightforward, as particular forms of inequality are tied to 
informality, but many of these are only revealed when looking at extremely local-
ized data. That is, when looking for evidence of inequality in data from any spatial 
level, we must always be mindful that there is often a more local level of data that 
can expose inequalities hidden at the broader scale. We see this in the EMN case, 
where maps presenting municipal-level data hide the inequalities found between 
subdistricts.
Conclusions
Looking at the cities of Cairo and Johannesburg, this chapter has examined 
aspects of spatial inequality in African cities, namely, the primary factors con-
tributing to inequality, how spatial configurations and inequality correlate, and 
the connection between informality and inequality. Our study reveals two cities 
where inequalities in terms of income, poverty, and access to many services – 
especially housing – are still very prevalent, and take a decidedly spatial form. 
In Johannesburg we found access to infrastructure better in the city’s historical 
centre (CBD) and areas designated as ‘white’ under apartheid, while peripheral 
locations – which also house some of the largest informal settlements as well as 
state-provided housing – have fewer amenities and often worse access to services. 
In Cairo, although access to the basic utilities infrastructures (water and electric-
ity) seems to be equally distributed throughout the city, deep spatial inequalities 
exist when it comes to housing conditions, with denser and poorer conditions 
tending to coincide with informal-area locations.
What the built form can tell us about inequality also differs significantly between 
the two cities. Comprised largely of apartment buildings, Cairo has higher built-
form densities, in which we observed that the spatial difference between owner-
ship and rental can be taken as a proxy for wealth or lack thereof. In Johannesburg, 
the picture is slightly more complex, with both rental and full ownership being 
likely indicators of poverty. State intervention in the housing market (i.e., subsi-
dized houses in peripheral areas) and the scarcity of formal rental accommodation 
have resulted in a concentration of informal rentals (in backyards of formal town-
ships and informal areas alike, as well as in inner-city apartment shares), where 
hidden types of inequality persist. In addition, areas characterized by full owner-
ship by means of bank loans are located in better-off and mostly white areas, 
demonstrating where banking institutions are willing to invest and place risk, and 
thus underscoring where poorer people are less able to gain access to formal loans 
(Haferburg & Huchzermeyer, 2017).
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In both cities, we found high densities, informality, and low incomes to be 
closely correlated. However, we found that this reality is not as clearly expressed 
in terms of infrastructure and housing provision as we would have first assumed, 
and that different realities are revealed at finer spatial levels of analysis. It must 
also be noted that through simply mapping location and access to infrastructure 
and amenities, what remains hidden is the private or public nature of those ser-
vices as well as their quality. Even within a single district, spatial inequalities 
can be seen in the distribution of infrastructure – especially related to housing – 
and poverty rates. For example, in Soweto some residents enjoy good access to 
services, whilst those living in backyards of formal units and in informal settle-
ments have highly variable access, and may experience overcrowded and under-
resourced conditions. Similarly, in East Madinat Nasr, the low average poverty 
rate and good average access to infrastructure obscure the actual elevated levels 
of poverty, overcrowding, and generally poor conditions dominant in Ezbet El-
Haggana subdistrict.
What is clear from the analysis is that in both contexts, historically poorer sec-
tions of both cities maintain that status, and there is no question that despite mas-
sive intervention, spatial, social, and economic transformation have yet to occur. 
The relationship between poverty, informality, and lack of services endures, with 
the poorest areas receiving the fewest services, and the poorest in terms of quality 
of provision. Thus, the recursive relationship between poverty and service provi-
sion means that poor provision continues to lock people into poverty due to lack 
of access to the very services that would facilitate their upward mobility. In other 
words, poorer people have less access to quality facilities, and so seem to be less 
able to change their economic status.
Our study further shows the importance of taking intra-urban inequality into 
account when monitoring and reporting on global as well as local urban develop-
ment policy agendas, and the importance of using city-level and localized data 
and indicators that reflect local realities and can better support more equitable 
allocations of infrastructure and services (see also Klopp & Petretta, 2017; Cole 
et al., 2018). Furthermore, the research underscores the importance of moving 
beyond the purely financial and economic measures of development, poverty, and 
inequality that continue to dominate the literature.
Additionally, the findings also point to some of the challenges that African cit-
ies continue to face around multilevel governance and coordination around urban 
planning and service delivery in large city regions. Although not a focus of this 
chapter, we would speculate that the conditions outlined earlier also hinder the 
poor from advocating for their rights or for the implementation of their rights. 
Informality tends to exist in tandem with myriad legal issues that make the gov-
ernance of services and infrastructure complex, and this often creates legal obsta-
cles blocking upgrading projects. Furthermore, for residents in both Cairo and 
Johannesburg, mechanisms and modes of participation and engagement with the 
state are largely dysfunctional. That said, in Johannesburg, wealthier residents 
have been better able to gain the ear of the state, often through threatening liti-
gation or the rates base (Clarno, 2013). When that has failed, self-provisioning 
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through privatized, off-grid solutions allows wealthier residents to ‘splinter’ from 
the state, ensuring access to services that poorer residents simply cannot afford. 
Thus, the dynamics of provision in Johannesburg are mediated by the politics of 
who has power to demand from the state or self-provide, and who does not. In 
Cairo, mechanisms for poor and marginalized citizens to claim their rights have 
historically been quite limited, and are arguably becoming even more scarce, as 
the space for civil society and freedom of assembly becomes ever more restricted. 
However, Egypt is also currently undergoing a moment in its history when infor-
mal areas are incredibly high on the public agenda, and addressing their issues 
has become part of the public narrative. Making use of data such as that presented 
in this chapter can aid such efforts and ensure that state efforts and resources are 
targeted where they are most needed.
The value of comparison
Responding in many ways to the growing call for a more comparative approach 
to understanding the urban, the comparative work undertaken in this chapter has 
proven useful in unmasking general trends and demonstrating how they persist in 
different contexts (Robinson, 2011; Brenner & Schmid, 2015). Comparing these 
cities helped us consider the idea of what is disguised as well as what is revealed 
in the two contexts: when we saw specific outcomes or phenomena in one city, it 
provoked the need to ask questions of the other. Asking questions of clarity that 
may have been obvious to researchers about their own context caused us to dig 
deeper into the data, and the discussion and debate that followed gave greater 
depth to our interpretations of the various phenomena. For example, it was useful 
to consider issues of property and tenure, and how they are expressed in both con-
texts. However, what is not always apparent in the relatively high-level literature 
is the need for depth in the empirical data in order to make useful comparisons. 
Whilst looking at outcomes has merit, there is a need for taking ‘deep dives’ into 
other contexts in order to make better sense of what can be seen.
This comparative approach was not without its challenges – especially where 
definitions, expectations, data sources, and reliability differed. Expressions of 
poverty look very different when examined in the two contexts, which rendered 
terms like formal and informal less useful, as they mean very different things 
in the two cities. For example, poor housing conditions manifest differently: in 
Johannesburg, poor households live in backyards, informal settlements, and inner-
city ‘bad buildings’, while in Cairo, informal areas take the form of multistorey 
buildings constructed from reinforced concrete, but with much higher densities 
and overcrowding, and poorer facilities and services.
This study highlighted some of the benefits of conducting comparative analysis, 
especially South-South comparison, and particularly comparisons across African 
cities. In particular, it shed light on the utility of somewhat nascent concepts such 
as ‘African urbanism’, which encourage the extraction of insights and lessons 
from African cities for African cities, rather than those imported from the global 
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North. As McFarlane (2010) argues, the comparative method is more than a meth-
odological comparison, but also an ‘implicit mode of thought’ (2010, p. 726), 
which informs how knowledge and theory are constructed in the urban.
Overall the research presented here should be seen as a first step in mobilizing 
the practicalities of comparative urbanism, and as an exercise to generate better 
bilateral relationships and generative questions of context. The lens of inequality 
and infrastructure was a useful one, but given the constraints of time and budget, 
it too should be seen as a first step in moving towards a deeper and richer analysis. 
Such an analysis would stem from acquiring a better sense of the historical and 
political contexts in which infrastructural decisions have been made, and in doing 
so, reveal more about the politics of decision-making and offer greater insight into 
the many actors and modes of governance at play.
Notes
 1 Despite numerous concerns about the reliability of the data, these are the only national 
datasets that exist.
 2 Urban-rural governorates differ from fully urban governorates in terms of how they are 
divided spatially; because Cairo is fully urban, this chapter will only cover the spatial 
dynamics of fully urban governorates.
 3 There is some involvement of the private sector in the water, sanitation, and electricity 
sectors, but it is still in its early stages and not very significant.
 4 RDP settlements are publicly provided houses (with titles deeds and state-provided ser-
vices) for households earning less than R3,500/month. The acronym comes from the 
‘Reconstruction and Development Programme’, under which this form of housing deliv-
ery was first initiated.
 5 In-kind benefit refers to people who receive housing in exchange for work. It includes 
domestic workers who live with their employers, but also persons who work in a factory 
that provides housing for workers, or, for example, a CEO of a multinational who is 
providing housing as part of their contract. Any work benefit that is given in-kind in the 
form of housing is included in this category. The category ‘Other’ includes those who 
are living somewhere under any arrangement that is not via renting, owning, or provided 
through employment (e.g., those who were given homes as a gift).
 6 The practice of banks not loaning money to people based on where they live.
 7 Although the most recent census was conducted in 2016, the results that have been pub-
licly released are only at the level of the governorate and do not go down to the level of 
the municipality and subdistrict. The most recent census available at such a local level 
is the 2006 one.
 8 In Cairo there are a number of impoverished people who, rather than remain homeless, 
have taken up shelter in Cairo’s graveyards and tombs.
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Introduction
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has identified sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) as one of the world’s regions most vulnerable to the effects of climate 
change (IPCC, 2007; Serdeczny et al., 2015; Chirisa et al., 2016; Mail&Guardian, 
2018; IPCC, 2018). Although climate vulnerability translates into altered envi-
ronmental conditions that increase weather-related risks to human settlements and 
infrastructure (IPCC, 2013), there has been limited research on climate adaptation 
in African cities (Magadza, 2000; Filho et al., 2018). Moreover, the policy direc-
tives and discussions that do exist to help vulnerable urban communities in SSA- 
countries continue to focus largely on mitigation rather than adaptation (Muller, 
2007; Jagers & Duus-Otterström, 2008; van Vuuren et al., 2011). While mitiga-
tion efforts focusing on the drivers of climate change are critical, the conversation 
on adaptation requires further attention (Muller, 2007). Adaptation models that 
deal with perceptions, social responsibilities, and appropriate community-based 
public relations interventions can be decisive in helping vulnerable communities 
improve their responses to flooding (Mullins & Soetanto, 2011; Kellens et al., 
2013; Kruse et al., 2017).
In many African countries, there is limited state capacity to address infrastruc-
ture deficits and socioeconomic challenges. In such cases, innovative and col-
laborative approaches to urban risk management response are vital. An example 
is the flood-risk management paradigm integrating social cohesion and commu-
nity preparedness methodologies (cf. Kellens et al., 2013; Kruse et al., 2017). 
While such methods recognize the importance of the human dimension in creating 
resilient communities in a flood-risk management context, there is a need to bet-
ter understand the specific interventions or actions that help communities inte-
grate and utilize the existing knowledge, perceptions, and values that are key to a 
community-based flood-risk management approach (Wood et al., 2012; Chong 
et al., 2018). This work aligns with the Africa Climate Resilient Infrastructure 
Summit (ACRIS II), held in Addis Ababa from 20–21 April 2015, which empha-
sized the development of resilient communities as a priority in African urban 
disaster-management work (see also Sylla et al., 2016).
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Global development frameworks such as the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) also stress the importance of community resilience with a specific tar-
get, as part of the stand-alone urban SDG 11 (cf. Parnell, 2016). This focuses on 
the need to ‘increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and 
implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, 
mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop 
and implement, in line with the Sendai Agreement for Disaster Risk Reduction, 
holistic disaster risk management at all levels’ (SDG target 11.b; see also Rodri-
guez et al., 2018).
This chapter aims to add to this conversation by understanding how communi-
ties at high risk of flooding perceive their own adaptive preparedness within a 
sub-Saharan West African context. The purpose therefore was to analyse the level 
of awareness of communities to current flood-risk management issues, and also 
understand the state of citizens’ participation in seeking to proactively and col-
lectively build a resilience spirit towards flood hazards. Through a co-production 
process to develop engagement strategies, the community showed keen interest 
and participated expressly in the series of engagements. It was further observed 
that being part of the data gathering process made it more acceptable to commu-
nity members to appreciate and associate with the project.
The chapter begins with an overview of flood risk in Ghana and various frame-
works for risk management, after which we introduce the research site of Sepe-
Buokrom, and our CityLab approach to understanding community responses to 
the flooding risk in that community. After presenting our key findings, the chapter 
concludes with reflections on the enabling factors and challenges for knowledge 
co-production in this area.
Managing flood risks
In Ghana, as in many other SSA countries, flooding ranks highly among disasters 
in terms of casualties and property destruction. While the government is already 
overwhelmed in its attempts to tackle the hazard, the frequency and impacts of 
flooding have increased. Records from 1990 to 2015 indicate that flooding in 
Ghana killed over 500 people, affecting more than 4 million, and causing eco-
nomic losses of roughly US$800 million (Asumadu-Sarkodie et al., 2015).
Most of the existing measures employed to control flooding are structural in 
nature and have achieved little in terms of mitigation (e.g., river dredging, desilt-
ing, and the construction and rehabilitation of primary drains). Severe loss and 
damage continue, with property in the Accra metropolis worth US$43 million lost 
due to flooding in 2009, an amount that increased to US$150 million in 2011 
(Frimpong, 2014). In June 2015, the International Federation of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies reported that flooding in Accra affected over 46,000 peo-
ple, displaced 9,200 people, and resulted in over 200 deaths (IFRC, 2015). These 
numbers are unprecedented in Ghana’s annals of flood disaster (ibid.). The trend 
in the ensuing years is indeed worrying. In March-June 2016, about 13 people died 
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and 4,000 were displaced as a result of flooding (Nkrumah, 2016). In 2017, Ghana 
experienced widespread flooding, with five regions severely affected, devastat-
ing impacts to health, safety, property, and livelihoods, and about 1,500 people 
displaced to seek refuge in schools and churches (IFRC, 2017). In 2018, after just 
a few hours of rain, another devastating flood hit capital city Accra particularly 
hard, with images on social media showing streets submerged under one metre 
of water (Floodlist, 2018). In 2019, another flood hit seven of the country’s tradi-
tional ten1 regions, resulting in the drowning of 12 children in the middle of the 
country, 29 deaths in the Upper East region, and over 1,000 buildings destroyed 
(Floodlist, 2019).
These increasing and severe impacts of flooding across urban Ghana call for 
a new integrated approach to tackling the risk, emphasizing considerations that 
assist communities in ‘living with the risk’ rather than solely focusing on pre-
vention (Proverbs & Lamond, 2017). This new resilience paradigm for reducing 
flood risk has not been given due consideration in many SSA countries, either 
theoretically or practically, in terms of developing integrated community flood-
risk management frameworks.
Mitigation versus adaptation
Adaptation requires that communities consciously leverage social responsibility 
to identify their exposure to flood hazards, and to proactively undertake actions 
that engender a response to those threats, including how to recover from an event, 
and perhaps more importantly, how to build resilience for sustainable develop-
ment (Mullins & Soetanto, 2011; Kruse et al., 2017; Chong et al., 2018). Drawing 
on grey and academic literature on adaptation at the city-scale level in developing 
countries, it is clear that changing environmental conditions are increasing the 
weather-related risks facing human settlements, including increasing flood haz-
ards (Douglas et al., 2008; Proverbs, 2011; Huong & Pathirana, 2013; Serdeczny 
et al., 2015).
As a strategy to handle weather-related risk, adaptation is achieving greater 
prominence, particularly as societies recognize the gravity of their vulnerability 
to the impact of flooding (cf. van Vuuren et al., 2011). Given the documented 
trend of increasing flooding and the challenges posed by this reality, the need for 
supporting, facilitating, and enhancing communities’ adaptive capacities for sus-
tainable development is clear (cf. Lwasa, 2010; Jones & Boyd, 2011; Jha et al., 
2012). In addition, developing country contexts of extreme vulnerability and 
weak structural and economic foundations require bespoke adaptation solutions 
(Mertz et al., 2009; Serdeczny et al., 2015; Chirisa et al., 2016).
Mitigation is about reducing the short-term impact of flooding, while adapta-
tion focuses on learning to cope over the long-term with flooding (van Vuuren 
et al., 2011). While mitigation is critical, adaptation is also vital to help vulnerable 
communities better respond to the flooding that is happening and will continue to 
happen. Adaptation work concerns influencing perceptions and social responsibil-
ities, and instigating appropriate public relation models for effective community 
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engagement (cf. Mullins & Soetanto, 2011; Kellens et al., 2013). As implied by 
Niehm et al. (2008), shifting values through influencing perceptions and social 
responsibilities engenders citizenry involvement and greater community ties (see 
also Shafer et al., 2007). Moreover, the literature suggests that the theoretical 
and practical basis of how communities adapt are both context-specific and func-
tional within social limits (Adger et al., 2007, as cited in Wilby & Keenan, 2012). 
That is, while mitigation may often lead to global and/or international prescrip-
tions, adaptation is localized and often culturally sensitive, suggesting the need to 
understand the social context of the community engaged (van Vuuren et al., 2011; 
cf. Bender, 2008; Pohl et al., 2010).
To contribute to such an understanding, the Centre for Settlements Studies (CSS) 
at Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) undertook 
a community engagement study in a flood-prone community in Kumasi, Ghana’s 
second largest city. The research wing of the College of Art and Built Environ-
ment at KNUST, the CSS researches urban and rural interventions that address the 
socioeconomic and housing needs of disadvantaged communities and settlements. 
The CSS also provides outreach programmes and training in settlement devel-
opment and management. Over the last decade, the Centre’s research has been 
guided by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and, more recently, the 
SDGs approach to human settlements. The aim of this community engagement 
study was to assess a community’s appetite to participate in the development of a 
community resilience framework (CRF) for flood-risk management.
CRFs intend to help vulnerable communities identify ways to prepare for and 
also cope with the occurrence of present and future flood-hazard events. Cut-
ter et al. (2008) propose the Disaster Resilience of Place (DROP) model, which 
factors in localized information around the vulnerability of communities, and 
is specific to natural hazards such as flooding. Renschler et al. (2011) espoused 
what they call the PEOPLES model: Population and Demographics, Environ-
mental/Ecosystem, Organized Governmental Services, Physical Infrastructure, 
Lifestyle and Community Competence, Economic Development, and Social-
Cultural Capital. The PEOPLES Resilience Framework provides the foundation 
to integrate quantitative and qualitative models that measure systems’ resilience 
against disasters. emBRACE  is another CRF recently developed by a consortium 
of five European countries. The core domains of the emBRACE focus on con-
ceptualizing community resilience of resources, capacities, actions, and learning. 
Chong et al. (2018) espouse a framework seeking to engender a spirit of com-
munity resilience towards flooding, and identify four conditions for communities 
to focus on as deliverables: securing basic needs, being able to adapt to change, 
minimizing vulnerabilities, and emerging from poverty. Further to this these four 
conditions, the authors emphasize the important contribution of institutions in 
assisting communities to execute well-prepared disaster-resilient frameworks, 
particularly relating to planning systems, and resilience initiatives in rural com-
munities (Chong et al., 2018).
While these frameworks are all useful in their own right, it is agreed that any 
CRF will require further adjustments for different cultural backgrounds, hazard 
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types, and sociopolitical contexts (cf. Renschler et al., 2011; Kruse et al., 2017; 
Chong et al., 2018). Developed mostly for advanced economies like those in 
Europe and Asia, these CRFs are thus not likely to be well-suited to the political 
and socioeconomic conditions of SSA. This suggests the importance of under-
standing the requirements of a suitable approach to engendering community resil-
ience initiatives in the local context of SSA countries such as Ghana.
Given the looming threat that flooding poses to cities and conurbations in 
Ghana and the subregion, the CSS focused this study on understanding urban 
communities’ perceptions of flood risk. The study also engaged communities 
on the need for adaptation to flooding based on social responsibility models and 
community-based initiatives. Our approach to this engagement centred around 
the use of a ‘CityLab’ approach, which sees stakeholders not only as subjects 
for data collection, but partners in knowledge production and critical in driving 
the research focus (Brown-Luthango, 2013; AURI, 2014; Patel et al., 2015). So 
far, the notion of co-production in Ghana has mainly been applied to research 
collaborations between the state and communities in the area of land and water 
management (McCusker & Carr, 2006; Akaateba et al., 2018; Mangai & de Vries, 
2018). To our knowledge, this study represents the first effort to focus on the co-
production of knowledge to develop a framework for implementing community-
led resilience and flood-risk management initiatives in SSA.
Sepe-Buokrom
The research site of Sepe-Buokrom is a flood-prone community in Kumasi, Gha-
na’s second largest city. For the last decade, Kumasi has been at high risk from 
flooding, with over half the city currently flood-prone, including the selected study 
area. Located in West Africa’s forest zone, Kumasi has a wet, semi-equatorial 
climate, with two distinct rainy seasons (June and September), which produce an 
annual average rainfall of 1,400 mm. The mean annual temperature is 25.7°C and 
humidity ranges from 53% to 93%.
According to the 2010 National Census, Kumasi’s population was 2,035,064, 
with an annual population growth rate of 5.7% (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012). 
Interpreting the trend in population increase, Owusu-Ansah (2016) observed that 
human activities relating to land use have intensified in Ghana’s inner cities, spill-
ing over into public parks and natural open spaces, including riparian areas and 
wetlands. This trend has led to increasing numbers of settlements on flood-prone 
terrain, large areas of land covered by impervious surfaces without sufficient 
drainage, and correspondingly increased volumes of runoff from precipitation 
(Afriyie et al., 2018).
Figure 6.2 illustrates the main flood-prone locations within Kumasi Metropo-
lis, as well as the study area of Sepe-Buokrom, one of Kumasi’s most vulner-
able communities. Houses in Sepe-Buokrom settlement are largely constructed 
from cement and sand-block walls, and roofed with corrugated iron sheets. The 
structures are clustered together with little space between, and choked gutters and 
drains are also common. The major economic activities in Sepe-Buokrom are 
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Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (Headed by 
Metropolitan Chief Executive)
Manhyia Sub-Metropolitan District Council
Buokrom Town Council
Unit Committee
Sepe Buokrom Electoral Area
Assembly Member
Figure 6.3  Local Governance Structure of the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly Showing 
the Study Area, Sepe-Buokrom Electoral Area
Source: Authors
small-scale microenterprises such as petty trading, mechanical workshops, and 
carpentry workshops (Asamoah et al., 2016).
Governance structure
Located in the Ashanti region (one of Ghana’s traditional ten administrative 
regions), Kumasi is governed by the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA). The 
KMA is one of 260 Metropolitan/Municipal/District Assemblies (MMDAs), the 
highest unit of local government in Ghana. The KMA is headed by a Metropolitan 
Chief Executive (MCE), who acts in the same capacity as an executive mayor 
(GoG, 2016). Thus the MCE is a political leader from the ruling government, 
appointed by the President to oversee and act in his capacity to champion devel-
opment at the local government level, as enshrined in the 1992 Constitution of 
Ghana and backed by Local Government Act 462, 1993.
Below the level of KMA, there are various sub-metros in Kumasi,2 includ-
ing the Manhyia sub-metropolitan District Council, which includes the Buokrom 
Town Council, the body that oversees the community of Sepe-Buokrom (Fig-
ure 6.3). Like all the sub-metropolitan District Councils, the roles and functions of 
the Buokrom Town Council are stipulated under the Second Schedule of Legisla-
tive Instrument 2223 of 2015 (GoG, 2015). These functions include maintaining 
public spaces, waste management, and the administration of self-help projects 
(GoG, 2016), all of which are crucial in flood mitigation and adaptation efforts.
Sepe-Buokrom is an electoral area with its own elected assemblymen. Assem-
blymen (also known as assembly members) are elected local government officials 
within a community in the Metropolis/District, who represent their community at 
the District Assembly. Unlike members of parliament, assemblymen are apolitical. 
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Assemblymen are responsible for the articulation and realization of their con-
stituents’ aspirations. Most decisions in MMDA are subject to the approval of the 
assemblymen.
The Unit Committee is the smallest component of local government in Ghana. 
Unit committee members are also elected representatives who work with assem-
bly members to enforce bylaws within their electoral/community level, as dic-
tated by the MMDA. As the local government entity closest to the community, the 
Unit Committee (UC) plays important roles in enforcing bylaws and mobilizing 
resources. The UC also provides a structured mechanism of representation, partic-
ipation, and accountability from the lowest community levels upwards. Together 
with the assembly members, UC members are responsible to the MMDA through 
the concerned Urban, Zonal, or Town Councils. However, UC members are not 
necessarily accountable to the assemblymen, as shown in the governance struc-
ture in Figure 6.3.
Given the complex and multi-layered nature of local governance, the project’s 
data collection required not only identification of key informants, but also careful 
negotiation between all of these different actors. In the section that follows we 
present our research approach and methods.
Research approach and methods
In September 2017 the project commenced with a literature review to better 
understand the study’s theoretical background and research area. An earlier study, 
Flood Risk Perception, Coping and Management in Two Vulnerable Communities 
in Kumasi, Ghana, which included a review of books, journals, newspapers, and 
grey literature conducted by the authors, greatly facilitated this process (Ahadzie 
et al., 2016). Evidence from this earlier study suggests that while flood-prone 
communities may be aware of the risk they are exposed to, there is no commit-
ment to the community, community support, and/or sense of social responsibility 
towards engendering citizens’ participation in flood-risk management.
We executed the project in three main phases as follows:
Phase One: A month of inception meetings to set the project goals, identify key 
stakeholders, and define the communication plan. The identification of key 
stakeholders from Sepe-Buokrom was an important element of this phase. 
Key stakeholders included the assemblyman, unit committee members, and 
opinion leaders.3 Once the stakeholders were identified, the research team 
began to build networks to assess stakeholder willingness and ability to 
participate in the project.
Phase Two: Data collection. The methodology was entirely qualitative, and 
included a mixture of segmented Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and 
Stakeholder Meetings (SMs). In line with the CityLab approach, relation-
ships were cultivated across institutions and interest groups to ensure broad 
participation. Five FGDs were held in total, followed by one SM. In all of 
these forums, we discussed participants’ understandings of the causes of 
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and potential solutions to flooding, and the potential role of community-
based initiatives to improve flood-risk management.
Phase Three: This final closure phase focused on completion of all research 
activities and validation of project data. This involved a second ‘End of 
Project’ SM, which attracted locally elected representatives (e.g., assem-
blymen), politically appointed government representatives (e.g., the MCE), 
and representatives from the National Disaster Management Organization 
(NADMO), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as well as the 
media.
Focus Group Discussions (FGD)
The success of the FGDs was largely due to the involvement of the Sepe-Buokrom 
assemblyman and UC members, who mobilized and organized the community to 
participate. Enjoying a close relationship with the communities, the assembly-
man and UC members have a strong grasp of local challenges. For brevity’s sake, 
henceforth, ‘assemblyman’ will be used to refer to both the assemblyman and his 
UC members.
The FGD research team was comprised of a moderator, camera operator, 
recorder, and two secretaries (the secretaries took notes and observed the par-
ticipants’ general mood and body language). The venue for all the FGDs was the 
Sepe-Buokrom Town Council Building. For maximum participant involvement 
and understanding, the local language (Twi) was used as the medium of communi-
cation during all FGDs, which were held during the week of the 19–23 September 
2017, and lasted approximately one hour per session.
The FGDs were organized with Men, Women, Children, the Youth, and Opin-
ion Leaders, with all participants from the Sepe-Buokrom community. The first 
FGD was with Women (average age 47), who were mostly self-employed and 
engaged in livelihoods such as hair dressing and petty trading. The second FGD 
of Men mostly included traders and artisans (average age 59). The third FGD of 
Opinion Leaders included two women and five men, including teachers, traders, 
and pensioners. The fourth FGD of Youth included three females and three males 
(average age 25). The final FGD of Children included six girls and four boys 
(average age 13).
Each FGD session began with carefully selected videos of major flood disasters 
from across the world, including Ghana. Depicting the devastating and destruc-
tive nature of floods, they captured participants’ attention, and in some cases, 
elicited strong emotions. The videos clearly made quite an impression on all par-
ticipants, paving the way for what appeared animated and genuine engagements 
from participants.
Although community members were divided into groups based on gender and 
power in the community, hierarchies within these groupings still existed. For 
example, among the women were ‘queen mothers’ (female leaders in the com-
munities), and among the men, representatives of the chief/chief linguist and the 
assemblyman (who have more power than other men in the communities) were 
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present. However, the participants in all the FGDs appeared relaxed both before 
and during the discussions, and there were no signs of intimidation in any of the 
FGDs, with participants expressing themselves freely.
Stakeholder Meetings (SM)
Following the conclusion of the segmented FGDs, the research team conducted 
its analysis and facilitated two SMs, which included key urban stakeholders com-
prised of select residents, assemblymen, NADMO officials, and the media. Held 
five months apart, these SMs were used to discuss the study’s preliminary find-
ings, and also represented the first meetings specifically arranged (not only in 
Kumasi, but in all of Ghana) to discuss CRFs and how communities can respond 
to flood-related issues.
The first SM, which took place at the town council meeting in the Sepe- 
Buokrom community, attracted educators, religious leaders, unions, market/trader 
associations, opinion leaders, and representatives from traditional leadership 
(chiefs) (Figure 6.4). Despite asking the assemblyman to ensure a gender bal-
ance, the stakeholder groups composition was overwhelmingly male – females 
constituting just over one third of the participants – reflecting the male-dominated 
nature of Ghanaian culture, particularly in areas of decision-making.
The second SM was planned for April 2018. However, local elections held in 
the same period required the research team to delay the meeting until August 2018. 
The second SM included heavy representation from assemblymen, along with 
officials from the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA), the National Disaster 
Management Organization (NADMO), and the media. Held at the KMA (the seat 
of the local government in Kumasi), the second SM was opened by the MCE, 
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whose participation spoke to the event’s significance and government’s interest 
in the discourse.
During his opening remarks, the MCE highlighted the increasing threat of 
flooding to the city in recent times, and assured government support for any flood-
risk management initiative in the metropolis. Towards the end of the meeting, the 
MCE requested that the CSS research team join the KMA in preparing a proposal 
that will extend this type of stakeholder engagement to all MMDAs in the Greater 
Kumasi area, intimating that the KMA was ready to offer all the necessary support 
in facilitating these meetings.
Data analysis
Data analysis was undertaken in two stages. First, FGD data (in the form of notes, 
audio, and video) were transcribed from the local dialect, Asante-Twi, to Eng-
lish, with research assistants verifying the translations for validity. Thereafter, our 
senior researchers held a group meeting to go through the transcribed data again, 
using the audio and video versions to verify and validate that data.
We chose the qualitative data analysis (QDA) computer software package 
NVivo desktop, version 10.0 for its ability to accommodate numerous data for-
mats in a single analysis (Dollah et al., 2017; Zamawe, 2015). Data was coded 
paragraph by paragraph, at multiple nodes, and analysed data were presented in 
the form of graphs, pictures, and the ‘Word Cloud’. The Word Cloud was gener-
ated by running Word Frequency queries that identify key phrases within the data. 
Figure 6.5 depicts findings from Focus Group Discussions, using Word Cloud 
after the Nvivo analysis. The results visually depict the degree to which prominent 
personalities (assemblyman, chief, and MP) are expected to drive the common 
vision of the community towards achieving flood resilience.
Visually highlighting the relative frequency of words in a text, the Word Cloud 
offers a way to capture text responses from qualitative data using visual means to 
reflect insights drawn from peoples’ social setting, background, and experience 
of socioeconomic issues (cf. Lohmann et al., 2015). As a form of analysis, Word 
Clouds have the marked advantages of being very fast and simple to conduct once 
the difficult work of transcribing has been done. The results of the analyses are 
also easy to comprehend and visually appealing, reveal only the essential vari-
ables, and provide a form of emotional connection that sets the tone for further 
discussions (McNaught & Lam, 2010).
Key findings
This section provides the key findings from the FGDs and the SMs.
To evaluate our findings we used Norris et al.’s (2008) four primary ‘community 
adaptive capacities’: economic development, social capital, information and com-
munication, and community competence. We also draw on Chong et al.’s (2018) 
position that the values and roles that institutions/agencies involved in disaster 
management bring on board are key in helping to build resilient communities. In 
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terms of economic development, the study revealed that, like many deprived com-
munities in SSA countries, Sepe-Buokrom lacked the capacity or readiness to lev-
erage economic resources to engender community resilience. Also, while social 
capital is deep-seated and used for individual mutual support (e.g., funerals), the 
community is yet to leverage this quality and apply it collectively in the interest 
of building a resilient communal spirit towards flood hazards. Regarding informa-
tion and communication, within the community, access to and sharing of flood 
information is nonexistent, and there is no engagement on how to handle commu-
nication collectively during a flood disaster. Most flood victims we encountered at 
the FGDs intimated that the assemblyman would be the first point of contact in a 
crisis situation (via mobile phone), though this was based on individual intuition 
rather than being an official policy. Finally, while the community was aware of its 
extreme vulnerability to flooding, no attempts to build a community competence 
towards engendering adaptive capacities to flood hazards have been made.
Figure 6.5 Word Cloud on Achieving Flood Resilience
Source: Authors
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Through analysing the FGD and SM data, three main factors identified by par-
ticipants as necessary to developing an urban CRF for flood-risk management 
emerged. These are: 1) the importance of local leadership; 2) residents’ initiative; 
and 3) community commitment, loyalty, and togetherness. The importance of 
local leadership aligns with the CRF developed by Chong et al. (2018) for Malay-
sia, suggesting the value of institutions and the need to integrate their role. This is 
particularly the case for places like Sepe-Buokrom, where, as in many Ghanaian 
communities, sociopolitical circumstances have led to a lack of social responsi-
bility, meaning communities will continue to rely on institutions while they work 
on developing community resilience initiatives towards flood hazards. However, 
Cutter et al. (2008) observe that financial considerations often make institutions 
reluctant to focus energy on communities’ hazard vulnerability – a concern that 
also arose and is discussed further in the next sections. That said, we argue that 
the way forward involves building a common vision of leadership requirements, 
which are detailed next.
Leadership is key
The FGD data established that participants viewed strong collaboration between 
residents and the ‘leadership trio’ (i.e., assemblyman,4 chief, and MPs) as impor-
tant to improving the community’s ability to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, 
and recover more quickly from flood disasters. This echoes findings from a simi-
lar study conducted in the capital of the country, Accra, which found that while 
community leaders participated in the implementation of flood-risk management 
strategies, they were often not involved in the formulation of these strategies 
(Atanga, 2020). Considering the assemblyman’s role and responsibility to consult 
and maintain close contact with his electoral area while also liaising between his 
people and the District Assembly on development issues, the study identified him 
as the best person to mobilize the community and initiate the community resil-
ience approach. Per the Local Government Act, the assemblyman is to ‘maintain 
close contact with his electoral area, consult his people on issues to be discussed 
in the District Assembly and obtain their views, opinions, and proposals; present 
the views, opinions, and proposals to the District Assembly; and meet with the 
electorate before each meeting of the Assembly’ (Act 462, 1993).
It must be noted here that the role of the assemblyman at the local level in Ghana 
is similar to that of an MP at the national level. That is, he is expected to repre-
sent his peoples’ views at the District Assembly, and to share Assembly decisions 
with his constituents.5 The District Assembly meanwhile exercises deliberative, 
legislative, and executive functions at the local government level, complementing 
the central government. Thus, District Assemblies are responsible for the over-
all development of local communities, and should promote and support relevant 
socioeconomic programmes. For example, the District Assemblies are expected 
to ‘be responsible for the development, improvement, and management of human 
settlements and the environment in the district’ (Act 462, 1993).6 This includes 
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managing flood risks and other disasters to ensure properties and people are pro-
tected. The assemblyman is thus the community’s elected representative tasked 
with carrying out such activities at the community level. However, unlike MPs, 
who are remunerated and can draw from the District Assembly Common Fund 
(DACF)7 for developmental projects in their constituencies, assemblymen are 
neither remunerated for their services, nor can they directly access the DACF. 
The assemblymen receive some allowances for attending assembly meetings, and 
ex gratia after their tenure expires (a four-yearly cycle). In other words, assem-
blymen rarely have the resources at their disposal to execute their mandate of 
ensuring that services are delivered at the local level efficiently and effectively 
(Abdallah, 2011).
According to our study, despite having the mandate and commanding the 
respect, the assemblyman felt incapable of mobilizing the community for meet-
ings to discuss issues related to flood-risk management, or to undertake communal 
work to manage flood risk. Thus, our study revealed that although the zeal to work 
may exist, the assemblyman’s inability to harness the resources to do that work 
disempowers the role. This is particularly undermining given that, according to the 
FGD data, the electorate’s expectations of assemblymen are very high, in spite of 
the assemblymen’s frequent inability to deliver. Adequately resourcing assembly-
men therefore could empower and enable them to carry out their mandate.
Unlike the assemblymen, the MP was seen by FGD participants as able to 
access the resources needed to promote community resilience. That is, the MP 
can ensure that communities in flood-prone areas receive a share of the DACF to 
promote CRF activities. The FGD participants also identified traditional leader-
ship (the chief) as key to the promotion of a CRF. As a respected and influential 
person who occupies the role of community custodian, the chief’s participation in 
resilience efforts was deemed critical.
Thus, the importance of these three key stakeholders working together to pro-
mote community resilience to flood risk through a common vision came through 
strongly from the FGDs. Table 6.1 shows some of the striking comments emerg-
ing from the FGDs around the ‘Leadership is Key’ sub-themes (e.g., role of the 
key personalities and residents).
Residents initiative
The second major finding from the FGD data analysis was the need for individual 
households to participate in community-based initiatives to help promote a CRF. 
FGD participants identified two ways for households to do this. First, ensuring 
proper disposal of refuse, and second, fully committing to any flood-management 
initiatives undertaken in the community.
Commitment, loyalty, and togetherness
The third and final element needed to facilitate community flood-risk resilience 
was articulated as a combination of ‘commitment, loyalty, and togetherness’. The 
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shared commitment was expressed as a prerequisite for the community’s success-
ful undertaking of its own initiatives to reduce flood risk. This shared commitment 
and unified vision would need to be negotiated with an understanding of the com-
munity’s history, conflicts, and shared future.
In contrast to the FGDs, the Stakeholder Meetings were focused on data valida-
tion and consensus building. The data from these meetings were analysed manu-
ally from written and summary reports and notes taken at the meetings (versus 
using Nvivo qualitative data analysis software, as was the case with the FGDs). 
The two SMs were also used to ascertain how well various stakeholders would 
take up the challenge to mobilize their respective communities to achieve the 
common vision relating to building a CRF for flood-risk management.
At the first SM, we presented themes that arose from the FGDs, asking partici-
pants the following questions:
• Were the FGDs adequately representative of the community?
• Did stakeholders agree that Sepe-Buokrom is a flood-prone area? How did 
they reach their conclusion?
• Have there been any other gatherings to discuss flooding issues within the 
community?
• What can communities do to lessen the immediate impact of flooding?
• Is there a safe haven in the community where people can assemble when 
flooding occurs?
Table 6.1 Emergent themes and supporting notable comments from FGDs
Themes and sub-themes Example of survey response
Leadership is key As my colleagues have already mentioned, the core 
members of the leadership are the assemblyman, the 
MP, and the chief. If these three come together and 
mobilize and educate the youth and the elders of the 
community, there is no way the community would not 
get involved.
a Role of the I believe all responsibilities lie on the assemblyman. He is 
assemblyman in the best position to identify the problems facing the 
community. Hence, he should be the one to mobilize the 
youth to take steps in fixing those problems.
b The role of the chiefs The chief is the owner of the community. Without him 
the assemblyman cannot work effectively. So, the chief 
must be involved, together with his team.
c The role of MPs Looking at our community now, the MP has played 
very little role in the community’s development. If the 
assemblyman is to work and work effectively, it will be 
upon the shoulders of the MP.
d Role of residents It is therefore important for us the residents to maintain 
and clean our homes and this will help prevent flooding
Source: Authors
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• Who would be the appropriate person/s to lead community-based resilience?
• What can the community do to help the area leadership in controlling floods?
The participants affirmed that the demographic groupings used for the FGDs were 
exhaustive and adequately represented the community. Based on their experi-
ences, they expressed overwhelming support for the notion that Sepe-Buokrom 
(the study area) is flood-prone. However, while participants accepted that their 
area is highly flood-prone, it emerged that this understanding has never caused 
them to engage with the risk factors in terms of how they as a community can 
engender their own resilience. Regarding the question of a safe haven, partici-
pants identified a school block, which they believe is located at the community’s 
highest point. However, the idea that this school is ‘safe’ is based not on proven 
fact, but rather on an incident that occurred about a decade ago, when a message 
claiming that a meteorite was aimed to hit a location in Ghana went viral. The 
instinctive response of many residents in Sepe-Buokrom was to congregate at this 
particular school – which may or may not actually be located at the highest point. 
As a result, this location continues to register in peoples’ minds as a rallying point 
in the event of flood emergency.
Results from the first SM also strongly confirmed support for the ‘leadership 
trio’ of the assemblyman, the chief, and MP. Indeed, a participant specifically used 
the words ‘Common Vision’ (which originally came out of the FGD findings), 
which phrase has since been adopted by the research team, and could be used as a 
catchphrase to whip up public interest for the research findings. Participants further 
expressed their full support in rallying behind this leadership trio for any flood-risk 
management initiative. Based on this, we anticipate that stakeholders in any typical 
Ghanaian community would equally express similar willingness to collaborate.
It should be noted that the first SM in Sepe-Buokrom represented the first 
community platform where communities interrogated the idea that they can take 
responsibility for themselves to achieve flood-risk resilience. Going beyond the 
usual conversation that focuses only on the causes of flooding and government 
relief and support, this novel platform attracted publicity from electronic and print 
media in both the Kumasi Metropolis and across Ghana.
At the second SM, which was largely attended by assemblymen (Figure 6.6), 
the discussion focused on issues around how the assemblymen as elected com-
munity leaders regarded the community’s expectation that the leadership trio (i.e., 
themselves, the MP, and chief) should initiate flood-risk management initiatives.
Manually analysing the data from this meeting, we divided the results into three 
thematic categories: 1) leadership for the common vision; 2) community role; and 
3) the role of government institutions.
Leadership for common vision
Results highlighted issues around the expectation that the assemblyman should 
take the lead role in mobilizing and addressing community development, as such 
initiatives are often seen as threatening both to the MP’s political career and to 
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traditional authority. As a result, it is unlikely those latter two stakeholders will 
cooperate, for fear of being unseated. Similarly, the assemblymen also believed 
that the level of recognition they receive in the community can be perceived as 
undermining the chief’s role, resulting in traditional leaders ignoring assembly-
men’s advice on land-use issues in particular.8 In other words, one of the key 
‘leadership trio’ actors expected to drive the common vision expressed scepticism 
concerning their ability to play that role. It was therefore suggested that joint 
meetings of the leadership trio would be fundamental to driving any ‘Common 
Vision’. Recommendations were also made for the Manhyia9 palace directorate to 
host similar forums and discussions. This could leverage support from the King 
of the Ashanti Kingdom (Ashanti Region of Ghana), and therefore from numer-
ous chiefs, to delve deeper into these issues, particularly addressing the lack of 
collaboration between key role players.
While we expected the leadership trio to operate from a common vision on 
all aspects of community development, including flood-risk management, the 
feedback we received – at least from the perspective of the assemblymen – 
contradicted this assumption. As previously noted, assemblymen lack direct 
access to funds that would allow them to take bold initiatives specific to their 
electoral areas. As such, it was suggested that an appeal be made to Parliament to 
review the allocation and use of the District Assembly Common Fund, to legally 
accommodate assemblymen. An alternative proposal was the establishment of an 
‘Assemblymen’s Common Fund’, to enable assemblymen to access resources for 
community development projects.
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Figure 6.6 Participant Affiliations in the Second Stakeholder Meeting
Source: Authors
170 Divine Ahadzie et al.
Following the SMs, these issues continued to be discussed in the media, includ-
ing suggestions that government should consider implementing a 5% fund for 
assemblymen (Graphic Online, 2018). All of this shows the contribution co- 
produced research can make to the national discourse.
The community role
The role of communities was another key theme to emerge from the second SM. 
Participants expressed the belief that the spirit of social responsibility, which 
previously existed in Ghana’s urban communities, needs to be reawakened. For 
instance, communal labour, which used to happen in most communities, no longer 
occurs. Most urban communities in Ghana today do not see communal labour 
or community and developmental challenges as their responsibilities, but rather 
those of the state and its agencies. Linked to community participation, stakehold-
ers advocated for a scheme to train community-based volunteers in flood-risk 
management skills. These include but are not limited to pre-flood planning and 
flood clean-up. Participants also suggested training in the construction of sim-
ple flood defences; swimming and rescue measures; and preparation of flood-risk 
maps. Participants also discussed assemblymen’s limited regulatory and enforce-
ment authority when it comes to ensuring that communities adopt and adhere to 
resilience initiatives for flood management.
Currently Ghana lacks any Flood Control Act that could guide either Devel-
opment Control Officers operations, or the specific roles and jurisdiction of 
assemblymen, including how they might enforce or regulate community-based 
flood-resilience activities. Participants indicated that if such a framework existed 
and informed community members of their rights and responsibilities when it 
came to flood resilience initiatives and actions, the people would play their part.
The role of government institutions
The last theme that emerged from the second SM was the role of government 
institutions in aggravating the flood problem. Specifically, respondents noted that 
development engineers and planners in local government departments contribute 
to the problem by approving permits for construction in low-lying areas suscep-
tible to flooding. Respondents further indicated that the District Assembly itself 
refuses to act, even when such cases are reported by assemblymen or community 
members. These factors coupled with rent-seeking by government officials can 
result in permits being wrongfully allocated. The performance and ethics of local 
government officials were also discussed, followed by calls for appropriate pen-
alties for officials found guilty of collusion with developers seeking to build in 
low-lying areas.
Data from the second SM also concluded that assemblymen needed to advocate 
harder for better collaboration between the various institutions (e.g., the NADMO, 
the Lands Commission of Ghana, the Engineers Unit of the Metro-works 
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Department) at assembly meetings, in the interest of promoting community resil-
ience. It appears that local government officials fail to fully recognize the impor-
tance of risk communication, which continues to be played down (cf. Ahadzie & 
Proverbs, 2011), all of which reflects local government’s relative weak apprecia-
tion for the importance of engaging communities in disaster risk management (cf. 
Terumoto, 2006; Chong et al., 2018).
Reflections of the Kumasi CityLab
This section highlights the reflexive discourse, examining the enablers of success 
for the community engagements, including the FGDs and SMs, as well as the 
challenges and prospects of promoting a CRF for flood-risk management.
Enabling factors
Previous CityLab experiences advocate for a good relationship and rapport 
between CityLab stakeholders (Patel et al., 2015). This is to engender trust and 
reciprocity, which are required for successful co-production of knowledge (ibid.). 
Fundamental to the success of the Kumasi CityLab project was our ability to iden-
tify key stakeholders, which was possible due to our prior engagements (e.g., with 
Sepe-Buokrom’s assemblyman) and our development of new networks (e.g., with 
NADMO officials and the presiding member of the KMA). From the very onset, 
the project identified key actors (the assembly member and NADMO officials) 
with whom future partnerships were developed. The core principles underpinning 
these relationships were trust, transparency, embrace and respect for diversity, 
enhanced inclusivity, flexibility, and accessible communication.
The importance of taking the time to foster good relationships was seen in our 
research coordinator’s engagement with the Sepe-Buokrom assemblyman. A con-
tinuation of the relationship we had developed with him due to a previous study 
in 2016 (see Ahadzie et al., 2016), this relationship played out over the course of 
preliminary meetings (in which we explained the purpose of the project, its ben-
efits to the community, and the role he was expected to play in making the project 
a success), right through to the second SM in August 2018. The assemblyman’s 
interest in the project came from a desire to find solutions to the serious problem 
of flooding confronting his constituency, the success of which also could win him 
more credibility and political visibility. This long-term process not only enabled 
support from the assemblyman and his unit committee (UC) members from the 
onset, but also helped put the community at ease, which translated into people 
willingly making themselves available to listen to our aims and objectives, and 
then participate in the study.
Although serving the same electoral area, the assemblymen and UC members 
generally operate independently of each other (Figure 6.3). If not carefully man-
aged, this separation could create problems for community engagement project 
like ours. However, bringing both parties on board from the project’s beginning 
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led to one of the Kumasi CityLab’s biggest findings, which is that to influence the 
level of community participation in flood-risk management and community-based 
resilience initiatives, early identification of and engagement with the assembly-
man and his office as a key stakeholder are vital.
Due to the assemblyman’s active participation, the research team was able to 
identify and mobilize participants for the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and 
the first Stakeholder Meeting (SM) at Sepe-Buokrom. Similarly, the researchers 
relied on the presiding member10 of the General Assembly to attract assembly-
men to participate in the second SM in August. Our engagements with the presid-
ing member took place in early July 2018, and were made possible during prior 
relationship-building with the NADMO officials of the KMA.
Regarding NADMO, we found that recognition of NADMO’s expertise was 
all the incentive needed to acquire their full participation in the project, which 
opened the way for frank discussions about the support and expertise they can 
offer towards developing a CRF. NADMO further helped to organize the second 
SM (where the NADMO Director of the KMA also made a presentation support-
ing the project). It is clear that NADMO now appreciates the need for bringing 
on board communities confronted with flood issues, and they have recently par-
ticipated in radio discussions to whip up citizen participation for developing flood 
resilience. This recent sensitization effort is new, and could be attributed to the 
CityLab engagements discussed in this chapter.
In sum, our research team’s outreach efforts with the community’s assembly 
members and opinion leaders played a critical role in successfully securing par-
ticipants for all sessions, and making the best use of those sessions. When plan-
ning the FGDs, the research team successfully identified participants’ livelihood, 
sociodemographic, and economic situations within the various groupings so that 
our subsequent discussions on the impact of floods were relevant to participants’ 
actual livelihoods, activities (in small-scale businesses or school), and gender 
issues. With this information in hand, the research team was better able to provide 
the most appropriate presentation to best engage with participants based on their 
individual situations, which was key to the success of the FGDs. For instance, 
based on what we knew about participants, we chose to show videos of flooding 
in Ghana and other parts of the world as part of the FGDs, which helped meet the 
needs of the varied stakeholders, including the schoolchildren (cf. Pasquali, 2007)
The primary aim of the Kumasi CityLab was to create a space for knowledge- 
exchange and experience-sharing between different stakeholders, with the further 
goal to produce knowledge that could serve to ignite continued collabora-
tion between the different entities involved. Based on feedback from both the 
research team and CityLab participants, this objective was largely met. The 
research process provided a rich source of information about Sepe-Buokrom, 
uncovering important nuances, like the community’s diversified nature based on 
ethnic lines, apparent tensions between two chiefs, and various perspectives on 
the potential for and challenges to successfully implementing a CRF for flood-
risk management.
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Our research also proved the value of using an Audio-Visual presentation 
during all FGDs and SMs, given the extent to which it engaged participants’ 
attention and sparked interest in the discussions that followed. In particular, par-
ticipants at the first SM deeply appreciated the visuals showing how devastating 
the impact of flooding can be, and requested copies for further engagements in 
their respective constituencies. All of these engagements gave the research team 
much deeper insight both into how individuals cope with flooding, and how there 
is a lack of collective engagement in terms of addressing flooding issues at the 
community level.
Participants of both SMs also commended the CSS and its research team for 
hosting this series of community engagements to tackle the problem of flooding 
in Ghana. The presiding member commented that the CityLab approach diverts 
attention from the ‘populist approach’ favoured by government functionaries (e.g., 
ministers of state). Mainly focusing on (admittedly much-needed) relief items and 
structural demolition, that approach is viewed by many Ghanaians as motivated 
more by the desire to win political favour than it is to address the root causes of 
and problems resulting from flooding. Moreover, demolition work is rarely car-
ried through to completion, often ceasing with the end of the rainy season. By 
contrast, the CityLab approach offers a more socially, environmentally, and politi-
cally sustainable way of mobilizing the community to change mindsets and take 
initiative independently of government action. Participants therefore encouraged 
the CSS to continue educating the various stakeholders involved in promoting this 
sustainable community-based approach to flood-risk management.
Challenges
The nature of CityLabs as spaces where people from different backgrounds come 
together inherently makes them difficult to navigate. Other researchers have 
pointed to challenges ranging from micro-politics to time and budget constraints 
(Brown-Luthango, 2013; Anderson et al., 2013). The cannot be underestimated 
and should be factored in when doing this kind of research. The Kumasi CityLab 
process took place over one year, during which time we were able to build fruitful 
collaborations with the Sepe-Buokrom assemblyman and other key stakeholders. 
However, dynamics not uncommon to working in informal settlements (e.g., ad-
hoc and impulsive decisions, and a general lack of adherence to time management 
principles) greatly affected meeting schedules (e.g., the commencement of the 
FGDs, as originally planned with the assemblyman). On four separate occasions 
(both before and then once during the FGDs), the assemblyman had to cancel 
attendance because of suddenly being called to emergency meetings at the District 
Assembly. Social gatherings in the community such as funerals also interfered 
with scheduling, as the assemblyman’s position in the community obliges him to 
attend such functions.
When planning the second SM, we invited the MPs from the Kumasi metropolis 
who oversee communities deemed flood-prone. Mindful of their busy schedules, 
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our invitations and interview questions were sent well ahead of the August meet-
ing, but not a single RSVP was returned. Although we made several efforts to 
retrieve interview data from the MPs offices in the metropolis, we did not receive 
a single response.
As per feedback from the first SM documented here, it was suggested that 
the leadership trio (assemblyman, chief, and MPs), among others, should col-
laborate to support the Common Vision to help build the community’s interest 
in social responsibility for a CRF for flood-risk management. After the first SM, 
efforts by the research team to bring these three personages together with other 
major stakeholders to deliberate on how best to advance a vision of community-
based flood-risk management were made. Unfortunately, the inability to sched-
ule a joint meeting with the chiefs and MPs meant that none of them attended 
the second (and final) SM in August. Finally, lack of time and the need to meet 
reporting deadlines prevented the research team from effectively monitoring and 
evaluating the project, and conducting follow-up initiatives for the project’s third 
‘Closure’ phase.
Prospects
Our reflections as documented in the enablers and challenges earlier conclude that 
it is indeed possible to achieve a shift in the way we conduct research with com-
munities, such that community members go from being research subjects to equal 
partners in knowledge production. While there is increasing interest and experi-
ences of such approaches, this remains a novel approach to research in Ghana. 
However, such a shift requires that the communities and other relevant stakehold-
ers are involved in every stage of the research process.
While the Kumasi CityLab project achieved its goal of creating a space for 
different stakeholders to engage with community-based responses to flood-risk 
management and also set the stage for future community-engaged collaborations, 
it was unsuccessful in bringing the MPs and chiefs together to these engagements. 
Also, much of our success was based on the cultivation of a long-standing rela-
tionship, which may not be possible in every instance.
Other studies have shown the potential of co-production in the field of climate 
adaptation as a way to influence decision-makers and bridge the gap between 
research and policy in Africa (Steynor et al., 2016; Ziervogel et al., 2016). This is 
imperative for meeting both global and local development goals on community 
resilience for climate adaptation in more structural and sustainable ways.
As part of the project’s Closure Phase, our intention was to capture the knowl-
edge shared during the FGDs and SMs in a document to be shared with a wider 
audience. Although we have not yet been able to complete that document, we 
have prepared a proposal to expand the CityLab, as per the request from the 
Kumasi MCE (political leader and head of local government). Meanwhile, a 
September 2018 exhibition of KNUST College Activities caught the attention of 
the Ashanti Regional Minister, who then invited the CSS to discuss with him 
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the expansion of the work. Additionally, the assemblymen who participated in 
the second SM have strongly advocated for multi-stakeholder/joint stakeholder 
engagements with the MPs and chiefs, which would significantly advance the 
agenda of CRFs for flood-risk management.
As noted, the presiding member commended the CSS research team’s proposed 
approach to tackling flooding problems in Kumasi. He observed that the community- 
mobilization approach redirects public attention from a focus on demolishing 
structures to finding risk-management methods that are more socially, environ-
mentally, and politically sustainable. Praising this approach, he suggested that 
stakeholders start thinking about which measures could be put in place to help 
manage flooding without focusing solely on demolition. Similarly, the Kumasi 
MCE and the Metropolitan Director of the National Disaster Management Organ-
ization called for this type of engagement to be extended to the rest of Ghana.
The KMA is in the process of executing an MOU with the College of Art and 
Built Environment/KNUST, which the CSS project discussed here was funda-
mental in engendering. One major area of interest for this MOU is the creation 
of a multi-stakeholder platform for the discussion of flood-risk management in 
Kumasi. Engagements are also ongoing with other local governments, and it is 
envisaged that the successful uptake of this CityLab’s methodology and results 
will provide the necessary leverage for extending the flood-risk management 
agenda at the regional and national level.
Conclusion
Flooding has become a major threat in cities around the world, including in Ghana. 
While structural measures are critical, nonstructural measures that focus on miti-
gation and especially adaptation are also essential. This CityLab research engaged 
a flood-prone community to contribute to the development of a framework for 
implementing community-led resilience and flood-risk management initiatives.
FGDs and consultative SMs with the community and opinion leaders brought 
together a wide array of community interest groups, including religious leaders, 
teachers, civil society groups, community leaders, and representatives from tra-
ditional leadership and political parties. The project’s objective – to empower 
and create awareness within the community concerning its own responsibility to 
develop and act on a common vision for mitigation and coping strategies that can 
minimize the impacts of flood hazards – was met.
Three key themes emerged from our community engagements: 1) leadership 
is key, 2) the community/residents must embrace initiatives, and 3) loyalty, com-
mitment, and togetherness are prerequisites for successful community resilience 
frameworks (CRFs).
The project affirmed the key roles played by the leadership trio (assembly-
man, chief, and MP) in mobilizing the community to manage and increase its 
own resilience to flood risk. It also affirmed that collaboration between this trio 
is key to developing and implementing a common vision and programme of 
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community-based flood-risk management. Additionally, the project found that 
residents are ready to work towards achieving flood resilience if the leadership 
trio plays its role.
Through the project, it also emerged that:
To influence the level of community participation in flood-risk management 
and community-based resilience initiatives, there needs to be an in-depth under-
standing of the workings of local governance structures, including traditional 
authorities. Hence, early identification of and engagement with the assemblyman 
and his office as a key stakeholder is vital. Further:
• Joint meetings of the leadership trio will be fundamental to driving any 
‘Common Vision’, and assemblymen need to advocate harder for better col-
laboration between the various institutions.
• More public forums and engagement with other stakeholders and chiefs are 
needed to help drive a change in mindsets about how to adapt to flood-risk 
through CRFs. Recommendations were made for the Manhyia palace directo-
rate to host such forums and discussions, which, it is expected, would lever-
age support from the King of the Ashanti Kingdom.
• Political rivalry among the leadership trio (assemblymen, MP, and chief) is 
a barrier to success, as strong collaboration between that trio is fundamental 
to mobilizing community support for community adaptation to flood risks. 
Additionally, nuances in community dynamics (such as diversity along ethnic 
lines) and apparent tensions between two rival chiefs are also worth noting.
• Given the strategic and close role of the assemblymen to the community, the 
assemblymen’s lack of access to resources to help facilitate engagements is 
highly problematic, but could be addressed through measures such as the 
establishment of an ‘Assemblymen’s Common Fund’ for community devel-
opment projects. It was also suggested that an appeal be made to Parliament 
to review the allocation and use of the District Assembly Common Fund.
• The CityLab approach diverts attention from the ‘populist approach’ used by 
government functionaries, and offers a more socially, environmentally, and 
politically sustainable way of mobilizing the community to change mindsets 
and take initiative independently of government action.
• Public interest in the project’s stakeholder engagements was remarkable, 
with the project attracting a great deal of publicity in radio, television, and 
print media.
Future research and practical actions
The Kumasi CityLab project has demonstrated both the importance of adopting 
a community resilience approach for flood-risk management in Ghana, and the 
readiness of stakeholders to assume their respective roles. It also has demon-
strated the benefits of knowledge co-production among various stakeholders in 
flood-risk management in Ghana, and has led to CRF development assuming a 
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national dimension, with a number of other local government areas requesting the 
CSS to engage communities within their jurisdictions by holding similar forums.
Reflecting on our findings, the research team suggested that the House of Par-
liament play a lead role in making community-based flood-risk management part 
of the national agenda, by proposing a bill for a Flood Control Act in Ghana. 
Flood risk in Ghana by all accounts is a grave national threat, and in June 2019, 
the House of Parliament requested the Minister of Works and Housing to pro-
vide a national plan for addressing floods in the country (Citifm Online, 2018). 
Such legislation not only would help make this issue a national priority, but also 
would assist in the implementation and enforcement of an integrated flood-risk 
management framework, including aspects relating to community resilience. All 
of this would support community members in learning what they can do for them-
selves regarding flood-resilient construction and adaptation, without flouting the 
law. Meanwhile the CSS continues to work to create a broader platform for this 
national conversation on engendering a community-based flood-risk management 
agenda. For example, on 22 May 2019, we were invited by a local FM station to 
share lessons on the Kumasi CityLab project, with the resulting sound bite aired 
the following day on Ghana’s most popular radio station, Joy 99.7 FM/Luv 99.5 
of the Multimedia Group Ltd.
Notes
 1 As of June 2019, new regions have been created out of the original ten, meaning Ghana 
now has 16 administrative regions.
 2 The KMA was formerly comprised of nine sub-metros, but due to reforms in the gov-
ernance structure within the last couple of years, it now comprises five sub-metros, 
including Manhyia sub-metro.
 3 Opinion leaders are leaders of interest groups in the community who command respect 
and are influential in decision-making within the community.
 4 The assemblyman and unit committee members will be referred to collectively as 
assemblyman/assemblymen. Assemblymen can be either men or women, but in the 
case of Sepe-Buokrom, the assemblyman is male.
 5 The assemblyman is required to regularly brief his electorate on the general decisions 
of the Assembly and its Executive Committees, including the actions taken to solve 
problems raised by residents in his electoral area.
 6 Under Function 3(e) of the District Assemblies in the Local Government Act 462.
 7 DACF is a Development Facility allocated to MMDAs to supplement their revenue 
base to enable them implement planned projects and programmes in their respective 
communities (Ankamah, 2012). It is backed by Act 455, 2003 of the 1992 Constitution 
of Ghana, and Parliament annually makes a provision for its allocation. Members of 
Parliament are given a share of the fund to undertake development projects in their 
respective constituencies.
 8 In the Ashanti region of Ghana in particular, chiefs are custodians of the land, a 
resource that is at the centre of infrastructure development and its associated floods in 
many parts of Kumasi.
 9 Manhyia as used here refers to the overlord Chief Palace for the Ashanti Kingdom in 
Ghana. All chiefs in the Ashanti region (including Kumasi and the study area) owe 
allegiance to the occupant of Manhyia, who is the King of the Ashantis. There is a 
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suggestion that if the overlord’s support is brought into the picture, it would provide 
much-needed attention for chiefs (in the metropolis in particular) to embrace this 
flood-risk management initiative.
 10 The presiding member is an assemblyman elected by the house to lead the District 
Assembly, and also acts as the Chairman of the general assembly.
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7  Housing for whom?
Rebuilding Angola’s cities after 
conflict and who gets left behind
Allan Cain
Introduction
Following a civil war of nearly three decades, the period after the 2002 peace 
accords saw oil-producing Angola become Africa’s fifth-biggest and fastest-
growing economy. Between 2004 and 2008, Angola’s GDP surged by an average 
of 17% a year, topping 22% in 2007. With foreign investment rising at a rate of 
more than US$10 billion a year, and GDP per person tripling by 2012, Angola 
has been heralded as one of Africa’s economic successes, at least until the global 
slump in oil prices in 2014 (The Economist, 2012). At the same time, decades of 
rural-urban migration have turned Angola into one of Africa’s most urbanized 
countries, with 62% of its population living in cities (UN-Habitat, 2014). As a 
result, public demand for housing and services in Angola’s cities is enormous. 
This is especially the case in the capital of Luanda, which counts an estimated 
8,000,000 inhabitants – about a third of the country’s total population. With an 
average annual growth rate of 5.77%, Luanda’s population is set to continue to 
increase over the next decade, making it a ‘megacity in waiting’ (UN-Habitat, 
2014, p. 192; see also GoA, 2016b).
While the country’s exploding post-war economy impacted the Luanda real 
estate market’s higher end through the construction of new suburbs and gated 
communities, it bypassed informal settlements. Over two-thirds of Luanda’s resi-
dents continue to live in shelters that are self-built with people’s own resources 
and savings, often with a lack of adequate and affordable basic public services, 
and on land for which they do not have formal titles. In an effort to address the 
country’s housing shortfall, in 2009 the Angolan government launched the coun-
try’s first Urbanization and Housing Programme (PNUH) with the goal of build-
ing 1,000,000 housing units through construction by the state, private sector, and 
cooperatives, as well as by supporting self-help building through the provision 
of titled land, infrastructure, services, construction material, and technical sup-
port. In doing so, the PNUH represents not only an important pillar of Angola’s 
post-war reconstruction efforts, but also an important instrument in implementing 
a range of global agreements ratified by the Angolan government. These include 
the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), replaced in 2015 by the Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as the New Urban Agenda (NUA), 
adopted at the third UN Human Settlements Conference in 2016.
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Since its inception, significant public resources involving a range of different 
actors have been invested into the PNUH. However, the government’s imple-
mentation of the PNUH generally, and the extent to which it has effectively pro-
vided housing for the urban poor or met the principles and objectives of global 
urban development agendas, have not been well monitored. This chapter presents 
research conducted by the NGO Development Workshop (DW) on Angola’s 
PNUH. The research builds on decades of action research conducted by DW 
among peri-urban communities and informal settlements, as well as its monitor-
ing of the implementation of global agendas at the Angolan government’s request.
The chapter starts with a review of housing policy, practice, and research in post-
war Angola, before moving to the work of the DW, its approach to co-production, 
and its role in monitoring Angola’s implementation of global policy agendas. 
Based on the lessons learned from these experiences, and using a variety of partic-
ipatory tools and methods developed therein, the study presented here assesses the 
outcomes and beneficiaries of the PNUH’s different sub-programmes, comparing 
their outcomes to those from the ‘social production of housing’ (i.e., built without 
state support) as well as slum upgrading. The chapter concludes by proposing 
principles to inform more sustainable and inclusive approaches to Angola’s moni-
toring and implementation of the NUA and other related policy agendas.
Context
Housing policy, practice, and research in post-war Angola
Angola’s civil war left almost all its infrastructure, both rural and urban, in ruin. 
Peace in 2002 liberated financing for reconstruction, and the country’s natural 
resources and booming economic growth attracted loans from both traditional 
Western donors as well as new emerging powers such as China, which offered 
deals with few strings attached. As the country’s cities had rapidly grown dur-
ing its war years, peace brought a strong public demand for urban renewal, basic 
public services, and housing for all. Post-conflict public policies committed to 
meeting these demands included the adoption of an official housing policy in 2006 
(Resolution 60/06), which guaranteed the universal right to housing, followed by 
a Framework Law for Housing (Law 03/07), as well as programmes to provide 
‘water for all’ and strategies to combat poverty, promote local development, and 
strengthen local government.
The housing sector was officially prioritized with the country’s first National 
Urbanization and Housing Programme (PNUH), which was announced on World 
Habitat Day 6 October 2008, just after the country’s first post-war elections, in a 
public meeting attended by UN-Habitat’s then-Executive Director, Anna Kamu-
julo Tibaijuka, and long-standing President José Eduardo dos Santos.
At the time of the Programme’s official launch in 2009, the Angolan Ministry of 
Urbanism and Housing estimated the country’s shortfall of housing to be almost 
2,000,000 units. Meanwhile, the National Institute of Statistics estimated that 
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90% of existing urban housing was substandard and needed substantial invest-
ment to upgrade it to acceptable living standards (GoA, 2009). It was envisioned 
that by the next elections in 2012, PNUH would reduce housing deficits by at least 
50% through an accelerated programme, using financing from the petroleum sec-
tor along with credit-lines from China (Croese, 2012).
While the plan was to promote urban development (including slum renewal), 
the only clearly articulated targets were around housing unit numbers. The 
PNUH divided the responsibilities for meeting housing targets among a range 
of housing providers, with the state taking on 11.5%, the private sector 12%, 
cooperatives 8%, and (state-directed) owner-builders assuming the major 
share of 68.5% of housing to address the nation’s unmet need for shelter. By 
2012, little progress had been made in terms of implementation, and the dead-
line was again extended to the following election of 2017. Meanwhile, the 
burden of Angola’s accumulation of foreign debt from expenditures on hous-
ing construction and expensive high-profile projects financed through Chinese 
and Israeli oil-backed credit lines became heavier in the face of steep eco-
nomic decline due to plummeting oil prices from 2014 (Benazeraf & Alves, 
2014; Macauhub, 2019). Further, highly centralized state structures meant that 
public programme implementation was often poorly coordinated with local 
government and lacked transparency. As a result, few targets were met and/or 
reached their intended beneficiaries.
Scholarly criticism of the governance and outcomes of post-war housing poli-
cies in Angola has focused on lack of transparency around finance for housing 
construction, and the slum demolitions accompanying urban renewal (Rodri-
gues & Frias, 2015; Gastrow, 2017; Waldorff, 2016). While such critiques are 
important, most of this work has focused on selected housing projects or specific 
moments in time. Moreover, the majority of this work was produced for the pur-
pose of contributing to academic debates, rather than the practical improvement 
of the implementation of housing policies. In contrast, the work of DW is situated 
at the interface between research and policy.
Our research approach is premised on the principals of co-production, which 
can refer to partnerships or collaborations between the state and society in the 
realm of services (Ostrom, 1996), knowledge (Polk, 2015), or policies (Durose & 
Richardson, 2016), and with a view to producing more inclusive and sustainable 
outcomes. The need for and benefits of co-production in Angola emerges – as 
in many other places in the global South (Joshi & Moore, 2004) – in a context 
of weak state capacity. However, whereas in other countries grassroots-led co-
production between state and society has represented a route to political power, 
influence, and transformation (Mitlin, 2008), civil society in Angola – with its 
legacy of long-term conflict and decades of authoritarian rule – remains relatively 
weak. As such, DW has played an important role in facilitating collaborations 
between state and civil society.
In the early 1980s, at the government’s request, DW started working in 
Angola to assist in developing policies and programmes for human settlements 
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and self-help housing. In the decades that followed, DW adopted a strategy of 
supporting and working together with Angolan civil society, community-based 
organizations, and local governments in areas ranging from infrastructure and 
basic services to community economic development, through research, practice, 
and advocacy on land titling programmes, water and sanitation committees, and 
micro- and housing finance (Cain, 1986; Cain et al., 2002; Cain, 2007, 2010).
Our research tools and methods include participatory mapping tools, GIS-
enabled surveys, and data collection involving local government officials, civil 
society organizations, and community associations through training and capacity 
building, as well as the organization of Municipal Forums as spaces for delibera-
tion. Much of the work at the community level engages individuals and commu-
nities that are often very vulnerable, naturally wary of any change, and likely to 
feel they lack the power to improve their lives. As such, trust building is a critical 
aspect and outcome of this work. Involving local municipal administrations and 
community associations in community research has contributed not only to bet-
ter understandings of the intentions behind the work, but also to a local sense of 
ownership of the data and knowledge produced.
DW has integrated the approaches described earlier into our partnerships and 
collaborations with different state agencies in the monitoring of the implementa-
tion of global development agendas. In doing so, we seek to generate evidence 
that is co-produced and co-owned, and therefore capable of contributing to better 
policies and practices.
Monitoring global policy implementation in Angola
In 2006, UN-Habitat and the Angolan Ministry of Urbanism and Environment 
requested that DW lead the creation of the Angolan National Urban Observa-
tory. This Observatory was one in a network of National Urban Observatories 
piloted to undertake work as part of the Global Urban Observatory (GUO), set 
up in 2001 by UN-Habitat, following the second UN Human Settlements Confer-
ence, or Habitat II. Taking place in Istanbul in 1996, the Habitat II conference 
had launched the ‘Habitat Agenda’, a collaborative approach to realizing sustain-
able human settlements and ‘adequate shelter for all’ through existing and new 
partnerships at the international, national, and local level (UN-Habitat, 1996). 
The purpose of the Observatories was to help governments, local authorities, 
and civil society organizations monitor the Habitat Agenda through the devel-
opment and application of policy-oriented urban indicators and urban statistics. 
By integrating the targets and indicators of the UN Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) in this work, the Observatories could simultaneously inform the 
implementation of target 11 of the MDGs: to significantly improve the lives 
of 100,000,000 slum dwellers by the year 2020. A network of National Urban 
Observatories was piloted to undertake this work, creating local focal points for 
urban policy development, planning, and collaboration among policymakers, 
technical experts, and civil society. Local Urban Observatories were also created 
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to coordinate capacity-building assistance and to compile and analyse urban data 
for national policy development (Ferreira et al., 2012).
As part of its inception, DW worked to build capacity at the Angolan National 
Institute of Territorial and Urban Planning (INOTU) and among provincial and 
municipal staff in the country’s major urban centres in four provinces (Luanda, 
Huambo, Benguela, and Namibe). In the course of this work, DW built impor-
tant partnerships with local civil-society poverty networks and community-based 
organizations to participate in data collection using MDG indicators. A number 
of important lessons can be drawn from this work. Most international agencies 
and many governments publicly committed themselves to the MDGs, which in 
some cases resulted in improved outcomes. For instance, the MDG of signifi-
cantly improving the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers translated into 
increasing the proportion of that population with secure tenure. However, aside 
from improving the lives of slum dwellers, the MDGs lacked adequate focus on 
urban issues, in part because of policymakers’ then-common misconception that 
urban poverty was much less serious than rural poverty, and thus had little rel-
evance to MDG achievement. The MDGs have further been criticized for being 
too narrow in focus, and too often determined by ‘external’ experts in a top-down 
manner, not reflective of local needs and priorities, and thereby producing unin-
tended outcomes, especially for the urban poor (Satterthwaite, 2003; Meth, 2013; 
Fukuda-Parr, 2014).
Following our work establishing Angola’s National Urban Observatory, the 
Angolan Ministry of Urbanization and Housing requested in 2015/2016 that DW 
lead the consultative process preparing the country’s National Report to Habitat III 
in Quito, which would measure the country’s achievements against commitments 
made to the 1996 Habitat II Agenda. A key finding in our analysis of the Habitat 
II Agenda process in Angola was that the MDGs’ relevance for Angola’s urban 
populations was compromised by inaccurate statistics, inappropriate criteria, and 
the use of unsuitable income-based poverty indicators (GoA, 2016a). These find-
ings coincided with Satterthwaite’s (2003) conclusions that MDG indicators were 
overly focused on deliverables from the national government – neglecting the 
investments and ingenuity that low-income groups and their organizations make. 
Monitoring efforts also were reliant on conceptually flawed indicators (especially 
the dollar-a-day poverty line), or ones for which the ‘official’ data was inconsist-
ent or inaccurate (i.e., if an income-based poverty line was set too low, poverty 
would statistically disappear). In Angola, the validity of that ubiquitous indica-
tor for measuring who qualified as income poor – i.e., the dollar-a-day poverty 
line – proved inappropriate for assessing the scale of urban poverty, as much of 
the urban population faces particularly high costs for non-food necessities as the 
combined result of being a post-conflict and resource-rich but highly dependent 
import economy (Soares de Oliveira, 2015).
While globally conceived indicators were measured nationally in physical 
terms, particularly regarding access to basic services, little attention was paid to 
the inequalities in power, incomes, and asset-bases that generally underpin the 
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lack of those basic services. For example, access to water was judged only on 
the basis of distance to a well or standpipe, with no attention to water quality, 
ease of access, regularity of supply, or cost. The Observatory noted such issues 
in Angola, where there is a general lack of available data measuring things like 
who has access to ‘safe water’ or adequate sanitation. Further, the Observatory 
found that many urban dwellers who did live close to water mains had no means 
to utilize them, as waterlines bypassed them, being channelled to new up-market 
real-estate projects. Finally, impacts that were difficult to measure – such as more 
accountable local governance, protection of civil and political rights, and greater 
possibilities for community-designed, managed, and monitored initiatives – were 
neglected. Thus, MDG monitoring ignored realities like the fact that many of the 
poor in Luanda’s inner city lived with the constant threat of eviction from the land 
they occupied for housing.
Fortunately, the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 
New Urban Agenda (NUA) adopted in 2016 were developed using lessons drawn 
from the problems encountered in monitoring the MDGs (Fukuda-Parr, 2016). 
This includes a more participatory approach to the conceptualization of the goals 
and agendas, and more qualitative targets and indicators through extensive con-
sultations in the run-up to the adoption of the SDGs. While there are still chal-
lenges and shortcomings in both the SDGs and NUA (Klopp & Petretta, 2017; 
Caprotti et al., 2017), the SDG monitoring framework reflects a move to more 
adequate measurement of the implementation of urban policies and plans, while 
the NUA puts National Urban Policies centre stage in terms of achieving urban 
development that is both inclusive and sustainable.
Monitoring Angola’s national urbanization and housing  
programme (PNUH)
In spite of the government’s laudable and ambitions aims, the PNUH was ini-
tially developed without any plan for how to monitor and measure progress on 
its implementation. Moreover, the housing challenge was essentially seen as a 
numeric deficit, which would be solved once new houses were added to the exist-
ing housing stock, and with little regard for local realities and needs around the 
quality, access, and affordability of housing. Moreover, when the State’s national 
PNUH programme identified four sectors as key actors in supplying housing, lit-
tle information was available about the capacity and past performance of these 
actors. This was particularly the case for cooperatives and owner-builders, who 
together were tasked to deliver three quarters of the envisaged housing. Addition-
ally, how these actors were to mobilize financing for housing had not been consid-
ered prior to launching the PNUH.
DW’s work on the assessment of Angola’s PNUH built on our experience of 
research co-production, considering the lessons from earlier monitoring pro-
jects, including the experience and shortcomings gleaned from the process of 
monitoring the Habitat II Agenda and the MDGs. To develop the framework, 
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DW quantitatively compared the results of PNUH-supported programmes (i.e., 
state, private, cooperative, and state-directed owner-builder efforts) with those 
of a slum upgrading component of PNUH’s programme, as well as with owner-
builder ‘social production of housing’. This latter term is described by the Habitat 
International Coalition as ‘all non-market processes carried out under inhabitants’ 
initiative, management, and control, that generate and/or improve adequate living 
spaces, housing, and other elements of physical and social development, prefer-
ably without – and often despite – impediments posed by the State or other formal 
structure or authority’. In other words, builders who received no PNUH (state) 
support.1
Further, we developed the framework used here with the aim of going beyond 
a merely quantitative analysis, to gain a more comprehensive understanding 
around the beneficiaries of urban interventions, with a focus on the urban poor. 
Participatory research methods were crucial in this regard, and all research tools 
were developed and conducted in collaboration with local municipalities, civil 
society organizations, and community associations. In doing so, the methodology 
engaged both community members and municipal authorities in the co-production 
and co-ownership of data on their neighbourhoods.
Amongst the research instruments employed were a poverty scoring meth-
odology and a housing client study, which are discussed in the following 
sections.
Methodology and tools
Poverty scoring methodology
An important dimension of the data collection was the measurement of poverty 
scoring that allowed us to identify the economic level of beneficiary families. 
In 2017, 58% of the Angolan population was living below the poverty line of 
US$1.90 per day (CEIC, 2018). The Traditional Poverty Line assessments used 
in the monitoring of the MDGs greatly overstated income poverty in rural areas, 
while understating it in urban ones. For our monitoring framework, we therefore 
wanted to use a poverty ranking system adapted to local conditions and reflec-
tive of a household’s capacity to access housing and basic urban services such as 
water, sanitation, and transport.
DW collaborated in constructing a Poverty Scorecard, which is an easy-to-use 
tool for monitoring poverty rates and tracking changes over time in order to target 
services for the most vulnerable groups (Schreiner, 2015). Poverty scores vary 
from 1 (most likely below the poverty line) to 100 (least likely below the poverty 
line). Indicators are non-financial, including easy-to-validate household assets, 
housing conditions, and access to water and sanitation services. The scorecard’s 
bias and precision are tied and weighted directly to indicators set by the National 
Statistics Institute in the Integrated Household Survey conducted in 2008–2009 
with support of the World Bank and UNICEF (GoA, 2009).
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Since 2015, community groups working with DW have collected scorecard 
question data on a biannual basis to monitor changes in local poverty indicators 
over time. The scorecard can measure individual households, or be aggregated 
geographically to assess a whole community’s trajectory over time, into or out 
of poverty. Scorecard data can be mapped in relation to access to basic services 
such as water (Figure 7.1), and used in Municipal Forums and Councils, provid-
ing evidence for civil society and community organizations advocating for more 
equitable access to basic services and public investments.
Housing client study
DW also conducted a household client study to understand how clients from dif-
ferent sectors accessed and financed their housing. The household study assessed 
the level of urban basic services that each household was supplied with, and the 
mechanisms that families used to acquire these services.
Using questionnaires (which included the poverty scorecard questions described 
earlier), focus groups, and key informant interviews, the household client study 
was able to determine how the four PNUH sectors performed in delivering social 
housing for the urban poor. The methodology further provided social and eco-
nomic data from questionnaires to help assess householder satisfaction, housing 
affordability, and level of service access.
In implementing the housing client survey, the research team enumerators (from 
both the community and local administration) worked with slum communities in 
Luanda to collect household data through the questionnaires using mobile-enabled 
Android tablets equipped with global positioning capabilities that can plot data in 
Google Maps. Such maps differ from paper maps in their greater spatial accuracy, 
permanence, authority, and credibility with authorities and communities.
Findings
In the following sections, we summarize the results of our 2016 analysis of the 
performance of the four housing sectors the PNUH was mandated to support (i.e., 
the state, the private, cooperative, and state-directed owner-built), and comple-
ment this with our research on interventions in the area of urban renewal and 
in-situ informal area upgrading, as well as on the social production of housing.
The public housing sector
Thanks to the PNUH, by 2016 the State had built 151,800 publicly funded units, 
mainly through contracts with foreign private companies, including the Chinese 
firms, CIF and CITIC, and KORA, an Israeli company. As part of the PNUH’s 
public housing commitment, municipalities were supposed to build a total of 
26,000 houses (200 houses per municipality in 130 districts). National firms and 
joint ventures were eligible to compete for the municipal sub-programme’s public 
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tenders, but in the end, only about 10,000 units were completed, meaning that less 
than 7% of the publicly funded units were built by local companies.
The most significant state contribution under PNUH was in the construction of 
‘new urbanizations’, mostly in the form of ‘centralidades’, or public housing con-
structed on state land reserves. Each providing housing for at least 2,000 families 
(mainly intended for civil servants and middle-income clients), state-built cen-
tralidades or ‘new town centres’ were built by foreign firms in the five provinces 
of Cabinda, Uige, Huambo, Huila, and Namibe by the end of 2014.
The model for the centralidades was Angola’s largest and most famous pub-
lic housing investment: the Kilamba New City project, a mixed-use develop-
ment built by CITIC, a major Chinese company. Delivering over 20,000 units 
of housing for more than 160,000 people, Kilamba was funded by Angola’s 
first Chinese credit line for a purported cost of US$3.5 billion. Its first phase 
was completed in 2012 and included 750 apartment buildings, with initial 
selling prices from US$120,000 to US$200,000. In an effort to stimulate sales 
in early 2013, government introduced a subsidized ‘rent-to-purchase’ scheme, 
with an annual interest rate of 3%, and the cheapest units selling price reduced 
from US$120,000 to US$84,200. This scheme brought apartment owner-
ship within the reach of middle-level civil servants with monthly salaries of 
US$1,500 or greater. With the introduction of successive subsidies however, 
any expectation of recovery of the state’s investment in the PNUH by the sale 
or rental of housing was effectively abandoned (for more on Kilamba, see 
Cain, 2014; Cardoso, 2016).
Figure 7.2 Kilamba New City in Luanda, China’s Largest Housing Project in Africa
Source: Moreira, 2012
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Figure 7.3 Private Condominium Atlantico do Sul in Belas Municipality, Luanda
Source: www.wikimapia.org/p/00/00/54/61/45_big.jpg
The private sector
Although the private sector was envisioned as a key partner in the delivery of 
PNUH’s national housing targets, a history of war and rigid economic controls 
meant that markets were still at an early stage of development. Private real estate 
enterprises and construction companies thus looked to the state rather than to 
markets for financing, focusing almost exclusively on the market’s upper end, and 
whenever possible, entering into public-private projects on the condition that the 
state provide access to land.
The State’s PNUH housing strategy specified that the private sector deliver 12% 
of the total targeted number of houses constructed. Under the PNUH, private- 
sector housing was to be financed via several mechanisms, including public- 
private partnerships, small-scale provincial and municipal home-building pro-
jects, and private contractor access to credit through Angolan banks, which could 
in turn draw financing from the Housing Development Fund.
Under the banner of ‘Public-Private-Partnerships’, the private partner takes the 
role of constructor and/or manager of state-financed projects. Government allo-
cated a budget for the construction of 200 housing units for each of Angola’s 18 
provinces. Occupying land designated under the Land Reserve programme, these 
units were to be distributed to the various municipalities depending on need, and 
tendered out to local contractors.
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Of the 120,000 dwellings that the private sector was supposed to build under 
the PNUH, only 12,756 units – 10.6% of the target – were actually constructed 
solely by private sector parties. Meanwhile, nearly 40% of the private sector target 
(45,600 units) was delivered through public-private partnerships or by contractors 
to provincial governments (GoA, 2016a, p. 73). The State also financed homes 
built by private foreign companies under the Programme; these units accounted 
for nearly 30% of the total private sector target, and though built by foreign com-
panies, they failed to attract overseas direct investment (ODI).
Meanwhile, private financing focused on building the market’s high end, rather 
than developing social housing. As a result, upper- and middle-class housing has 
been oversupplied, with many of these developments remaining unoccupied. 
Private banks remain reluctant to invest in the social housing sector without the 
protection either of a ‘mortgage law’ or transferable land titles to act as bank 
guarantees. The oversupply of high-end housing, which was often constructed 
with expensive loaned capital, has resulted in commercial banks taking ownership 
of much of this surplus unoccupied stock after investors defaulted on their loans.
Housing cooperatives
Housing cooperative legislation was drafted for the first time in 2010. It includes 
provisions for exempting cooperatives from paying any tax on their finan-
cial transactions, and requires state assistance in making land available from 
government-designated land reserves for housing with basic infrastructures properly 
installed, and swift issuance of the necessary surface rights, subdivision licenses, 
and construction permits. The draft law provisions preferential funding for coop-
eratives with at least 100 active members. The law further states that houses within 
the cooperative may be classified as individual or collective property, and that the 
prices of houses must correspond to the sum of the following values: cost of the 
land and infrastructures; cost of the studies and projects; cost of the construction 
and complementary equipment; administrative and financial costs related to the 
execution of the works. However, this legislation has yet to be implemented, as it 
lacked the publication of specific bylaws and regulations.
As a result, cooperatives were one of the weakest sectors in delivering hous-
ing units within the PNUH. By 2018, of the 80,000 units targeted for 2015, only 
12,608 were built. This poor delivery was due to the fact that cooperatives provid-
ing low-cost housing require dedicated access to land and ongoing financing to 
succeed (Cain, 2017a, p. 12).
Housing cooperatives in the PNUH were not granted the promised concessions 
in relation to land, thereby creating a bureaucratic bottleneck that has resulted in 
long lead times in acquiring land. Inadequate training of cooperative members in 
leadership positions led to a lack of administrative and management capabilities 
in the processes and operations of housing cooperatives. Difficulties relative to 
access and mobilization of funds have been created by the following interrelated 
factors, such as unfavourable repayment period, the unwillingness of banks to 
grant mortgage loans, and the unwillingness of the National Housing Investment 
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Figure 7.4 Lar do Patriota, the Most Successful Housing Cooperative in Luanda
Source: www.wikimapia.org 1097180
Fund to provide loans. In addition, due to the failure to finalize the publication of 
the draft legislation discussed earlier, housing cooperatives do not yet qualify for 
tax exemptions or incentives, as they are still classified as business enterprises.
State-directed self-built housing
The state-directed, self-built housing sub-programme (auto-construção dirigida) 
was conceived as a key component of the PNUH, and more than two-thirds (68.5 % 
or 685,000 units) of the government’s target of 1,000,000 homes was to be met 
through this modality. The programme promised to ensure the availability of 
affordable building materials so that homeowners in both urban and rural areas 
could construct their own homes. This programme’s targeted beneficiaries were 
supposed to be owner-builders from low- and middle-income classes.
Of the total 685,000 units envisaged, over 60% (420,000 units) were to be built 
in urban areas. Planning to implement a total of 164 self-build urban municipal 
projects nationwide, the government was to supply all 18 provincial capital cities 
with infrastructure networks for water and electricity and community facilities, 
as well as a total of 100,000 hectares of land from state land reserves. The state-
assisted self-build programme aimed to ensure the availability of construction 
materials (in the form of construction kits), and to provide architectural plans and 
technical guidance. Assistance and guidance from the state was to involve the pro-
vision of water and electrical infrastructure, formal urbanization plans, building 
plots with titled occupation documentation, house design, and technical support 
for construction. The programme also was to promote the use of local construc-
tion materials, to improve public health conditions through the installation of 
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adequate sanitation, and to respect traditional aspects of architectural design and 
cultural values.
A variation on the self-build model that provides an alternative to delivering 
completed houses is the ‘casa evolutiva’, or an upgradeable modular house that 
was piloted in a few communities. Here the state constructed the foundations, 
two divisions, and a sanitary block, and left the homeowner to further develop 
the house (i.e., build a kitchen, bathroom, and one or more bedrooms) when the 
necessary resources became available (Figures 7.5 & 7.6).
Implementation of the assisted self-help housing programme has been slow 
because of the lack of local capacity in the municipalities to issue the large num-
ber of land surface-rights titles and building licenses that the programme requires. 
Although 131,624 plots were laid out, by 2018 only 12,906 were built on under 
the PNUH framework, and few had received basic water services and road 
infrastructure.
In-situ slum upgrading vs urban renewal
The PNUH included an urban renewal provision to renovate (‘requalificar’) or 
redevelop musseques – the informal settlements that house more than half of 
Luanda’s population – to promote the legal ownership of land, reduce densities, 
and improve housing conditions (GoA, 2016a, p. 49).
The ‘requalificação’ procedure involves changing the status of the land from 
‘informal or illegal’ into land with regularized tenure and basic services. Said to 
have been successful in Singapore and São Paulo, the strategy involves tempo-
rarily removing resident slum populations to a nearby site, and destroying exist-
ing housing to make space for the construction of new multistorey housing. The 
model is envisioned as a cycle of phased, sustainable actions that are self-financed 
through the sale of the land made available through the greater densification of 
occupation.
In late 2010, a Presidential Decree (266/10) established in Luanda a special 
‘Office of Urban Reconversion of the Cazenga Municipality and both Sambizanga 
and Rangel Districts’ (GTRUCS) to pilot the musseque requalificação. Requalifi-
cation also intends to consolidate and urbanize the musseques, incorporating peri-
urban areas into the process by: legalizing already occupied land; conducting an 
economic valuation of musseque residents’ homes; and installing missing public 
infrastructure and social services.
Under PNUH, the implementation of slum requalificação projects was envi-
sioned as a public-private partnership, where private investors delivered the 
housing construction component, and government installed infrastructure. The 
GTRUCS Master Plan included the construction of water supply networks and 
roads, drainage for sewage, and public lighting and signalling. The plan was 
designed in accordance with international standards, with 55% of areas intended 
for housing, 30% for public roads, and 15% for social facilities and green spaces. 
The plan included building 4,038 dwellings, a mixture of houses and apartments.
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Figure 7.6 Incremental (Upgradeable) House in Zango
Source: GoA, 2016a, p. 70
The reality of requalificação slum redevelopment, as seen in Luanda’s old 
inner-city musseques, is that the approach has forcibly removed long-term resi-
dents, destroyed their housing, appropriated their land for new housing or com-
mercial development, and permanently relocated them to the city periphery. The 
first and only requalificação project was implemented in Bairro Marconi in Ngola 
Kiluange District (Cazenga Municipality), using a public-private partnership with 
the Israeli company KORA. The project built 480 dwelling units in four-storey 
walk-up blocks in Bairro Marconi. However, as these units remained largely unoc-
cupied by 2020, a housing client survey could not be conducted. It remains to be 
assessed if this requalificação model successfully provided the former musseque 
residents with improved housing conditions and at what cost.
Meanwhile in 2010, Brazilian advisors had introduced an alternative slum-
upgrading approach. Focused on in-situ upgrading of urban infrastructure ser-
vices and housing, the ‘Favela-Bairro’ model has been piloted by GTRUCS in two 
districts in Luanda. DW carried out a housing client study in the Tala Hady Barrio 
(Cazenga Municipality), where one of these pilot ‘Favela-Bairro’-style upgrading 
projects was implemented.
A working-class neighbourhood in an area regularly affected by flooding each 
rainy season, Tala Hady’s environmental conditions had deteriorated signifi-
cantly since its original settlement in the late 1960s. The upgrading of drainage, 
road paving, and the provision of water and electric services were completed 
by GTRUCS without the displacement of existing residents. Utility service fees 
were introduced, with billing for water and electricity consumption on a monthly 
basis. Waste collection – made possible for the first time (even in the rainy sea-
son) thanks to improved access – was cross-subsidized through a surcharge on 
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electricity invoices. In 2014, an urban real estate tax was introduced to generate 
local income for improving municipal infrastructure.2 Tala Hady residents them-
selves financed and carried out the upgrading of their houses, which sometimes 
involved densification of use of the site. Improvements included the construction 
of backyard rental units, and the occasional vertical extension of a second floor.
Using the poverty scorecard tool, we were able to rank the Tala Hady neigh-
bourhood population in order to estimate the affordability of this in-situ upgrading 
approach for residents. Most residents were shown to be lower-paid workers, with 
monthly household incomes between US$ 300–400, living close to or below the 
poverty line.
The social production of housing
Traditional building – construction by people undirected or assisted by the govern-
ment’s PNUH – continues apace in most urban centres across the country. That said, 
this activity largely depends on the informal sector for inputs of land, labour, and 
materials, and carries on without the benefit of subsidies, formal planning, or legal 
land allocations. Housing constructed with neither state engagement nor private sector 
investment remains largely unrecorded, and is poorly documented in Angolan official 
statistics. However, social production by owner-builders, or through the collective 
action of communities, accounts for a significant portion of all housing in Angola. 
Social production (by people or communities) may use informal sector mechanisms to 
acquire land and employ labour, but also sometimes relies on formal bank loans from 
consumer financing facilities, but these are not recorded as housing credit. Unable to 
access the lower rates usually applied to housing loans, owner-builders must pay the 
very high interest rates attached to such consumer loans. While foreign companies 
Figure 7.7 Ranking of Household Income in Tala Hady Barrio-Upgrading District
Source: Author
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delivered most of the formal housing built under the PNUH, the social production of 
housing employs mainly local, small-scale builders and individual tradespeople. The 
Angolan National Housing Directorate estimated that each self-built house created 
1.22 jobs, which means the social production of housing created 266,500 new jobs 
during the period from 2009–2015 (GoA, 2016a).
The National Statistics Institute demographic and census data estimates the 
total number of new households created during the PNUH period (2009–2015) 
at 428,426, of which nearly half were constructed through social production. In 
other words, housing constructed without the support of the Angolan State or 
private investors has delivered some 205,512 units, of which about 13,000 were 
built on land acquired from the state (Table 7.1). This number represents almost 
the same volume delivered by all other sectors combined (at 220,672 units).
Figure 7.8 Unassisted Self-Help, Owner-Built Housing on the Periphery of Luanda
Source: Cain, 2013, p. 25
Table 7.1 Showing the comparative performance of housing sectors
PNUH players Planned targets Achievements  Results 
against
Units Percentage Units Percentage planned
of total of planned
State public housing 122,000 12.2% 151,800 1244% Exceeded 
target
Private sector 115,000 11.5% 45,600 39.7% Disappointing 
results
Cooperative housing 80,000 8% 10,366 13% Poor results
State-directed 685,000 68.5% 12,906 1.9% 131,624
owner-built Lots laid-out
PNUH total 1,000,000 100% 220,672 22% 33.9% if lots 
are counted
Social production 205,512  Unplanned
Source: Author’s construct3
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Analysis and reflections: who has benefited from PNUH?
Based on our assessment, the following findings can be highlighted:
• The state-built sector accomplished significant delivery of housing, exceed-
ing its goal, but also consuming the majority of funds. Despite the 2007 cre-
ation of a Housing Development Fund (FFH) for ‘all public, private, and 
cooperative entities that promote the construction of social houses and for 
citizens in general’, the state ultimately consumed most of the earmarked 
public budget investments to build its ‘centralidades’ or satellite cities.
• The private sector’s results largely overlapped with those of the state, due 
to poorly articulated divisions of responsibility between actors in so-called 
public-private partnerships.
• The cooperative sector performed poorly.
• The PNUH’s real failure was its lack of financing and support in land regu-
larization for owner-builders, who were responsible for delivering about two-
thirds of the PNUH housing, but achieved less than 2% of that.
• Finance from commercial banks proved difficult to raise for the private sec-
tor, cooperatives, and owner-builders alike. So far, banks have approved 
fewer that 10% of applications, mostly because they cannot provide loans to 
applicants lacking clear demonstration of land title.
• Aside from a few pilot interventions, the PNUH effort had little impact on infor-
mal settlements, or ‘musseques’, where over half of Luanda’s population resides.
We applied our poverty scorecard tool to household client surveys across all of the 
PNUH housing typologies studied, as well as residences benefiting from the in-situ 
slum upgrading programme, and housing built through social production (using 
non-state and/or informal-sector resources). Figure 7.9 maps the results of this 
analysis, demonstrating who benefits from state housing investments in Angola.
Figure 7.9 Ranking of Household Income Against Housing Typologies
Source: Author
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Using the World Bank’s ranking (2018) of the poor (those earning less than 
US$1.90 per day), the vulnerable ($1.90 to $11.00), the middle class ($11.00 to 
$110.00 per day), and the wealthy (above $110), the graph correlates those catego-
ries with our poverty scorecard’s decile system, relating those rankings to prob-
able annual household incomes.
The graphic demonstrates that the population benefiting from state housing 
subsidies built into the PNUH are almost exclusively in the top 30% of the wealth 
scale, all of whom are considered to be middle class or above. In other words, by 
2016, the PNUH only reached a third of its 1,000,000 intended beneficiaries, and 
almost none of the bottom-of-the-pyramid target community. The few households 
that benefited from the pilot slum upgrading project in Tala Hady district could 
be classified as ‘vulnerable’. Few if any families living below the poverty line 
benefited from state housing subsidies, and most of those depended on informal 
sector rentals or the social production of their own housing, using family or com-
munity resources.
While demonstrating that few of the urban poor benefited from Angola’s major 
budget allocations to the PNUH, this research also draws attention to the Pro-
gramme’s failure to lay the groundwork to fulfil commitments made to the NUA’s 
goal of building sustainable and equitable cities that leave no one behind. Even 
Angola’s nascent housing construction sector seemed to have been ‘left behind’ 
in the PNUH. Indeed, our second major finding was that the international pri-
vate sector was the major beneficiary of construction contracts from the Angolan 
State’s PNUH. Despite its overwhelming construction needs after 27 years of war, 
Angola has failed to exploit its housing demand as an opportunity to develop 
competitive construction-sector expertise. Angolan firms could have benefited 
from government support to reach higher levels of performance; for example, 
being offered better access to credit, services, and training. Demands to use local 
contractors were made, but even on smaller projects this rarely happened. Mean-
while, government decision-makers argue that foreign firms are often more com-
petitive in terms of offering better ‘value for money’ (Søreide, 2011). As a result, 
relatively little employment was created by the PNUH, as foreign companies 
brought their own skilled technicians, and government only belatedly set quotas 
for engagement of local companies (30% subcontracts), technology transfer, and 
national labour.
Additionally, despite being initially promoted as social housing, our research 
demonstrated that most of the housing built under PNUH was too expensive for 
the majority of the population. As a result, the state had to draw additional funds 
from its housing budget to subsidize the units to make them affordable, even for 
upper- and middle-level civil servants. State-delivered subsidized housing has 
satisfied an important segment of the middle-class and better-paid civil serv-
ants, offering a rent-to-purchase opportunity to acquire their units over a 20-year 
time frame. Meanwhile, a further subsidy embedded in the mortgage rate (3%, as 
opposed to the 15% market rate) ensures that the PNUH housing will continue to 
drain state budgets for years to come.
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In sum, under the PNUH, the state reassumed its role as both developer and 
landlord (a position it had relinquished in the 1990s when attempting to privatize 
the housing sector), resulting in a saturation of the high end of the housing mar-
ket, and a failure to deliver to the majority of the population at the ‘bottom of the 
pyramid’. While the PNUH created high expectations among lower-paid work-
ers and the economically active urban poor – all of whom hoped to benefit from 
subsidized social housing as their civic right – the housing shortfall still stood at 
1,224,514 units in 2015 (GoA, 2016a).
Conclusions: towards a new approach  
to (re)building Angola’s cities
With a weak culture of systematic evaluation of project performance after project 
completion, failure to draw lessons learned for future projects has become a pat-
tern in Angola. DW’s ongoing research in Angola seeks to redress this problem by 
partnering with communities and local government actors in the critical monitor-
ing of the state’s urban policies and programmes using co-production tools.
Having determined that an adequate monitoring framework needs to go beyond 
tracking housing delivery numbers, we more specifically wanted to measure the 
extent to which the implementation of the government’s PNUH policies was 
addressing the housing needs of the poor. Additionally, given the PNUH’s over-
reliance on conventional housing solutions, we saw the need to examine how 
the state can better support the social production of housing, and also explore 
different means of improving informal settlements to make Angolan cities more 
inclusive and ensure that the urban poor are not left behind.
The dramatic fall of petroleum prices from 2014 resulted in a substantial con-
traction of the Angolan economy. The PNUH’s continuing reliance on foreign 
contractors has contributed to Angola’s US$43 billion debt, of which more than 
half is owed to China.4 The housing contractor market’s dependence on govern-
ment contracts means that, with state budget cuts, payment delays have hit the pri-
vate sector hard. This is particularly true for small- and medium-sized enterprises. 
It is clear that the government will be unable to provide investment and subsidies 
to continue building new housing in the same form and at the same pace as before. 
It is likely that the state will therefore withdraw from its position as primary hous-
ing developer, instead focusing on creating an enabling environment for the pri-
vate sector and owner-builders. This must involve the reform and simplification 
of land administration (Cain, 2013) and the publication of legislation that would 
facilitate housing finance through a functional mortgage market (Cain, 2017b).
We found that the housing that is provided by owner-builders (i.e., social pro-
duction) is financed by family members, employers, or personal savings. Land for 
housing is procured on the informal property market, disqualifying builders from 
receiving bank loans. Land purchases are normally recorded with documents or 
contracts that do not have the legal weight of land titles. Often owner-builders sub-
sequently attempt to regularize their occupation through petitions to municipal or 
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provincial government administrations, a process that may take years to success-
fully secure legal tenure. In the meantime, housing is constructed incrementally 
and transacted through the informal market. A mechanism needs to be put in place 
to rapidly record, recognize, and legitimatize urban land occupations and housing 
construction that meets minimum standards, does not present environmental risks, 
and can be relatively easily provided with basic services. The research presented 
in this chapter provides evidence for civil society and consumer groups advocat-
ing for a ‘one-stop shop’ to facilitate the formalization of informal housing in 
Luanda and other Angolan cities.
Angola’s pent-up demand for housing means that the real estate market could 
still become an economic driver. Local construction companies securing more 
projects (as opposed to international developers) would represent a chance to 
increase employment figures. The potential for an increase in consumer pur-
chases also holds promise for Angola’s domestic industries. However, there can 
be no private real estate market without credit, and that credit needs to come from 
banks. According to the National Bank of Angola (BNA) data, commercial banks 
reject 86% of housing loan applications (Corrrêa, 2015). Without access to credit 
and the formal mortgage market, poor households will be forced to continue pro-
ducing housing on their own, and they will be restricted to using their own savings 
and loans from family and friends.
Recommendations and additional research
Using sustained and co-produced research from the ground via our housing client 
study and poverty scorecard methodology, this study examined all sectors partici-
pating in the PNUH, including slum upgrading and owner-builders, thus provid-
ing a comparative framework to assess who benefits from the PNUH’s different 
urban strategies. We hope that our results will feed into the Angolan public policy 
debate on how to best achieve global policy goals, and that the tools developed 
and utilized here will be employed in the ongoing monitoring of Angola’s imple-
mentation of these goals to help ensure that the urban poor are not left behind. 
Specifically, we note the following opportunities for improved policies and fur-
ther research:
• Efforts to decentralize state power, finances and decision-making have 
accelerated since 2018. Although it is unlikely that local elections intended 
to create and empower new municipalities will take place as promised in 
2020 (or before the next legislative elections of 2022), the future imple-
mentation of the NUA will depend on the effectiveness of these theo-
retically empowered municipalities in developing plans for urbanization; 
transparently managing land, housing, and public utilities; and finding a 
way for local citizens to participate in budgeting processes. Both to sustain 
themselves and to satisfy their constituents’ demands, Angola’s municipali-
ties will need to be able to capture income through the offering of affordable 
urban services.
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• Urban development and infrastructure for housing in Angola could be 
financed, at least in part, by capturing the increases in land value resulting 
from public investment in tenure regularization. Land-based financing is an 
opportunity for raising the revenue necessary to provide key public services 
and improvements in urban infrastructure and services. However, land infor-
mation systems need to be strengthened and based on fiscal cadastres and 
valuation estimates. This means land information systems need to provide 
updated data on land occupation, use, and values. Our work has demonstrated 
that this is the kind of information that can be co-produced in participation 
with communities using innovative mapping tools.
• Urban land reform and the approval of legislation on mortgages that has 
been long stalled in parliamentary committees must both be key parts of a 
new approach to housing. Innovations in housing finance that are linked with 
land tenure security and accessible to lower-income groups (such as housing 
micro-finance) must be piloted, and funding mechanisms established to bring 
them to scale quickly.
Notes
 1 See www.hic-gs.org/document.php?pid=2438
 2 The Urban Real Estate Tax ‘Imposto Predial Urbano’ was published as part of a tax 
reform under the Presidential decree N° 155/10 on the 28 of July 2010, but only enforced 
from 2014.
 3 Based on data presented by the Ministry of Territorial Planning and Housing at the Con-
sultative Council Meeting in Soyo, 12 April 2018.
 4 The Angolan Finance Minister announced on 4th September 2018 that Angola’s debt to 
China was US$23 billion.
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Towards a research agenda  
for knowledge co-production  
in Urban Africa
Sylvia Croese
This book brings together contributions from researchers and practitioners across 
Africa to provide insight into some of the continent’s most pressing urban devel-
opment challenges, including infrastructural inequality, affordable housing, cli-
mate resilience, and food security. The chapters show how African cities – ranging 
from small, peri-urban areas to entire mega-city regions – are at the coalface of 
such challenges. Central to all the cases is the disjuncture between policy and 
practice, often resulting from contrasting needs, understandings, and interests that 
guide the actions of both states and citizens. This disjuncture produces complex 
spaces and arrangements in which formal plans and policies are intertwined with 
informal actors and practices that are in turn strongly shaped by local histories 
and politics.
Taken together, the complex reality of contemporary governance in African 
cities has a daily impact on the degree to which cities and communities are safe, 
inclusive, resilient, and sustainable, and able to meet local and global urban devel-
opment goals. The need for knowledge that engages meaningfully with this com-
plexity and is capable of capturing the finer and often shifting grain of informal 
systems and actors is urgently needed to inform improved policies, governance, 
and urban development planning. By bringing together multiple actors and per-
spectives to examine and address these challenges and their different manifesta-
tions in eight African cities, the collection’s authors created new spaces and entry 
points for knowledge sharing, production, and experimentation. This concluding 
chapter reflects and builds on those contributions, with the aim of outlining a 
research agenda to guide ongoing and future knowledge co-production in urban 
Africa.
Practising knowledge co-production in urban Africa
There is no single definition of knowledge co-production, and much of the lit-
erature on co-production still focuses on the co-production of services (Mitlin & 
Bartlett, 2018). Moreover, while there is increasing interest and work on transdis-
ciplinary knowledge co-production, particularly in the field of (urban) sustainabil-
ity, this still remains a novel approach to research in Africa, with the exception of 
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South Africa (Swilling, 2014).1 As such, this collection’s main purpose and con-
tribution is to share its experimental practice of alternative and innovative forms 
of knowledge generation through co-production in urban Africa.
Most of the chapters in this volume follow a CityLab approach, broadly under-
stood as the creation of deliberative spaces aimed at enabling dialogue between 
different urban actors and stakeholders. As such, many of the researchers con-
ducted multi-stakeholder roundtables, meetings and workshops, municipal fora, 
learning labs, and policy dialogues. Other research methods included secondary 
literature review, participatory mapping, personal interviews, focus group dis-
cussions, GIS-enabled surveys, direct observations, as well as quantitative data- 
gathering methods.
To ensure the inclusivity and relevance of the research, all of these tools and 
methods included a vast range of stakeholders, from city and other (local) govern-
ment officials, traditional leadership (chiefs), community leaders, and political 
party representatives, to local community organization representatives, business 
owners, and ordinary citizens, including youth. As a process-driven enterprise, the 
undertaking of urban knowledge co-production required not only the cooperation 
of stakeholders, but also their inclusion as equal research partners with invaluable 
perspectives. In most cases, the research also necessarily included activities rang-
ing from community sensitization, stakeholder mapping and identification, and 
other preparatory meetings in the inception phase, to end-of-project stakeholder 
meetings and presentations as part of the research completion phase.
In addition to the chapters that focus on knowledge co-production within 
individual cities, a number of chapters focus on co-producing knowledge across 
geographical boundaries by comparing different cities within the same country 
(Chapter 3) or across national borders (Chapter 5). These comparative studies 
intend to offer yet another way of generating questions and insights to contrib-
ute to the construction of new ‘South-South’ knowledges, outside of the tra-
ditional paradigms of research practice and thought. While both singular (i.e., 
looking at one case city) and comparative modes of knowledge co-production 
offer productive avenues for rich insights into local realities, they are not with-
out their challenges. The chapters here show that when working within a single 
local community, challenges related to (the lack of) trust between and among the 
varied urban stakeholders and complex local governance structures operating in 
that space can pose significant barriers. This dynamic was particularly notable in 
instances where power is practised and shared by numerous actors both in and 
outside of formal state structures (e.g., political parties and traditional authori-
ties). Meanwhile, when engaged in comparative urbanism research, other practi-
cal challenges emerged, such as dealing with differences in definitions (e.g., of 
informality), expectations, and data sources and reliability from city to city.
Taken together, the chapters in this volume show the need for much more con-
scious reflection on the specific challenges involved in co-producing knowledge 
in urban Africa in order to come up with definitions and methods that are suitable 
and appropriate to Africa’s context-specific local realities. In doing so, there is 
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much to be built on in terms of the different exercises of adjustment and experi-
mentation that the researchers in this book demonstrate to have undertaken in 
responding to and overcoming their respective sets of local challenges.
As the authors of Chapter 2 argue when writing about Lusaka’s Soweto Mar-
ket, the complexity of local governance structures has tangible consequences for 
the extent to which stakeholders can freely participate in (spaces of) governance, 
including spaces of knowledge co-production. Researchers thus must have the 
knowledge, intuition, and skills required to navigate and manage such spaces. 
As such, the ability to assess the degree of ‘freedom’ needed for participants to 
express themselves, and/or create conditions to facilitate the co-production pro-
cess are crucial, and will mean different things in different contexts, as is also 
demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 6 (Thika and Kumasi).2
With these concerns in mind, the authors of Chapter 2 describe how they chose 
to ‘separate political leaders from the administrative staff of the Lusaka City 
Council during the two CityLabs held on Soweto Food Market, in order for them 
to engage more freely’ (my italics). Similarly, the authors of Chapter 4 on land 
sharing in Thika describe how workshop participants were chosen ‘by gender and 
age, creating one workshop for women, one for youth, and one for men. The aim 
[being] to enable optimal engagement in a free atmosphere, and to better capture 
divergent and sometimes gender-specific tenure issues’ (my italics). Workshop 
participants in Sepe-Buokrom in Kumasi, Ghana were similarly divided into 
groups based on age, gender, and power of authority in order for participants to 
express themselves freely (my italics). Despite these efforts, certain hierarchies 
persisted even within the groupings (e.g., ‘queen mothers’ within the women’s 
focus group in Kumasi, and representatives of the chief in the men’s group). That 
said, researchers continued to do what they could to ensure participants’ comfort 
and ability to express themselves, as was seen in the Kumasi CityLab, where the 
local language (Twi) was used as the medium of communication during all focus 
group discussions at the community level for maximum participant involvement 
and understanding (Chapter 6).
The meaning and impact of such adjustments and interventions cannot be taken 
for granted, and depend on researchers being both in tune with local realities 
and flexible enough to adjust and switch gears when needed. There is a need for 
further analysis of the ‘practice of best practice’ as used throughout the continent, 
and the kind of tactical knowledge that underpins such work (Bulkeley, 2006). 
Such analysis would provide an important basis for further experimentation, 
learning, and theorization of alternatives to universal ‘best practices’ of knowl-
edge co-production based on local experiences in urban Africa (Patel et al., 2015), 
as well as for a research agenda that can support and strengthen such endeavours.
Towards a research agenda
Existing practices of knowledge co-production in urban Africa show the impor-
tance of experimentation and innovation with alternative forms of knowledge 
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generation. These are not limited to crossing societal, disciplinary, linguistic, sec-
toral, or geographical boundaries, but also include the use and mixing of new 
technologies to support ‘citizen science’ (West et al., 2020).
How can the experience gained, the knowledge applied, and the social capital 
built in co-production experiments by both researchers and co-production part-
ners be harnessed? How can an explicit link to policy formulation and imple-
mentation be made? And how can sustained modes of collaboration be forged in 
order to build a lasting bridge between research and policy? These are some of the 
questions that we hope this collection catalyses researchers and urban practition-
ers to explore further.
Supporting the role and capacity building of researchers
Most of the contributors to this book have a vast wealth of knowledge and research 
experience, which we argue is a vital asset in navigating the complexity of knowl-
edge co-production processes. Many of the authors refer to the importance of 
continuous engagement with stakeholders, as well as the neutral positionality of 
the researchers as partners, in order to build and maintain trust. The consequence 
of these deliberate efforts is the creation of an atmosphere conducive to participa-
tory and inclusive dialogue (Chapters 4 on Thika and 7 on Luanda). In addition, 
the authors stress the ability to identify key actors with whom future partnerships 
could be developed (e.g., Chapter 6 on Kumasi) – a type of tacit relational knowl-
edge that is acquired through years of experience and practice rather than the 
application of scientific or academic protocols.
How can such roles be better supported, and how can the knowledge created 
in these processes be captured and passed on to new generations of researchers? 
Importantly, the Centre for Urban Research and Planning at the University of 
Zambia (Chapter 2) and the Centre for Urban Research and Innovations of the 
University of Nairobi (Chapter 4) are members of the Association of Africa Plan-
ning Schools (AAPS), which intends to transform urban planning education and 
practice in Africa by equipping up-and-coming urban planners with the relevant 
skills and methodologies to address the challenges facing the African city. As 
demonstrated across the different chapters in this volume, this is crucial work – 
not only for research to more effectively contribute to participatory and inclusive 
community plans and policies, but also to strengthen the research-education nexus 
(Duminy et al., 2014).
Engaging knowledge co-production partners
The chapters in this book have illustrated the importance of relationship building 
and management in the knowledge co-production process. This not only was an 
essential research tool, but also in itself an important process that provided the 
researchers with deeper insight and understanding of the perceptions and experi-
ences of research stakeholders.
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The researchers in Kumasi, Ghana point to important nuances that were uncov-
ered through the co-production process used in focus group discussions and 
stakeholder meetings, such as the community’s diversified nature based on ethnic 
lines, apparent rivalry and tensions between local leaders, and various perspec-
tives on the potential for and challenges to successful implementation of a Com-
munity Resilience Framework (CRF) for flood-risk management (Chapter 6). 
Consciousness of these nuances and the ability to engage with them carefully and 
constructively allowed the researchers to contribute to building awareness within 
the community of its own ability to take initiative independently of government 
action. That said, despite efforts to ensure a gender balance in stakeholder groups, 
the group composition in this research was overwhelmingly male, with females 
constituting just over one third of the participants. According to the authors, this is 
reflective of the male-dominated nature of Ghanaian culture, particularly in areas 
of decision-making. This observation raises questions around how such percep-
tions can be overcome, and how co-production processes can be more inclusive 
of gender and age, as well as political and religious beliefs.
Working with numerous partners builds greater and more nuanced understand-
ing of the challenges faced by the different stakeholders. This is seen in the case 
of Zambian public servants who deal with the daily politics of urban markets, but 
also must strive to remain professional (Chapter 2) – an example that speaks to 
the plight of the countless public servants caught between the pressures emanating 
from failing market economy models playing out in constitutional democracies. 
The resulting conflicts and paradoxes of that dynamic are also noted in Chap-
ter 5’s comparative study of Johannesburg and Cairo, where ‘on one hand, [there 
is] the need for cost recovery, and on the other, a constitutional pledge guarantee-
ing citizens the right to these services – [a situation that] has led to a number of 
court cases’.
In some cases, the political weight associated with key challenges can mean 
that government officials feel they need to withdraw themselves from the work, 
as experienced by the authors of Chapter 4 working on the ‘the land question’ in 
Thika, Kenya – a question that was considered ‘too emotive to engage in during 
a campaign period’. In the same project, which examined the potential for land 
sharing in an informal settlement, the researchers also had to accommodate the 
high turnover of government officials, and the effects of shifts in political leader-
ship on potential gains made under previous administrations. The tension between 
the long-term process of knowledge co-production and short-term political cycles 
represents an often unavoidable barrier to extending co-production models to 
regional and national levels, and putting results to action.
Such barriers also point to the necessity of taking things like political elec-
tion cycles into account when planning research, and devising methodologies to 
engage high-level government officials and to mitigate against political influence. 
The case of Luanda (Chapter 7) is instructive in this regard. Working with both 
community members and local government officials through training and capac-
ity building for data collection, this co-produced effort contributed not only to 
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stakeholders having a better understanding of the intentions behind the work, but 
also to a local sense of ownership of the data and knowledge produced. Also 
seeking to fully engage focus group discussion participants in Kumasi, Ghana 
(Chapter 6), researchers note the positive impact of beginning all sessions with 
an audio-visual presentation of flood events, which moved participants to actively 
contribute to the discussions that followed. Whichever tools or methods were 
employed, all of the chapters in this volume repeatedly illustrated the vital impor-
tance of seeing co-production through to the end: that is, communicating and shar-
ing research results as part of community and stakeholder engagement.
The research-policy nexus
One of the key questions underlying and unifying this volume is how co-
produced research can be harnessed to inform both local and global develop-
ment policies and agendas. Here we must take care to not blindly mimic global 
agendas – that is, simply transposing them to the local level – but rather to 
critically evaluate the relevance and utility of these agendas, and accordingly 
change and adapt them where necessary. To that end, as was revealed by some 
of the research here, co-production represents a useful tool to localize global 
development frameworks such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
and New Urban Agenda (NUA). Notably, several chapters revealed important 
gaps and shortcomings of global and local development agendas, by highlight-
ing the importance of good land governance and well-functioning land adminis-
tration systems (Chapter 4), spatial and intra-city inequality (Chapter 5), and the 
importance of assessing the extent to which existing urban policies do not leave 
anyone behind (Chapter 7).
In critically interrogating development agendas at the finer grain of local-level 
real-world application and through the lens of a multitude of stakeholders, all 
chapters underscore the importance of the negotiated co-production of policy 
interventions, as opposed to policies that are either imposed from top to bottom 
(or vice versa) without taking into account the full spectrum of urban actors, as 
well as practices and systems of urban informality, that operate in African cities 
on a daily basis. As such, the authors of Chapter 3 argue for the adoption of an 
integrative policy approach that necessarily considers and builds upon the exist-
ing ways in which the formal and informal are both connected and disconnected 
across three cities in Egypt. Similarly, authors of Chapter 6 stress the importance 
of Community Resilience Frameworks (CRFs) for understanding how communi-
ties at high risk of flooding effectively perceive their own adaptive preparedness 
within a sub-Saharan West African context, and thus can devise local adaptive 
responses and systems to flooding. The implication here is that such ‘informal’ 
locally implemented and owned systems can integrate with and supplement more 
formal government initiatives to collectively help Ghanaian flood-prone commu-
nities to meet global goals and targets on community resilience for disaster risk 
management and climate change adaptation.
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In sum, much of the research from this volume both demonstrates the need 
and advocates for alternative policies that intentionally use the formal-informal 
interface as a key entry point to bridging the research-policy gap and advanc-
ing urban integration. However, understanding and mapping those entry points 
requires local knowledge, particularly of the informal, and we would argue that 
the acquisition of that knowledge is aided by co-productive methods and tools like 
the ones discussed in this volume.
Concluding thoughts
While interest in and experience of knowledge co-production in Africa is on the 
rise, it still remains a novel approach to research, and requires further support 
as well as theorization. The importance of such work cannot be underestimated, 
as when successful, CityLabs and other modes of knowledge co-production cre-
ate important alternative spaces for knowledge-sharing, participatory planning, 
and urban governance, thus representing an important vehicle by which to bring 
the wider community together in understanding the urban challenges that beset 
African cities. The use of co-productive methods also offers the opportunity to 
incorporate the voices and perspectives of communities who have routinely been 
forgotten in the quest for one-size-fits-all technical solutions to development chal-
lenges. That said, CityLabs are but one method that can be undertaken as part 
of knowledge co-production, and researchers must continue to deliberately and 
methodically engage with communities and a wide range of urban stakeholders to 
generate the kind of knowledge that is required to disrupt the power imbalances 
that continue to be the hallmark of citizen and state relationships in African cities.
Notes
 1 For a more detailed overview of knowledge co-production, see Chapter 1 of this volume.
 2 Notably, out of the six different countries covered in this book, only two (Ghana and 
South Africa) were considered to be ‘free’ as measured by the degree of civil liberties 
and political rights by the US-based NGO Freedom House at the time of completion of 
the work in 2019. Zambia and Kenya are considered as ‘partly free’, while Egypt and 
Angola are considered ‘not free’. See: https://freedomhouse.org/. By contrast, Chapter 5 
on Cairo and Johannesburg, shows that different degrees of freedom can still result in 
similar outcomes for the urban poor, as in both cities ‘mechanisms and modes of partici-
pation and engagement with the state are largely dysfunctional’.
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